AUTHOR
Aaron Norgrove

ABSTRACT

This paper emerges from the initial stages of research towards a Doctoral thesis in Sociology on practices of digital gifting in Online Communities. Specifically, the paper represents a series of preliminary theoretical reflections on one nexus of the wider debate over research ethics: the use of spatial metaphors in the conceptualisation of Internet social relations and the consequent impact of this conceptualisation on debates over the appropriate form that ‘ethical’ research should take.

Over the past decade, the issues of internet research and the ethical dilemmas (potential and actual) faced by those engaged in such research has grown significantly, in both volume and sophistication (see for example Johns, Chen and Hall, 2004), particularly in relation to the conceptualisation of, and research on, the different forms of ‘community’ that have emerged through the Internet. At the level of ontology, the theoretical conceptualisation and consequent debate over the definitions of online communities is indebted to accounts of community formulated prior to the emergence of the internet as a significant site of social relations. As Nils Zurawski (2002) has previously suggested, theories of space have a long history in the social sciences, and these theories have in turn influenced the conceptualisation of the Internet as a qualitatively different social ‘space’ that is characterised by historically-specific forms of social relationships. From Benedict Anderson’s ‘Imagined Communities’ to Manuel Castells’ ‘Space of Flows’, through to Hine’s (2000) suggestion that the internet ‘community’ transcends both online and offline spheres of experience and action, the spatial metaphor has played an important role in the production of academic discourse on the nature of the Internet and Internet Mediated Communication.

In terms of research practice, the use of spatial metaphors in the conceptualisation of OnliOver the past decade, the issues of internet research and the ethical dilemmas (potential and actual) faced by those engaged in such research has grown significantly, in both volume and sophistication (see for example Johns, Chen and Hall, 2004), particularly in relation to the conceptualisation of, and research on, the different forms of ‘community’ that have emerged through the Internet. At the level of ontology, the theoretical conceptualisation and consequent debate over the definitions of online communities is indebted to accounts of community formulated prior to the emergence of the internet as a significant site of social relations. As Nils Zurawski (2002) has previously suggested, theories of space have a long history in the social sciences, and these theories have in turn influenced the conceptualisation of the Internet as a qualitatively different social ‘space’ that is characterised by historically-specific forms of social relationships. From Benedict Anderson’s ‘Imagined Communities’ to Manuel Castells’ ‘Space of Flows’, through to Hine’s (2000) suggestion that the internet ‘community’ transcends both online and offline spheres of experience and action, the spatial metaphor has played an important role in the production of academic discourse on the nature of the Internet and Internet Mediated Communication.ne Communities has in turn, it is argued, influenced the framework of debates on Internet Research Ethics. For example Waskul (1996) uses the metaphor of the public park to draw the relationship between appropriate ethical practice in offline situations and their similarities with research on the internet. However, following Mihalache (2002) it is suggested that such arguments are undermined when one considers that the internet is qualitatively different from the pre-existing, metric and topological spaces that characterise the offline world. Just as the emergence of urban centres lead to the development of a qualitatively different set of experiences from rural modes of life, and despite the flow of goods and people between the two sphere, so too does the Internet and online community lead to the emergence of experiences and relations that cannot be completely subsumed by metaphorical understandings that are appropriated from the offline world.

As such, it is suggested that debates over research ethics in relation to Internet research remain indebted to, and consequently hindered by, an attachment to conceptualisations of space that are insufficient if the ethical dilemmas presented by online research are to be resolved. Whilst Bassett and In terms of research practice, the use of spatial metaphors in the conceptualisation of OnliOver the past decade, the issues of internet research and the ethical dilemmas (potential and actual) faced by those engaged in such research has grown significantly, in both volume and sophistication (see for example Johns, Chen and Hall, 2004), particularly in relation to the conceptualisation of, and research on, the different forms of ‘community’ that have emerged through the Internet. At the level of ontology, the theoretical conceptualisation and consequent debate over the definitions of online communities is indebted to accounts of community formulated prior to the emergence of the internet as a significant site of social relations. As Nils Zurawski (2002) has previously suggested, theories of space have a long history in the social sciences, and these theories have in turn influenced the conceptualisation of the Internet as a qualitatively different social ‘space’ that is characterised by historically-specific forms of social relationships. From Benedict Anderson’s ‘Imagined Communities’ to Manuel Castells’ ‘Space of Flows’, through to Hine’s (2000) suggestion that the internet ‘community’ transcends both online and offline spheres of experience and action, the spatial metaphor has played an important role in the production of academic discourse on the nature of the Internet and Internet Mediated Communication.ne Communities has in turn, it is argued, influenced the framework of debates on Internet Research Ethics. For example Waskul (1996) uses the metaphor of the public park to draw the relationship between appropriate ethical practice in offline situations and their similarities with research on the internet. However, following Mihalache (2002) it is suggested that such arguments are undermined when one considers that the internet is qualitatively differeO’ Riordan (2002) for example have suggested the partial abandonment of spatial metaphors in favour of conceptualisations of Internet Mediated Communications based on text and textuality, it is argued that the limits of philosophical understanding demand that spatial metaphors cannot be dispensed with: as Derrida (1984) outlines, the relationships we conceptualise are lived by the subjects we study as a series of non-conceptual practices. Yet the need to conceptualise in the production of academic discourse, particularly in terms of the relationship between Self (as researcher) and Other (as research subject) demands that spatiality be preserved: if spatiality is denied to the Other, then any consideration of ethics and ethical responsibility on the part of the researcher becomes impossible. Retaining some form of spatial metaphor is especially imperative if one concurs with Lakoff’s (1992) argument that our metaphor system is central to our understanding of experience and to the way we act on that understanding.

The central argument of this paper is that a reversal of the step from spatial conceptualisation to ethical implications may lead to alternative pathways for the debate over research ethics in relation to the Internet. Instead of debating appropriate forms of ethical research practice from a position where there is an a priori conceptualisation of Internet social relations, it is suggested that the conceptualisations themselves can only proceed from an initial consideration of online ethics. Utilising a number of philosophical reflections on ethics from Jacques Derrida’s (1978) critique of Emmanuel Levinas and Silverstone’s (2003) exploration of cyber ethics, it is argued that the practice of ethical research on the Internet shares a number of similarities with the wider debates over ‘ethical communication’ on and through the Internet in general. As Silverstone (2003) suggests, the social space that emerges through internet technologies is effectively a metaphysical space founded on the ambiguity of physical distance and social closeness – an ambiguity that reverses pre-cyber spatial ambiguities of social distance and physical closeness. The potential implications of this argument for the debates over internet research ethics are explored, and some possible directions for further analysis outlined.

REFERENCES

Bassett, E. and K. O’ Riordan. (2002). Ethics of Internet Research: Contesting the Human Research Subjects Model in Ethics and Information Technology. 4 (3): 233 – 247.

Derrida, J. (1978). Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas in Writing and Difference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Derrida, J. (1984). White Mythology in Margins of Philosophy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Hine, C. (2000). Virtual Ethnography. Surrey: Sage.

Johns, M. S. Chen and G. Hall (eds.). 2004. Online Social Research: Methods, Issue, and Ethics. New York: Peter Lang Inc.

Lakoff, G. (1992) The Contemporary Theory of metaphor in Ortony, A. (ed.) Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mihalache, A. (2002). The Cyber Space-Time Continuum: Meaning and Metaphor in The Information Society. 18: 293-301.

Silverstone, R. (2003). Proper Distance: Towards an Ethics for Cyberspace in Liestøl, G., A. Morrison and T. Rasmussen (eds.). Digital Media Revisited. Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Waskul, D. (1996). Ethics of Online Research: Considerations for the Study of Computer Mediated Forms of Interaction. (http://venus.soci.niu.edu/~jthomas/ethics/tis/go.dennis).

Zurawski, N. (2002). Ideas and Metaphors of Space on the Internet … and How These Help or Restrict Us in Research. Paper presented to the Conference Internet Research 3.0: NET / WORK / THEORY. Maastricht, The Netherlands, October 13-16.

AUTHOR
Kiyoshi Murata

ABSTRACT

Nowadays, information and communication technology (ICT) is ubiquitous, and the quality of our home, work and social life is significantly dependent on the quality of ICT-based information systems. Since the majority of ICT and ICT-based information systems are developed and used in business organisations, ICT workers, including ICT professionals and ICT non-professionals or end-users, have both intentional and unintentional power over the general public. They have to recognise their responsibility to the general public and develop a professional outlook and attitude in order to create and maintain a safe and reliable information society.

Well-organised codes of conduct for guiding ICT workers in their professional behaviour have already been laid down; however, these codes may not function well on their own, unsupported by context. An ICT worker is not necessarily an independent and unchallenged entity; he/she works within a complex environment filled with various types of stress and pressure. This context might affect individual decisions, which may result in unprofessional behaviour, even though that individual has made a conscious decision to abide by a code. Therefore, the construction of an appropriately professional working environment, designed to encourage ICT workers to develop their sense of professional ethics, could offer a useful strategy for making codes of ICT professional conduct more effective.

AUTHOR
Marcus Johansson

ABSTRACT

In my paper, I explore the possibilities for legitimately punishing a virtual character. I propose a plausible example, where John (a physical person) develops a close emotional relation to Dante (his virtual character). If a moral wrongdoing is done, either in real life or in the virtual world, I argue that there could be instances where a retributive punishment should be measured out to the virtual character. The argument goes as follows: as John and Dante affects each other to a high degree, there are reasons to view the two as a singular moral agent, in which John and Dante are both contributive parts. While John carries the moral component, the moral agent as such cannot be accurately described without Dante, just as a moral agent cannot be properly described without any extension such as a body. John and Dante thus constitute an organic whole. Arguing from our commonly held conviction about appropriate punishment, I then conclude that there would be nothing extraordinary, in terms or reasonableness, to punish a virtual character – such conclusion seems to be in line with our everyday reasoning in questions regarding punishments. Punishing Dante could be either a part of punishing John and Dante as an organic whole, or it could be a pragmatic way of punishing the physical person John. However, there are reasons to believe that the first view is to be preferred, since the second, pragmatic view collides with some deeply held convictions. If this reasoning – which I believe could have some force – is correct, then it would imply new demands on legislation and judicial reasoning in order to handle questions concerning retribution in the virtual sphere.]

AUTHOR
Nivedita Debnath and Dr Kanika T Bhal

ABSTRACT

The theory of cultural lag postulates that material culture like technology changes very fast however the non-material culture like social norms and values take much longer to change. Information technology too has given us the advantages of speed, time and accessibility at a level which was inconceivable till very recently, however the concomitant social and ethical issues of piracy, intrusion of privacy and accuracy too have become increasingly significant, which need to be addressed both at the level of laws and social norms. With the introduction and use of technology are sought to be resolved through old paradigms, which applied to the older social order. Since these paradigms often are not generic they fail to address the typical issues. In these situations understanding how individuals construe the reality in their minds helps us in not only understanding how they would behave, it also helps in the evolution of subsequent social norms.

Piracy in the workplace is one of major ethical issues that have arisen in the context of IT usage. The ease of copying has made the issue of piracy very prominent in the current society. In this paper we first explore whether people perceived doing piracy as ethical or not. Since the personal norms and cognitive maps are important, we next explore the personal norms (mental frameworks) that people use for their perception of ethicality. Kohlberg’s model (1981) of cognitive development tested over the last 30 years emphasizes the cognitive development or reasoning aspect of moral decision -making. It addresses how the cognitive processes of moral decision-making become more complex with development. The emphasis here is on the cognitive decision-making processes, the reasons an individual uses to justify a moral choice, rather than the decision itself (e.g., the outcome). Kohlberg proposed that people go through stages of moral development, and naturally the stage of moral development will influence his decision-making process. His framework provides three broad levels of cognitive moral development; each composed of two stages. Moral development involves the individual’s passage from stage to stage in an invariant irreversible sequence. The profile of an individual represent a dominant stage the person is in, a stage the person is leaving, and a stage he or she is moving into. Though this process the individual develops a personal philosophy.

The various cognitive logics can be mapped on Kohlberg’s stages of moral development by looking at the content of the logics. If the moral logic corresponds with the normative principles the individual is at the principled level, however if logics of self-interest and other defense mechanisms (like neutralization, negation etc) are used they represent lower levels of moral logics. Though Kohlberg and others have used the level to explain moral development of an individual it is possible that certain situations (issues) might either reflect use of different moral principles while making ethical decisions. It is also possible that the situations under enquiry are amenable to various interpretations of principles. Thus, we build in a possibility of the situation under condition determining the use of cognitive logics as well. The major thrust of the research on cognitive logics has been identifying normative logics, taken from philosophy and /or existing psychological defense mechanism while identifying the predominant moral logic. The research has been done through a positivist approach wherein the individual chooses from a given set of philosophies. This methodology is useful when applied to traditional issues, which have clear normative principles, however if we use the existing frameworks we are less likely to explore the unique connotations of ethical issues that a new situation brings in.

In this paper we first explore whether people perceived software piracy as ethical or not. Since the personal norms and cognitive maps are important, we next explore the personal norms (mental frameworks) that people use for their perception of ethicality. Thus, this paper reports the findings of in depth interviews conducted to find out whether people perceive the situation of piracy as ethical or not, and the logic or personal norms that they use for their perceptions. For this purpose data has been collected through in depth interviews of 38 software professionals, from 6 different IT organizations based in North, South and West region of India. Out of 38 respondents 29 were male and only 9 respondents were female. Mostly the respondents were in the age group of 25-30 years. The paper would identify the personal norms of the people and their construction of reality. The paper reports the findings of these interviews conducted to find out whether people perceive piracy in the workplace as ethical or not, and the logic or personal norms that they use for their perceptions. Interviews have been analyzed using grounded theory. Grounded theory “is a qualitative method that inductively discovered by careful collection and analysis of qualitative empirical data. This methods does not being with theory, and then seek proof. Instead, it begins with an area of study and allows theory to emerge from that area of study” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990 p23). The theory that is literally grounded in the data, but is not the data itself (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Since the interviews are open ended they are likely to get insight into the people’s mental models/personal norms instead of imposing the current models.

Interestingly, besides using the normative principles for ethical decision making individuals use psychological defense mechanism too as guiding philosophies. Results have implications for future research and practice.

REFERENCES

Glaser, B. and Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory – strategies for qualitative research. London: Weiderfeld and Nicolson.

Kohlberg, L. (1981). The Philosophy of Moral Development. San Francisco: CA, Harper and Row.

Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1990). Basic of qualitative research techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory. California: Sage.

AUTHOR
Bernd Stahl

ABSTRACT

This paper introduces a new online resource for the community of scholars interested in computer and information ethics called the “Information Ethics Library”. Originally born from the idea to build an online teaching system for information ethics, the system developed to a community based resource. The paper will recount the rationale and development of the system. It will describe some of the main functionalities and organizational aspects. It will conclude with a discussion of the ethical issues raised by the IEL.

AUTHOR
Mary Prior

ABSTRACT

A paper presented at the first ETHICOMP conference made the case for a Hippocratic Oath for IS professionals (Prior 1995). This paper claimed that there had been little debate among members of the profession about potentially harmful applications of computer technology, such as the use of software to control weapons of mass destruction or the violation of human rights through the development of databases to track ‘dissidents’. It suggested that codes of conduct may have a role to play in stimulating debate and helping to encourage the growth of practitioners with a ‘well-developed conscience’, a term used by Thring (1980) in his arguments for a Hippocratic oath for engineers. However, the paper noted that unlike the more established professions such as medicine and the law, there were a number of professional bodies for computing professionals, in general their codes contained flaws (such as not providing guidelines about the priority of obligations when there is a conflict of interest), there were no sanctions for members not abiding by them and there was no obligation for those working in the IS field to even belong to any professional body. It nevertheless proposed that codes of conduct include a Hippocratic oath, ‘committing the IS professional to ensure that the work s/he engages in is for the benefit of human society and the world it inhabits’.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether, ten years on, an argument for a Hippocratic oath for IS professionals can still be made and if so, whether any progress towards this concept has been made.

One of the questions to be addressed is the extent to which the potential for the deployment of computer technology to have negative consequences on society has changed in the past decade. Another will be whether the changes that have been made to the codes of ethics/conduct of various Computing and IS professional associations during this time have lead to major improvements (for example, BCS Code of Conduct (2001) and Code of Good Practice (2004); IMIS Code of Conduct; ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (1992); Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional Practice (1999); IEEE Code of Ethics; Australian Computer Society Code of Professional Conduct and Professional Practice).

The consideration of the role of professional bodies is complicated by the fragmentation of those working in IS/IT among many different areas and the ability of such workers to join one or more of a variety of professional associations, or none at all. Nevertheless the licensing of software engineers was introduced in Texas in 1998 and is a topic that has produced vigorous debate elsewhere in the U.S.A. and Canada (e.g. articles by Bagert, Kennedy & Vardi, Knight & Leveson, Parnas and White & Simons in Communications of the ACM 2002); it has also been the subject of papers presented to ETHICOMP conferences (e.g. Betts, Rackley & Webb, 1996 and Storey & Thompson, 1999). A survey of the ethical attitudes of members of the Institute for the Management of Information Systems found considerable support for the idea of licensing (Prior et al 2003). The prospect for these developments and the implications they may have on the issue of a ‘Hippocratic oath’ will be examined.

In addition to Thring (1980) there have been others who have argued for a Hippocratic oath for engineers. Singleton (1991) considers the IEEE code of ethics in the light of the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster and concludes that the code is not widely implemented in the engineering workplace. She calls for the establishment of ‘an engineering oath modelled on the Hippocratic oath’ as part of a campaign to raise the ethical standards of engineers. Student Pugwash USA (SPUSA) has a pledge that it encourages young scientists and technologists to take in which they promise not to use their scientific and technological education ‘for any purpose intended to harm human beings or the environment.

Researchers at IBM are working on a ‘Hippocratic Database’ (Agrawal et al 2002), based on the principle of privacy as expressed in the oath. ‘Hippocratic databases would negotiate the privacy of information exchanged by a consumer to companies’ (Hicks 2002) and the concept is being prototyped to work with the P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences) standard from the World Wide Web Consortium.

Taking all of the above factors into account, the paper will conclude by considering whether the professional bodies for computing professionals now have the equivalent of a Hippocratic Oath embodied in their codes and what further steps might be required to ensure socially responsible practice by those involved in this field.

REFERENCES

Agrawal, R, Kiernan, Srikant, J. & Xu, Y. (2002) Hippocratic Databases. In Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Very Large Databases, Hong Kong, China, August 2002.

Betts, J, Rackley, L. & Webb, J (1996) Licensing – What is Happening to the Existing Professional? Paper presented at ETHICOMP 1996, Madrid.

Communications of the ACM (2002) Special issue: licensing software engineers. Vol. 45 (no. 11).

Hicks, M. (2002) Data security oath. http://www.eweek.com/print_article2/0,25533,a=30785,00asp Accessed 01/02/2005.

Prior, M. (1995). The Case for a Hippocratic Oath for Information Systems Professionals. ETHICOMP95, De Montfort University, Leicester, March 28-30 1995.

Prior, M. Fairweather, N.B. Rogerson, S. & Freeman, J. (2003). Is IT Ethical? 2002 ETHICOMP Survey of Professional Practice. IMIS.

Singleton, M. (1991) The need for Engineering Ethics Education. Paper presented at IEEE 1991 Frontiers in Education Conference.

Storey, A. & Thompson, J.B. (1999) Will the Regulation of Software Engineering and the Texas Licensing Model Act as Catalysts for the Integration of Computer Ethics into Mainstream Computer Education? Paper presented at ETHICOMP 1999, Rome.

Thring, M. (1980) The Engineer’s Conscience. Northgate Pub. Co. Ltd.