AUTHOR
KAMEDA Hideaki, SUMITA Tomofumi, SHIMAZAKI Masahito

ABSTRACT

International market competition intensified, and a Japanese company, manufacturing industry in particular rebuilt personnel system to achieve corporate strategy while globalization advanced after 1990’s, and many companies were able to go ahead through introduction of personnel system to advocate the principle of result.

However, after the bubble collapses, they have been pointing out a short-term point of achievements to happen to expect the principle of result excessively or motivation down of an employee with it as a problem of a company organization.

However, as a result of having performed reflection of the principle of result that a Japanese company is excessive, it may be said that the present age is the times when long-term result is demanded from both an employee and a company not together short-term result.

And, in a Japanese company, they reconsider a way of thinking of human resources development.

They thought that a person of object of education should have selected, or thought that an employee had responsibility of ability development.

However, in late years the thought changes somewhat, and they think human resources development to be necessary I stand in a long-term field of vision, and to wrestle in responsibility of a company again.

It may be said that a key for both a company and an employee to achieve result to the maximum together hangs for the management of a middle manager of each place of work.

However, from a result of slimming and personnel reduction of management, a middle manager comes to carry a role as employment as a playing manager while performing a conventional role to say with a manager of a place of work.

In other words, as for them, it is expected duties improvement, subordinate upbringing, the achievement of duties aim and the management of the routine that said and new problem discovery and solution, vision construction, systems design and the management of the innovation that said as a role of a middle manager at the same time while oneself is in charge of some of a theme of a place of work same as a subordinate.

Therefore we think that playing manager who　have network ability to have many human networks, to transmit and receive much information, and to install cooperation of a person concerned with speedily, have been expected.

A company is fixing a new education system for ability development to cope with the principle of result., and　considers ability development to perform for a middle manager too.

However, there is human network construction as a problem of the personnel training that cannot support by a conventional ability development program. Construction of an unofficial network represented as a new trial to solve it by an off site meeting and cross function team is regarded as important.

We think that an unofficial network solves what a check between members thought about for communication by conventional IT and distrust and a saying evil produced.

In addition, it is thought that an unofficial network becomes basic as for us as the place where a place of exchange of necessary information and the new problem formation are performed so that a manager accomplishes a role.

We applied SEC-CIS combination model that quoted an SECI model so that construction of an unofficial network considered a background regarded as important and considered a process of network construction in managers in an off site meeting.

In other words S (socialization)→ E(externalization) → C(combination) and a process to say and the information addressee who expressed information an information sender as for the communication thought about us when I applied an SECI model to interpret the dispatch / reception of information between members in an off site meeting when it was divided expressed information into C(combination) → I(internalization) → S(socialization) which did internalization and a process to say.

Then　ｍembers understand to some extent such as duties of a partner and one’s thought and sense of values for a company organization, home or a local action in the background belonging to the person information 　because they have already performed self-introduction of long time each other.

Therefore a person receiving information can understand a process of S → E → C that a partner sending information to expresses information deeply.

In addition, we thought that we could come to send information while assuming what kind of process an addressee reached C → I → S by when an information sender sent information.

We thought about the process with a valuable process for relations of a member to turn from relations of a check and an opposition of distrust into relations of cooperation.

And we examined a direction of the new management by network construction and examined an ideal method of new education system for ability development.

AUTHOR
Mari M. Heltne, Anne H. King

ABSTRACT

This essay seeks to address the theme of the conference from two our areas of specialization. Mari Heltne is concerned with ICT itself and methodologies of presenting it to students of multicultural background versus those of a homogeneous background. Anne King is primarily interested in the questions of ethical reflection centering upon the origins and future of ethical normative discourse and the meaning this has for teaching and student’s lives. Together we have been working on the meaning of “computer ethics” and its implications; we have written a paper together, and will teach a class of honors students this academic year on this subject.

In the first part of this essay, we will endeavor to evaluate the term “glocalization” itself. Is it, as some would suggest, a type of globalization that exists and is impossible to resist, as a movement? While the term itself has only been in use for a fairly short time, it is undeniably a process that is taking place. Or are we to understand “glocalization” as a dual movement, where the attempt is to apply the local to the global and the converse? One might argue that this is the very source of the term, which originated from its use in Japanese business practices that sought to combine global markets with local markets. This usage can be employed in different ways, and at time can overlook significant omissions about what “local” means:

The competition between the Americanized E-Mart and the American Wal-Mart is unlikely to bring up the issue of glocalization just because E-Mart is a Korean retailer. In fact, it is just a fierce fight between the Americanized companies. Everybody seems to be so busy relating this issue to glocalization that they forget about the falling traditional “sijang’’ or market places of Korea. (The Korea Times, 26 July 2006)

Is it instead of either of the above, a herald of a new, non-hierarchical and non-dogmatic future? Some advocates of glocalization see it as a way to promote peace in local and global communities. This is succinctly summed up as follows: “glocalization: a new route to world peace?” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 19, 2003.) Others have noted that it is equally possible that ICT could bring a new kind of totalitarianism instead of peace and equality. The assumption that one set of values might be better than another is a question for ethical reflection.

Danah Boyd, in her discussion of the design process in programming, has suggested rather provocatively that

‘glocalization’ [is] one of the most grotesque words that academics have managed to coin. . . . Glocalization is the ugliness that ensues when the global and local are shoved uncomfortably into the same concept. (Boyd, O’Reilly Emerging Technology Conference, March 6, 2006)

Many advocates of glocalization do not share the impression of “ugliness” that Boyd regards as a clearly questionable juxtaposition of terms and concepts. As in many attempts to discuss the ethics of ICT, whether it be computer ethics broadly defined, or in the specific definition of ethics such as Floridi’s “objective realism” as he defines information ethics, it is crucial when looking at the past and the future to analyze what is the presupposition of each speaker when using ethical terminology and the purpose to which it is put.

The second part of this essay will be devoted to the question of whether or not ethics can be “glocalized,” and, if so, in what sense this can be accepted as a valid argument grappling with the language of ethics and norms. There have been those who suggest, such as Donald Gotterbarn, that the language of philosophers has nothing significant to add to the development of a computer ethics. However, the teaching of theology and ethics has led at least one of us to conclude that one of the primary things lacking in a globally connected technological society is often an conscious awareness of what is considered acceptable “locally.” Groups identify themselves according to shared structures of meaning, whether they are religious or non-religious in origin. Thus, this section will concentrate upon the meaning that “local” and “global” have in ethical and normative discourse. This is not an abstraction; it emerges directly from the experience that norms can be assumed in life — and in academia — rather than explicitly considered. It has been suggested that new set of values and norms are emerging from ICT itself. Ethical considerations need not be stagnant but are in the process of evolving. It is not merely accidental that Ronald Robertson, the sociologist who first coined the term “glocalization” in English, studied theory, culture, and religion in a sociological perspective. It is vital to consider ethical norms to have any coherent idea of “computer ethics” in an applied form, or as a professional set of guidelines.

The third part of this essay will address the “digital divide” and the “have” and have-nots” in the ICT revolution from a perspective of the meaning of justice, ethically as well as socially. We will also consider the very real technological inequities that currently exist in the world. These are complex issues, which include whether or not the revolution in information systems and technology is one that separates groups rather than unites them in a global community. Additionally, the openness of each local group or culture to ICT must also be taken into consideration. “Local” cultures come from a set of values, a history, and a shared identity that may be formed and yet go unrecognized. It is through this lens that the “local” community views the “global” community.

In the final part of this essay we will draw upon the previous sections, coming to some definite conclusions about glocalization and computer ethics; however, we also will unapologetically raise questions that continue to remain unanswered for the present, bearing in mind that sometimes it is the questions that are as important as the “answers.”

AUTHOR
Don Gotterbarn

ABSTRACT

In making complex ethical judgements or decisions the decided needs to select from a set of abstract concepts and principles which they deem relevant to the situation and then apply these principles to a set of facts. The complexity of the ethical judgment is increased because in addition to the problem of identifying which principles and facts are relevant one must be familiar with and select from the numerous methods used apply these concepts to solve the ethical problem. We bring some presuppositions of the correct approach to ethics and this drives the decision method we apply to the situation. For example in Bynum and Rogerson [Chap 3 in Computer Ethics and Professional Responsibility by Bynum and Rogerson 2004 pages 60-85 copyright Blackwell Publishing] “ Ethical Decision Making “ starts from a presupposition of a set of core values and takes an approach modeled on virtue ethics. While the Collins and Miller “Paramedic Method” [“Paramedic Ethics for Computer Professionals,” by W. Robert Collins and Keith W. Miller Journal of Systems and Software, Volume 17, Issue 1 (January 1992) ] is an algorithmic approach which is keyed to a rights-obligations view of ethics. Both of these methods help to identify and integrate several elements but they optimistically presume a basic understanding and consensus about the nature of the ethical elements of the situation.

There are two primary problems with these types of approach. First, many of the ethical questions that arise in computer ethics vary in significant ways from more traditional ethical concerns and correct results from applying these methods depends on a common interpretation of the nature of the problem. Second, following on the first, a limited or narrow understanding of the nature of the problem contributes to a blurring of the potential ethical tradeoffs associated with a particular decision. Many of the tradeoffs are not clear when applying these methods to a complex decision-

In teaching ways to make ethical decisions it is useful to precede these formal approaches with a back of the envelope analysis technique to clarify concepts and isolate relevant issues and tradeoffs. The back of the envelope technique I have used is a version of, Line drawing, a method developed by Harris [Harris, Jr., C.E., Pritchard, M.S., and Rabins, M.J. Engineering ethics: concepts and cases. 2nd ed. Wadsworth 2000.]

The problem to be addressed:

Many ethical decision guidelines focus on the situation as a whole and ask about ways to respond to the situation without identifying the elements that make of the situation and which of those elements contribute negatively and positively to the situation. The failure to identify how discrete parts contribute to the situation leads to the danger that any decision may remove positive elements and increase the impact of negative elements.

For example, both the Bynum and Collins methods ask the analyst to consider alternative actions and the consequences of those actions, but they do not provide a means to identify the significant elements in these alternative actions, and identification which is needed to reasonable predict the consequences of the alternative actions. In complex situations there are no simple solutions but each varied element in the alternative can have multiple values; each one of which makes a significantly different solution

AUTHOR
Krystyna Gorniak-Kocikowska

ABSTRACT

The ongoing process of globalization is a fact. ICT is regarded (correctly) as a major force enabling and speeding up this process. Globalization causes and promotes changes; it thrives on change. In this paper, I will attempt to examine the ethical value of change in the ICT-driven, global society.

Psychological roots of the problem of change

One of the features of human nature is that we all have an attitude toward change. Some people like changes; some don’t, even abhorr them. Establishing an individual’s attitude toward change counts today among standard steps in producing his/her psychological profile.

Typically, people try to justify rationally their predilections. In the case of their attitude toward change, a very important component of this justification is of ethical nature. When somebody likes changes, he/she would tend to see it as good, including “good” in moral sense; and the lack of it as bad. The same is true of the opposite attitude. Hence, the justification of one’s preference is based usually on ethical arguments. Consequently, one’s attitude toward change becomes part of not only a psychological profile of that person; it becomes part of his/her moral profile as well.

Philosophical (Greek) roots of the problem of change

One of the oldest philosophical questions in the Western civilization is the question whether the reality has a dynamic (changing), or static (unchanging) nature. Already Parmenides and Heraclitus pondered over it; and they came up with opposing answers. Then, Plato famously proposed a solution that was a compromise between these two earlier positions. At the same time, Plato accomplished something else as well. But Whereas the philosophers before him treated the question of change as an ontological one, Plato gave it an ethical dimension. Plato did not like change (one can say that this was part of his psychological profile). So, in his dualistic concept of reality he attributed perfection and moral goodness to the unchanging component of reality, whereas the changing (physical) reality was characterized as flawed both in ontological as well as ethical sense.

Plato’s views, and even more the views of some of the neo-platonists strongly influenced Western religions, in particular Christianity and Islam – Judaism to a lesser degree. Consequently, in the Western civilization change has been for centuries perceived as bad, because it was seen as an attribute of “this” imperfect and morally flawed reality. On the other hand, the lack of change, associated with goodness, was attributed to the “other world,” “the Kingdom of Heaven,” the paradise.

The problem of happiness

Another Greek philosopher, Aristotle, contributed a very important thought to the subject of change. He declared that what characterizes all human beings, what makes us all similar, is the desire to be happy. We all want to be happy; happiness itself is good.

However, there are two problems related to this issue. However, there are countless ways in which people perceive happiness. Hence the question, whether all kinds of happiness are morally good. This question became the backbone of all ethical systems in the West, no matter whether religious or not.

The other problem is more directly linked to the subject of this paper. If it is human nature to desire happiness, than people who are happy (no matter whether “blissfully happy” or simply content) will want to stay happy. Hence, they will want things to remain as they are; and they won’t be interested in change. On the other hand, people who do not perceive themselves as happy, will pursue happiness, whatever it means to them; and they will want change. The desires and actions of these two groups will oppose each other.

The reversal of values

This conflict manifested itself very drastically in the Western civilization at the end of the 18th Century, when it took the form of violent social and political revolutions. Ever since, people who are unhappy/discontent support change in pursuit of happiness (in some societies, the pursuit of happiness belongs to individual civil, or human, rights).

Meanwhile, Plato’s view on the nature of reality has been revised in that sense that the changing character of physical reality lost its negative value. Change has been declared an unalienable feature of Nature. Nature, it turn, has been declared as good.

That way, a reversal of values took place. At the beginning of the 21st Century, to promote change is good because it is part of the nature of things. To oppose change is bad. The problem, however, is that wanting change is itself an expression of unhappiness, or at least discontent.

Change and happiness in the global ICT society

It would seem that this situation should not cause any problems for the global, ICT driven society, which – almost by definition – is supposed to support and promote change. But things are not that simple, because there remain still two problems regarding the human nature: 1. the fact that some people do not like change due to their own psychological make-up – in other words, change in itself makes them unhappy rather than happy; 2. for some people, especially those who are happy now, change may mean unhappiness rather than happiness.

The emerging question in this situation is, whose happiness should be sacrificed on the altar of the global ICT society? Or maybe the individual human right to happiness should be sacrificed? Of course, we will all have the right to eternally pursue happiness in the world of constant change.

AUTHOR
Roma Gorzelańczyk

ABSTRACT

In my paper I would like to concern myself with the Information Society issue regarding problems connected with digital divide and exclusion. Considering the fact that this problem embraces a lot of domains I anticipate, that my paper will have interdisciplinary character.

In my article I would like to present initiatives and programmes of European Union institutions and selected member states aiming at elimination of digital divide and exclusions. I would like to focus on European dimension of this subject and ways in which Europe concerns this issue and tries to solve the problem of digital divide.

Analyzing the issue of Information Society in the aspect of main topic which is digital divide and exclusion, a question regarding the problem of dependence between each other appears. Could we claim that digital divide is the effect of building of Information Society, or maybe it is so that Information Society is the way of overcoming it? The answer is not equivocal. At the same time lack of coherent and precise definition of Information Society makes it difficult to solve this dilemma indisputably.

As a result, different European Union institutions’ documents should be analysed in order to find the answer for the question what Information Society is and after that to present in this light the problem of eInclusion.

The issue of Information Society is a crucial problem of European Union policy. This fact is reflected in different documents and legal instruments. A document, which is the basis for this issue was a plan held on Lisbon European Council in 2000. The plan was called: “Information Society for all”. Another important document is eEurope Action Plan, in which there is a regulation about “participation for all in the knowledge-based economy”. However, the core of new Social Inclusion Strategy is the issue of e-Inclusion. Analysis of this and many different documents will be also a subject of my work. For more complete vision of this phenomenon it must be mentioned about the Information Society World Summit final documents, in which we can find ideas about prevention digital exclusion by an access to knowledge and new technologies.

It is always claimed, that new technologies give great possibilities of development for all, both individuals and whole communities. At the same time it is a chance to solve a lot of today’s social problems. New technologies help to pass the geographical borders and distribute information on unimaginable in the past scale. Simultaneously, there are a lot of conditions (such as accessability, knowledge and possibilities) hiding behind every new technology what decides about their real implementation. A computer equipped with Internet connection was intended to be a remedium for example for such problems as unemployment and access to education. However, from literature of the subject and scientific researches arises a reality in which main benefits are achieved mainly by groups which were earlier privileged. Economy of modern countries is based on the use of information technologies (ITC) in many fields.This fact causes that workers are to enquire sophisticated knowledge and are obligated to permanent improving of their qualification. However, for groups for which new technologies were supposed to be a great opportunity for equality and possibility of a better life they become a cause and source of even deeper exclusion. How Charles Jonscher says in “Wired Life. Who Are We in the Digital Age?”: “Future will belong to those who participate in the age of information in the widest, not narrowest way”.

New Technologies become a source of deeper differences in many fields. These differences occur both in global and local communities. They proceed through all socioeconomical categories: young – old, educated – uneducated, poor – rich, employed – unemployed, women – men. With passing the time these differences are getting deeper and deeper and leading another social inequality. What is important digital divides will not be eliminated with the social saturation level of the information technologies and therefore it requires active operations from social policy, what shows Szilárd Molnár Szilard in his article “The explanation frame of the digital divide”.

Summering, this article will include analyses of key operations of European Union which main aim is to eliminate digital exclusion and divide. It is intended to show European Information Society, its concepts and aims as well as problems which must be overcome.

AUTHOR
Jean-Gabriel GANASCIA

ABSTRACT

A few months ago, in March 2006, at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium entitled “What Went Wrong and Why: Lessons from AI Research and Applications” there was a session dedicated to intelligent agents. One of the talk presented experiments with “elves” that are personal agents acting as efficient secretaries and helping individuals to manage their agenda, to fix appointments, to find rooms for meetings, to organize travels etc. The talk reported technical successes but difficulties with inappropriate agent behaviours. For instance, one day – or, more precisely one night –, an elf rang his master at 3am to inform him that his 10 o’clock plane had to be delayed. Another was unable to understand that his master was in his office for nobody, since he had to complete an important project… Many of these inappropriate behaviours render intelligent agents tiresome and distressing. Our goal is to contribute to design clever and discreet agents acting with discernment and judgement by formalizing ethical rules of behaviour that use non monotonic logics.

Multiple Principles

During the past, there were many attempts to build computational ethics, i.e. procedures defining ethics for artificial agents or robots (Alan Aaby 2005, Luciano Floridi and Jeff Sanders 2005). More precisely, computational ethics models ethical systems by the use of programs and simulates decision procedures with physical information systems, i.e. with computers. Inspired by Asimov’s short story “Runaround” written in 1942 (Isaac Asimov 2004), the ethics for artificial agents studies the rules on which robots have to rule their behaviour to be ethically admissible. For instance web agents have to respect privacy; agents in hospitals have to respects patients and their pain etc.

However, one of the difficulties we face when writing rules of behaviour for intelligent agents is that the requirements are numerous and sometimes contradictory. For instance, we want personal robots act as faithful dogs who have to defend and help their master. Simultaneously, we need to protect our privacy by restricting access to personal data. But, we also demand the robot to behave ethically, i.e. to say the truth whenever someone ask them and not to increase information entropy by divulging wrong information. Those three requirements are somehow contradictory, since security of people demands total transparency while personal servants have sometime to lie to protect their master intimacy.

As a consequence, agents who pretend to be discreet have to obey to multiple and independent principles that may appear to be contradictory. But, it is difficult to automatically manage inconsistent rules of behaviours and to find, in each situation, the one that is the most adapted to the situation. The notion of “common sense reasoning” has been developed in artificial intelligence to face a similar problem. Therefore, our aim is to propose a “common sense ethic” based on “common sense reasoning”.

Common Sense Ethic

One of the main problems the logic-based artificial intelligence has to deal with is to conciliate the specificity of singular cases with general rules. Depending on the domain of application, it has got different names: “frame problem”, “common sense reasoning”, etc. When this problem is applied to solve ethical dilemma, I propose to name it “common sense ethic”. To be more precise, let us take an example related to an ethical question.

A general ethical principle is that we always have to say the truth. But a more specific say that you don’t have to say the truth to someone who doesn’t deserves it. For instance, imagine that you have been living in France during the Second World War, under the Occupation, and that you hid a friend, wanted by French militia or the Gestapo, in your home. If you were asked where your friend had been, would you obey to the general rule that commands to tell the truth, and to denounce the man to the authorities? We name “common sense ethic” a system of conflicting ethical rules, where the most specific has to apply to the current situation. For instance, in case of lying, a first rule commands to say the truth to everybody while a second orders to not say the truth to a person who deserves it. However, such a system is contradictory since the general rule may be applied in every situations.

Modelling Common Sense Ethic with Artificial Intelligence

Modern logic-based artificial intelligence techniques have been developed to solve this kind of problem within a logical framework. More precisely, the goal of logic-based artificial intelligence techniques is to satisfy rules if they don’t lead to contradictions, while being able, in cases of contradictions, to cancel the effects of inconsistent rules.

In the past, many Artificial Intelligence researchers tried to simulate non-monotonic reasoning, i.e. reasoning based on general rules and accepting exceptions. Several formalisms have been developed, for instance, default logic (Raymond Reiter 1980), circumscription (John McCarthy 1980), non-monotonic logics (Drew McDermott and Jon Doyle 1980), Truth Maintenance Systems, etc. However, most of the mechanical solvers based on those formalisms were very inefficient. Recently, a new efficient and general formalism called Answer Set Programming (ASP) (Chitta Baral 2003) has been developed to simulate non-monotonic reasoning. It has been designed to unify previous non-monotonic reasoning formalisms.

Our purpose in this paper is to show how non monotonic logic may model “common sense ethics” for intelligent agents. It will present the way ASP, which simulates default reasoning, could provide a clear formalization of the way multiple principles of “common sense ethics” can be managed in order to solve particular cases. Such a formalisation may be useful to design discreet intelligent agents; it would then be of practical use. But, it could also be of interest to clearly specify computational ethics. Lastly, it is a first step toward a clear formalisation of human ethical rules.

REFERENCES

Anthony Aaby, Computational Ethics, technical report, 2005

Issac Asimov, I, Robot, Spectra, New York, NY. (2004)

Chitta Baral, Knowledge Representation, Reasoning and Declarative Problem Solving, Cambridge University Press, (2003)

Luciano Floridi, Jeff Sanders, On the Morality of Artificial Agents, Minds and Machines, 2004, 14.3, pp. 349-379

John McCarthy, Circumscription: a form of non-monotonic reasoning. In: Artificial Intelligence, number 13 (1980) 27-39, 171-172.

Drew McDermott, Jon Doyle, Non-monotonic logic 1. In: Artificial Intelligence, number 13 (1980); pp. 41-72.

Raymond Reiter, A logic for default reasoning. In: Artificial Intelligence, number 13 (1980) pp. 81-132.