AUTHOR
Richard Lucas

ABSTRACT

“I’m sorry Dave, I can’t do that”

Is it possible or even desirable for Autonomous Software Agents (ASAs) to be socially responsible? Since it is usually agreed that to be socially responsible implies a sense of morality some steps towards answering this large question can be taken by asking the smaller questions; ought and can ASAs be ethical? These questions I will answer in this paper.

There are two claims and a discussion resulting from these claims in this paper.

The two claims are: Firstly, we ought to demand that an ASA be morally responsible and secondly, ASAs, currently, are not morally responsible. That these claims are at odds leads to the discussion of how the issues provide a challenge for the citizen of the Information Society

The first claim
This claim stems from the commonplace observation that we are relinquishing more and more control of our lives to computer-controlled technology (ie intensive-care units, autopilots, and the like). The consequence of this relinquishing is that we are taking less and less active part in decisions which have moral import (Do I crash into a building or a cornfield?).

Should we do this? That is to say, ought we to consider more carefully the degree to which we give computers effective control over morally charged parts of our lives and why? This further leads to questions such as: What moral controls ought to be built into computers? and What does this mean for our notions of moral responsibility? The origin and implication of these questions is explored in this paper. These matters will form the basis of an examination of how the issues provide a challenge for the citizen of the Information Society, that is why it matters that ASAs are being used to do things for people.

The second claim
I do not make the strong assertion that it is not possible for any ASA to be morally responsible but rather the more modest one that, by way of example, at least two attempts to imbue ASAs with morals fail.

To substantiate the second claim I will use two models namely, Asimov’s 3 Laws of Robotics and the BDI Model of Software Agency.

For the 3 Laws of Robotics, I will use the example of the September 11 disaster to examine the effectiveness of such a computer. Would, on September 11, an autonomous moral computer have resulted in better consequences, where thousands of workers and passengers might not have died? It seems that some kind of computer control, moral computer control, would be just the thing in situations like this. I will show that this Æ could be circumvented. All three laws, in this example, are either easily bypassed or are potentially trapped in a deep if not infinite regression of conditions and exceptions.

For the BDI model of software agency, I will show that it flounders conceptually. I will examine the AI field’s (or at least that part which proposes ASAs) conception of autonomy but will concentrate especially on their conceptions of belief, desire, and intention and show that the uses and definitions (implied and explicit) for these are sometimes contradictory, at other times confusing, but always short of any reasonable persons expectations of how these terms ought to be used, especially in moral discourse.

The failure of these examples leads to the suspicion that the problems which undercut them lie deep. Deep in the nature of: the sorts of beings that can be moral, moral theories, and the notions of responsibility and control. These conclusions also lead to the same place as those of the first claim; what are the challenges and why it matters that ASAs are being used to do things for people.

Progress

If these failed attempts are symptomatic of the enterprise as a whole then we ought to be lead to: a) reexamine the first claim, b) examine what the current (moral) state of computers means for us, c) examine what is possible (morally speaking) for ASAs, and d) develop a preliminary sketch for a possible typology for assessing moral theories to see if they that would be appropriate for ASAs.

This paper discusses a) and b), but not c) and d). As a portent to future papers, c) and d) lead to the idea of a classification of moral theories that would be appropriate for ASA’s and a typology of such theories. The classification of such possible moral theories I have called Artificial Ethics (Æ). These are not to be confused with Danielson’s Artificial Morality, though there may very well be theories which fall into both camps. I point to the work of Coleman on Kantian computers and, Van den Hoven and Lokhorst on deontic logics as possible candidates for inclusion in the Æ schema.

Concluding remarks

Perhaps the expectations implied by merely asking the opening question is setting the bar too high; demanding too much of the entities that are, by default, taking control and responsibility. But, it seems that what is being asked of computers is, and, ought to be, no more demanding than what we would ask of people. What would be the point of making the demands lower for computers than people? The answer to this questions seems to imply that accepting less in the way of moralizing is to create a new class, morally constrained entities. Making the standards higher for computers than people, while initially seeming attractive is also problematic. Just how high do we make any such standards and, are we risking creating moral superiors and perchance, moral saints? This, incidentally, is what futurists such as (Warwick, 2000) and (Moravec, 1999) predict, encourage, indeed embrace.

AUTHOR
Tomas A. Lipinski

ABSTRACT

Recent developments in the United States, a jurisdiction heretofore considered vesting its citizens with broad array of free speech rights, including the right to speak and to receive information and its concomitant right to read has undergone challenge in the past two years. The traditional loci for the exercise of these rights for many citizens, the library, the bookstore or newsstand, is now subject to scrutiny by the government and other plaintiffs. This is occurring not only in traditional physical spaces but also in virtual spaces. Three areas are discussed: the use of subpoena powers by aggrieved third parties to ascertain the identity of anonymous speakers on the Internet, the acquisition of online bookstore customers purchase records by law enforcement agencies, and intrusion into reading habits of library patrons by the USA PATRIOT Act and the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA).

The prior work of the author discussing anonymous speech on the Internet and the use of subpoena powers by aggrieved third parties¹ is briefly discussed and updated to included recent developments concerning copyright owners attempts to ascertain the identity of potential defendants.² Furthermore, the impact of the RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America) efforts to control the copyright infringement occurring on college campuses is also discussed either through third party subpoena or the enlistment of the educational institution in monitoring traffic on its computer networks is assessed. ³

Next, the implications of the Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thorton, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 269 (Sup. Ct 2002). While the Colorado Supreme Court preserved the rights of online bookstore customers when it determined that the Colorado constitution offered a source of broader privacy protection than did the U.S. Fourth Amendment, the case is significant for two reasons nonetheless. First, it demonstrates the patterns that law enforcement agencies use when investigating reading habits vis-à-vis purchase histories of suspects. Second, the result of the case is likely singular as many state high courts may be reluctant to look to its own constitution as similar cases arise. This might occur of one of two reasons: judicial restraint and underdeveloped body of precedent.

Finally, the reading habits of public library patrons are most impacted by two recent pieces of federal legislation. First, the Children’s Internet Protection Act and the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. American Library Association, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4799 (2003), upholding its provisions requires that public libraries, as a condition of receipt of federal funding, to place filters on computers with Internet access with result that many patrons will have access to far limited array of material. Moreover, the provisions in CIPA that allow libraries to “turn-off” the filter can only be made in response to a patron request. In other words patrons must first ask before they may access constitutionally protected material.

Most pernicious is the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001⁴ or USA PATRIOT Act or the PATRIOT for short, a complex and detailed piece of legislation, amending dozens of federal statutes. In general, PATRIOT relaxes, so to speak, the standards under which surveillance activities may be undertaken in the name of thwarting domestic terrorism. For example, under PATRIOT section 218, amending the FISA (50 U.S.C. § 1804) an application for surveillance is now available if the federal investigator demonstrates that “a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.” The pre-PATRIOT standard required that law enforcement demonstrate that the “sole or main purpose” of the surveillance was to gather foreign intelligence information; this “lessening the burden of proof” is subtle but no less significant. ⁵ “Considering the fact that the FISC [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court] has only turned down one surveillance application since its inception, it becomes even more likely that the court will authorize all forthcoming applications under this more lenient standard.”⁶

The most controversial section, at least for library advocates, is section 215, which appears ominous in its clear application to the library environment as it authorizes the Director of the FBI or his or her designee to “make an application for an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” “Instead of subpoenas, the act provides that such information will be sought via search warrants. The advantage for the FBI proceeding by search warrant rather than by subpoena is speed: While a party can wait and object to a grand jury subpoena before producing documents, compliance with a search warrant is immediate.”⁷ “[T]the ‘so-called’ search warrant is issued by a secret court. Once granted, it entitles the FBI to procure any library records pertaining to book circulation, Internet use or patron registration. Librarians can even be compelled to cooperate with the FBI in monitoring Internet usage.”⁸ Even more troubling, the library or librarian receiving such order is prohibited from disclosing its occurrence to anyone else as well.⁹ New section 50 U.S.C. § 501(d) commands that “[n]o person shall disclose to any other person (other than those persons necessary to produce the tangible things under this section) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things under this section.” Because of this, reports of library incidents of Section 215 investigations will be rather limited so do not expect to read about such investigations in the next issue of the OIF (Office for Intellectual Freedom) Newsletter, or an annual review of such occurrences in the same way the OIF reports on book challenges in libraries and schools. The implications for individual consumers, readers, of information as well as societyat large are discussed.

REFERENCES

1. Tomas A. Lipinski, To Speak or Not to Speak: Developing Legal Standards for Anonymous Speech on the Internet, 5 INFORMING SCIENCE 95 (2002).
2. In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6778 (D.D.C. 2003).
3. See, University Students Settle File-Swapping Law Suits, 7 The Copyright & New Media Law Newsletter, at 11 (2003); Hearing, U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, February 26, 2003 on Peer-to-Peer Piracy on University Campuses.
4. Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
5. Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL 933, 972 (2002).
6. Sharon H. Rackow, How the USA PATRIOT Act Will Permit Governmental Infringement Upon the Privacy of American in the Name of “Intelligence” Investigations, 150 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1651, 1675 (2002) (footnote omitted)
7. Henry E. Hockeimer, Jr., USA Patriot Act is Broader than You Might Imagine: From Libraries to Universities to Trucking Companies, Sweeping Provisions of the Act change the Status Quo, NEW JERSEY LAW JOURNAL, April 15, 2002, (no pagination in LEXIS-NEXIS Legnew Library).
8. Zara Gelsey, Big Brother Hits the Books, THE RECORDER, July 19, 2002, at 5.
9. Henry E. Hockeimer, Jr., USA Patriot Act is Broader than You Might Imagine: From Libraries to Universities to Trucking Companies, Sweeping Provisions of the Act change the Status Quo, NEW JERSEY LAW JOURNAL, April 15, 2002, (no pagination in LEXIS-NEXIS Legnew Library) (“[L]ibraries are prohibited from disclosing to anyone other than counsel that the search warrant has been served and the nature of the documents obtained as a result of the search warrant.”).

AUTHOR
Paul B. de Laat

ABSTRACT

The so-called `open source software movement’ enjoyed a huge increase in popularity over the last decade. The movement has multiplied in scale. This holds for both `output’ – software in source code form to be used freely by anyone, and `process’ – networks of thousands of volunteer hackers working together. Famous examples include hackers developing Linux, Apache, and OpenOffice. This development is, of course, mainly the result of the creation of the Internet; participants now have immediate access to each other, and downloading code is a matter of minutes only.

What motivates hackers to contribute? This question has been the subject of fierce debates. Both the joy of writing code and building a reputation are the best answers that have come up. However, still puzzling is that such virtual teams assemble overnight and exchange comments and/or source code for some period of time, on a massive scale at that. How is it possible for people that are complete strangers to each other, as well as separated in space, to work together so quickly without much hesitation? What processes underlie this instantaneous creation of mutual trust?

Until recently, the development of trust in (normal) teams was believed to be well understood. Trust takes time to develop, must grow step by step, requires meeting face to face regularly, and is furthered by common language and common culture. All of this seems hardly of any use regarding virtual networks of open source hackers. Therefore some authors have taken to the concept of swift trust in order to come to grips with these teams. This article will explore the concept of swift trust and the theories behind it, and try to answer the question whether the comparison brings us any further. It is a theoretical exercise, which tries to connect two separate strands of theory.

The concept of swift trust was first developed in the context of film crews, theatre groups and the like, which come together for a short time and then disband. Their work mode necessarily is fast in, fast out. There is simply no time available for the usual processes of getting to know and trust each other. In these circumstances it is a norm of professional conduct to act along the lines of swift trust. Subsequently the concept has been adapted to virtual circumstances by authors like Walther, Meyerson and Jarvenpaa.

In their theories, swift trust refers to global virtual teams that are never to meet in reality. In contrast to the classical type of trust, swift trust develops in the first moments of electronic interaction (or not at all). It is task-oriented behaviour that keeps interactions going. Showing initiative as well as responding quickly to initiatives from others are crucial, given the inherent anxieties that cyberspace creates. At the same time, virtual communication tends to hide rather than reveal cultural characteristics. As a result, culture as a binding force recedes to the background, and efforts at building a common culture become irrelevant. Virtual trust hinges upon contributing creatively and swiftly, not about showing compassion and contributing to the social cohesion of the group. As I interpret these theories, again, like in the classical case of film crews, trusting swiftly is a mode of profesional conduct. Swift trust is the trade mark of the virtual worker that takes his profession seriously.

Questions to be answered are the following. Is it warranted to characterize the process of contributing to open source groups as swift trust? Does this analogy with temporary film crews yield new insights? More generally, are the two types of trust possibly a product of varying circumstances only? Related to this, might the impossibility of face to face contact by any chance be considered as a blessing instead of a curse, i.e. virtuality as freedom from the terror of social conventions that allows focusing upon the tasks at hand? Finally, are the two types of trust, classical versus swift trust, really opposites of each other? In particular, is not the vindication c.q. refutation of expectations of trust a driving mechanism common to both?

AUTHOR
Frank Land, Sevasti-Melissa Nolas and Urooj Amjad

ABSTRACT

Knowledge Management is widely regarded as the way an enterprise can leverage the know how of its employees, trading partners, and outside experts for the benefit of the enterprise (Chun Wei Choo, 1998, Bellaver & Lusa, 2001, Ackerman et al, 2003). Indeed some its advocates regard knowledge management as the essential tool for success in the highly competitive world of the global economy. Further, it is argued, the management, and with it the sharing of knowledge, not only enhances the enterprises ability to compete by increasing the competence of its employees also enriches the welfare of all those who are able to engage in the process. Hence, for those involved it is a win win game.

The advocates fall into two groups – those who focus on technology as the mechanism for managing and sharing knowledge, and those who place a greater an emphasis on human relations, on conversation and on the elicitation of tacit knowledge. But both groups appear to share the assumption that knowledge management is beneficial, and that in some senses the knowledge which is managed and shared is equivalent to the ‘truth’.

There is an asymmetry in most of the discussion of the field. Knowledge management is primarily discussed from the point of view of the user of knowledge. The motivation of the user of knowledge is seen to be to enhance capabilities, to be able to utilize knowledge to increase effectiveness.

There is much less discussion about the source of knowledge or of the dissemination of knowledge or of the motives of the knowledge provider. That information provides power is widely admitted. At the same time the political dimension of knowledge management and knowledge sharing is often covered in the KM literature as no more than an aside. Yet if we follow Sussman and her colleagues (Sussman et al, 2002) who perceive an organization to be a “political system, a network of interdependent members using power, influence, and political manoeuvring to achieve their goals”
Politics can be been defined as an intentional social influence process in which behaviour is strategically designed to maximize short term or long term self interests.

In the real world politics is often the dominant influence and knowledge manipulation, the dark side of knowledge management, is its prime weapon. In the world of politics we are accustomed to the notions of spin, deception and propaganda. The business world is no different. If we want to pick out those companies which have been the most successful managers of knowledge, ENRON appears high on the list. For many years they achieved competitive success through the systematic management of information and knowledge. One of their prime tools of knowledge management was the shredder.

My conclusion – knowledge management has a very strong ethical dimension and unless we recognise that fact we are going to develop technology based systems which enhance the power of the knowledge manipulator.

The paper traces the evolution of the concepts behind knowledge management, contrasts this with the actual practice and highlights the ethical problems that the development of ever more efficient tools for the dissemination of ‘knowledge’ poses for the systems designer.

REFERENCES

Ackerman, M., Pipek, V., Wulf, V., (2003), Sharing Expertise: Beyond Knowledge Management, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.

Bellaver, R.F., & Lusa, J.M., (2001), Knowledge Management Strategy and Technology. Artech House.

Choo, Chun Wei, (1998), The Knowing Organization: How Organizations Use Information to Construct Meaning, Create Knowledge and Make Decisions, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Sussman, L., Adams, A. J., & Raho, L. E. (2002). Organizational Politics: Tactics, Channel, and Hierarchical Roles. Journal of Business Ethics, 40, 313-329.

AUTHOR
Banita Lal and Jyoti Choudrie

ABSTRACT

The creation and evolution of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has challenged the traditional structure of work activities within organisations and enabled a movement away from office-based work (Belanger, 1996; FORUM, 2002). New technologies such as videoconferencing, audioconferencing and messaging (both standard text and multimedia) enable employees to see, hear and communicate with colleagues at disparate locations, thus representing teleworking opportunities within organisations (Lipton, 1998). Recent years have witnessed an upsurge in the adoption of teleworking in many countries (FORUM, 2002) and developments in technological capabilities suggest further growth.

Greater flexibility promoted by teleworking replaces the traditional ‘Industrial Age’ style centralisation of work processes and location and strict hierarchy-based structures (Hedberg, 2000). A transition from more traditional work structures entails a vast amount of change and incorporates a variety of possible costs and benefits for all parties involved. However, much of the existing teleworking literature that investigates the costs and benefits of teleworking initiatives fails to support such assertions with solid empirical research.

Benefits for companies often stated by the implementation of teleworking include reduced real estate and recruitment costs, enhanced productivity and organisational flexibility (Helling, 2000; Skyrme, 1993). The benefits for teleworkers include reduced travel and costs, better quality of life and greater flexibility over work organisation (Skyrme, 1993). Given the theoretical context of this research and the lack of availability of empirical evidence, this research was interested in exploring and understanding the costs and benefits associated with teleworking -by incorporating a cost benefit analysis- and whether these affected two often cited and desired outcomes of teleworking: individuals’ productivity and satisfaction within an organisational context. Studying the overall impact of costs/benefits on these two factors can help determine the long-term prosperity of teleworking within an organisation.

Lack of an accurate measurement tool meant that productivity and satisfaction had to be measured subjectively: based on each individual’s perceptions (Belanger, 1999), which are shaped by his or her experiences of teleworking. An amalgamation of qualitative and quantitative research methods (Myers, 1997) was used in this research. A combination of methods enabled the shortcomings of one method to be counteracted by the other. The research methods chosen for primary data collection in this paper were case study, questionnaires and in-depth semi-structured interviews.

The case study in this research was a large UK-based telecommunications company with a global presence: ‘Company X’. Following Yin’s definition (1994), the case study was an empirical inquiry that allowed for the investigation of a contemporary phenomenon (teleworking) within its real-life context (Company X). At the time of this research, Company X employed 150,000 employees; 5,200 of which were teleworkers. Following a pilot study with 10 willing Company X teleworkers, questionnaires were used to collect primary data from teleworkers as they allowed for the attainment of a larger sample size. Questionnaires were utilised as the opinions of multiple participants could be understood in a more beneficial manner whereas in-depth semi- structured interviews allowed the researchers to gain deeper insights into the actual teleworking initiative at Company X. 106 questionnaire responses (66 male, 40 female) were received and three in-depth semi- structured interviews (2 males, 1 female) were carried out in the research. The interviews were not regarded as being representative of the 106 participants or the teleworking population as a whole at Company X. They were used solely to gain a deeper understanding of teleworking at the company. More details on why this particular strategy was followed will be presented in the final paper.

The participants were all self-selected, i.e. volunteers, and were highly professional individuals occupying a variety of job roles, from Systems Engineer to Personnel Manager. The length of employment at Company X ranged from ?1 year to 35 years and the length of time spent teleworking ranged from ?1 year to 30 years.

Following data collection, the questionnaire data was analysed principally using SPSS. Interviews were recorded, transcribed then underwent an analysis of the content in order to gain a corroborating description of the teleworking initiative at Company X. The main costs identified in the research were: lack of social face-to-face interaction and high reliance upon technology. The main benefits were identified as being: reduced commuting time, financial and time savings and the ability to arrange work duties around domestic duties. The general understanding generated from the findings was that the number of participants who perceived the benefits to be greater than the costs exceeded those who did not. In the majority of cases, costs were offset by the benefits as different individuals placed dissimilar weightings on each of the costs and benefits. This depended upon the individuals’ own experiences and beliefs. The existence of different costs and benefits of teleworking was depicted in the research. Additionally, there was a strong indication that the generally positive perceptions of teleworking lead to overall positive perceptions of satisfaction and productivity: the majority of participants felt more satisfied and more productive when teleworking.

The research concludes with a discussion on the limitations of this research and from this, makes suggestions for future research looking into the same topic area. For example, limitations regarding the problem of using ‘self-selection’ as a method of participant recruitment are discussed. The contributions of this research are finally addressed, namely how this research contributes to the area of IS by providing an in-depth exploratory study looking at assertions made about teleworking, thus linking teleworking theory with practise. Such findings contribute towards a greater understanding of the social aspects of teleworking, which is important considering the expected future growth of teleworking.

REFERENCES

Belanger, F. (1996), Distributed Work Arrangements: Impacts of Advanced Information Technologies, Work Coordination Mechanisms and Communication Requirements, http://hsb.baylor.edu/ramsower/ais.ac.96/papers/BELANGER.htm, (viewed 28/07/03)

Belanger, F. (1999), Workers’ Propensity to Telecommute: An Empirical Study, Information and Management, 35,(3), pp139-153

Berg, B.L. (1998), Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, third edition, Boston, USA, Allyn and Bacon

FORUM (2002), The Changing World of Work: Trends and Implications for Occupational Safety and Health in the European Union, http://osha.eu.int, (viewed 23/06/03)

Hedberg, B.; Dahlgren, G.; Hansson, J.; Olve, N.G. (1998), ‘Virtual Organisations and Beyond: Discover Imaginery Systems’, West Sussex, John Wiley and Sons

Lipton, S.P. (1998), ‘Planning the Office of the Future- Today’, Journal of Accountancy, December 1998, v186 i6 p(85)I

Myers (1997), Qualitative Research in Information Systems, www.qual.auckland.ac.nz, (viewed 15/05/03)

Skyrme, D.J., (1993), Teleworking- Achieving the Business Benefits (1993), From Teleworking to E-Work (2000), Distance Working- The Corporate Perspective, www.skyrme.com, (viewed 12/05/03)

AUTHOR
Matthijs Kouw, Edo Schreuders and Lizette Pater

ABSTRACT

In 1890, Warren and Brandeis famously formulated privacy as ‘the right to be left alone’. However, it may be argued that, in the light of contemporary technological developments, this definition demands a thorough reworking. Dealing with, for example, surveillance, cookies, computer hacking and so on, demands a revisiting of the concept of privacy. Debates surrounding privacy and technology tend to treat the former as a given concept to be found in human nature, thereby begging the question at hand, namely: how is privacy being articulated in particular social contexts?

Instead of treating privacy as a given, we will take a look backstage and problematize its apparent rigidity, thereby hoping to clarify the relation between privacy and technology.

Firstly, the traditional liberal distinction between the public and the private sphere will be reflected upon. It will be exemplified that the binary public-private distinction is not neutral in the sense that it applies equally to everyone (as it pretends to do). This commonly accepted dichotomy will be unveiled as supportive of certain inequalities. The liberal distinction appears to be an expression of a specific point of view, namely that of the neutral liberal state, in which the public sphere is carefully demarcated from the private sphere. All things associated with nature, body, particularities, irrationality are excluded from the public sphere. This serves the alleged neutrality of the liberal state, which claims to be impartial and rational, but that claim only works insofar all nee! d and desire is kept in the private realm. We argue that this dichotomous organization has exclusionary effect

That this exclusion is obvious, but at the same time maintained, will be explained in the second part. Panoptic power regimes, carefully explored in the work of Michel Foucault, exercise normalizing judgment by punishing deviations from the required standards. The constant threat of coercion disciplines and regularizes people as individuals, and causes an internalization of the norms. In the panoptic regime there is no distinction to be made between the public and the private sphere. Panoptic power is not limited to one realm: power is exercised always and everywhere. The ideal, which can easily be traced back to legitimizations of camera surveillance, is one of perfect visibility, complete transparency, and total surveyability. First of all, this Foucauldian model of disciplinary power will ! be supplemented by Reg Whitaker’s model of the participatory panopticon (which he describes as more consensual and voluntary because convenience for consumers is the motivation for implementing panoptic norms). Secondly, we will enhance Foucaults model by discussing Gilles Deleuze’s model of the society of control. Where, according to Foucault, power was thought to penetrate everything, Deleuze states that for Foucault each realm corresponds with a specific, limited exercise of power. Deleuze argues that control strives for ubiquity: it uses the newest surveillance technologies in order to accomplish the production of the ‘proper citizen’.

Thirdly, biometrics will be considered. The examination of practices of biometrics will reveal them as discursive practices, ideologically engineered to produce legible bodies that thereby represent cultural codes that deliver a description of socially appropriate responses. Bodies are then not pre-discursively given, but appropriated through discursive practices, as a discussion of the work of Judith Butler and Donna Haraway will reveal. Since these discursive practices are never devoid of ideological elements, inclusion and exclusion are concomitant to the protocols deployed in biometric practice

The way the body is made legible then leads to a preoccupation with visible properties, and a suspicion, or exclusion, of tactile properties that lie beyond the scope of biometrics. In the biometrics discourse the bodily aspects become the ultimate decisive factor in determining who one is. Biometrics seems to decontextualize people from their motivations and environments. This can be a particularly questionable practice when it is related to biometric body surveillance, since many social problems have socio-economic contexts: people may have good reasons to act in a certain, unaccepted way. Body surveillance basically ignores this, by focusing mainly on behavioral aspects.

Parallels will be drawn between biometrics and the preoccupation with visible behavior (which will be illustrated in a discussion on Closed Circuit Television). Just as biometrics reduces identity to what can be found in the text of the body, this preoccupation reconceptualizes socio-economic problems in terms of visible behavior.

Fourthly, we will consider some of the implications of technology on the public-private distinction. After elaborating on technology and the disappearance of the biological substrate of human agency, due to virtual technologies, a problematization of panoptic societies may be provided. Subsequently, common themes of both virtual technologies and control societies may be described – to what extent is disembodiment a common theme of both digital culture and control societies? A closer investigation will then allow a description of the emancipatory power of virtual technologies. The latter examination implies a definition of human agency as a locus that contains both creative and suppressive forces that can lead to an explanation of privacy as an evaluative concept that may unfold throu! gh processes of critical examinations.

In conclusion, we will argue that privacy is to be seen as an evaluative concept that emerges as an immanent possibility for the human subject to reflect upon its dependence on existing power structures. Privacy in our view is fundamentally contingent over time, and permanently needs to be worked upon.