AUTHOR
Matteo Turilli, Antonino Vaccaro and Luciano Floridi

ABSTRACT

The paper investigates the ethical nature of network neutrality in relation to its application to the Internet. Three main questions are addressed:

1. What is the ethical nature of Internet neutrality?
2. Should Internet neutrality be endorsed when considering its ethical implications?
3. What ethical framework should be endorsed for regulating Internet traffic?

Specifically, we argue that network neutrality is not an ethical principle per se and that it does not directly enable or substantiate ethical principles. Consequently, network neutrality should not be considered dogmatically, as done in previous literature (e.g. Goldsmith and Wu, 2006; Wu, 2005), but rather should be evaluated pragmatically when applied to the Internet. An analysis of the parameters that to evaluate the quality of Internet services from the user’s perspective uncovers how, in many cases, implementing Internet neutrality may breach ethical principles. So we argue that a set of coordinated policies would be preferable in order to regulate Internet traffic, instead of a neutral approach. We propose an ecological ethical framework, that accord competing interests and considers the effects of stakeholders’ actions on each other, in order to avoid the potential unethical consequences of Internet traffic regulation.

The paper is organised into four sections. The first critically analyses the concept of network neutrality. Following previous literature (e.g. Wu, 2005; Yoo, 2005), a network is qualified as neutral if and only if all transactions are performed under the same set of criteria. For example, the United Parcel Service (UPS) network can be said to be neutral only if packages are sent to and from any user by applying the same criteria expressed in terms of priority, checking-in and checking-out procedures, carrier typology or pricing. Such a definition does not depend on the topology of the network or the technology involved. It is therefore readily applicable to all networks, including the Internet. Clients, servers and routing-related devices coordinate and perform transactions of data packets through the Internet. Such transactions are regulated by communication protocols that determine the route of a data packet depending on its destination and properties. The Internet is neutral if and only if all data packets are transmitted with the same priority, irrespective of their properties.

The second section of the paper investigates the ethical implications of implementing network neutrality into the Internet. The ethical myth of Internet neutrality is debunked showing how a neutral Internet can be used unethically by offering unfair services to a variety of stakeholders. It is argued that a neutral Internet does not allow for a quality-based prioritisation of the traffic and, as such, impairs some services and their users while unfairly favouring others. For example, in a condition of neutrality, P2P services can augment the latency of real-time, interactive services such as VoIP or remote shell connections. In such contexts, Internet neutrality supports unfair and discriminatory usage of resources based on uncontrolled competition. Therefore we suggest that, in order to avoid such negative consequences, Internet neutrality should be dropped in favour of a controlled, service-oriented prioritisation of the traffic.

The third section shows that, while a neutral Internet does not guarantee an ethical service and still allows for unethical practises, regulative policies raise important ethical issues if they are not devised in the context of an appropriate ethical framework. In particular, the discussion leads to the analysis of four main problems associated with the development of a regulative internet policy: (1) appropriation of the communication resources in favour of a pay-per-transaction model; (2) deterioration of the standard quality of service; (3) packet routing discrimination; and (4) unfair intra-service competition. These consequences would promote unethical conditions for Internet services, such as unfairness, discrimination, digital divide or lack of freedom for developers and users.

The fourth and final part of the paper analyses how the adoption of an ecological-ethical framework during the phase of policy-making would minimise unethical consequences in Internet regulation. An ecological approach requires one to consider the interplay between the interests of all the parts involved in the use, maintenance, development and monitoring of the Internet. The goal is to guarantee and balance different interests against each other, carefully evaluating the effects of each choice on all the stakeholders.

This approach has been successfully deployed in many existing communications networks (for example, private national highway systems, private national power-grids, world-wide transportation infrastructures) and we provide a detailed description. We then argue that the separation and ‘ecological’ regulation of different Internet services offered, in addition to a shared and possibly nationally controlled communication infrastructure, would make it possible to control unethical practises and optimise available resources.

The paper ends with two explanatory examples. They point out how Internet regulation, as opposed to the neutrality paradigm, can be leveraged in order to guarantee both ethical requirements and more efficient communications and services. The first example shows how to implement a policy to avoid spam by introducing subscription-based mail services modelled on physical mail delivery systems. The second example illustrates how a resource redistribution schema could guarantee a standard quality of service comparable to the one enjoyed today by Internet users.

REFERENCES

Goldsmith, J., Wu, T. 2006. Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Wu, T. 2005. Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law 2, 141-78.

Yoo, C. S. 2005. Beyond Network Neutrality. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 19(1), 1-24.

AUTHOR
Jin Tong

ABSTRACT

Information technology is changing the world, and cyberspace crosses borders between countries and cultures. A number of ethical issues are raised by the border-crossing nature of cyberspace. To deal with this ethical challenge, new policies (including, perhaps, new laws) are needed. The necessary cross-border policies should be based upon a “global”, cross-cultural ethics, and recent computer-ethics research regarding “global information ethics” can be helpful. Because human beings share a common human nature, our understanding of human autonomy, and its dependence on the acquisition and processing of information, provides a good starting point for research on global information ethics. The present paper focuses upon the examples of Confucian ethics and Aristotelian ethics in the search for a global information ethics. The paper is part of a larger project to identify and explore a common ethical foundation, based upon human nature, for all the great ethical traditions around the globe, both East and West.

Confucianism presupposes that all human beings are similar in nature. The Confucian thinker, Mencius, for example, emphasized that all humans are potentially good because, by nature, they all have four “seeds” or “roots” of moral virtue. These common roots give humans the potential to (1) set their will to become virtuous, (2) train their emotions, (3) engage in appropriate reflection and thinking, and (4) engage in appropriate actions. The Confucian thinker Xunzi also recognized the potential of all humans to become virtuous, but he focused instead upon his concern that humans start with an animal nature that can make them evil unless they use the power of their will and appropriate education, habituation and ritualization to become good.

Aristotle’s account of human nature and human virtue has much in common with Confucianism. For example, Aristotle also believed that humans share a common nature that gives them the potential to be virtuous. In addition, Aristotle also assumed that humans are born with an animal nature (he defined man as “the rational animal”) that can lead to evil, unless a person is properly educated, habituated and enlightened.

The common underpinning of Confucian and Aristotelian ethics is the understanding of human beings as autonomous agents, taking responsibility for their own actions and thereby determining whether or not they will be virtuous citizens. In this information age, a global ethics based upon this common understanding of moral excellence can, perhaps, be the foundation of a global information ethics that enables a worldwide ethical conversation on the Internet among all the cultures of the globe.

AUTHOR
J. Barrie Thompson

ABSTRACT

As stated in the call for papers “The information revolution has become a tidal wave that threatens to engulf and change all that humans value. Governments, organisations and individual citizens therefore would make a grave mistake if they view the computer revolution as merely technological. It is fundamentally social and ethical.” it is also made clear in the call that IT technology is a facilitator of social interaction, human endeavour and environmental wellbeing. However, to simply consider the technology is insufficient. It is essential that we consider both those who are developing the underlying technology itself and those who are using the technology in developing and supporting the IT systems on which so much of the world depends. It is people who are important and they must work beyond the technology, for as was highlighted in a recent high profile report [1]:

“A striking proportion of project difficulties stem from people in both customer and supplier organisations failing to implement known best practice. This can be ascribed to the general absence of collective professionalism in the IT industry, as well as inadequacies in the education and training of customer and supplier staff at all levels.”

The failure of many software projects to meet their objectives, or indeed the termination of partially completed projects, is an all-too-often occurrence. The ongoing problem of poor quality software has been repeatedly highlighted in published studies (e.g. [2]), and in major conference presentations (e.g.. [3]). The cost of these failures is enormous: a recent article [4] reported that in the UK, between 2000 and 2007, the total cost of abandoned Central Government computer projects had reached almost two billion pounds. These ongoing problems have obviously acted as a catalyst for particular national computing bodies to address professionalism in a proactive manner. In particular, the British Computer Society has undertaken, since 2005, an ambitious three-year managed programme [5] (named ProfIT) that has two key objectives:

1. By increasing professionalism, to improve the ability of business and other organisations to exploit the potential of information technology effectively and consistently.
2. To build an IT profession that is respected and valued by its stakeholders – government, business leaders, IT employers, IT users and customers – for the contribution that it makes to a more professional approach to the exploitation and application of IT.

The success of the BCS ProfIT effort can be judged from the fact that since January 2007 the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) has been working with the BCS and other professional bodies to develop an augmented international programme which has been named [6] the International Professional Practice Programme – I3P. The programme is intended to establish an international grouping to speak globally about issues relating to the profession and ensure that the voice of the ICT practitioner is clearly and powerfully expressed. There is also an aim to create a globally recognised accreditation, provisionally named the International IT Professional (IITP).

This paper will build on a paper published at Ethicomp 2007 [7] which charted earlier global and national developments relating to professionalism in the ICT sector and examined the first 18th months of work that had supported the ProfIT programme. The paper will cover the completion of the ProfIT programme and chart the latest developments relating to IFIP’s International Professional Practice Programme and related accreditation for the International IT Professional. It will also provide a critical appraisal of the likely effectiveness of these initiatives and finally an evaluation will be presented to assesses whether we are approaching a situation where IFIP’s definition of a professional, viz.

• Publicly ascribe to a code of ethics published within the standard.
• Be aware of and have access to a well-documented current body of knowledge relevant to the domain of practice.
• Have a mastery of the body of knowledge at the baccalaureate level.
• Have a minimum of the equivalent of two years supervised experience before the practitioner operates unsupervised.
• Be familiar with current best practice and relevant proven methodologies.
• Be able to provide evidence of their maintenance of competence.
  represents reality.

REFERENCES

[1] Royal Academy of Engineering , The Challenges of Complex IT Projects, Report of a working group from The Royal Academy of Engineering and The British Computer Society, 2004, available from: http://www.bcs.org/upload/pdf/complexity.pdf [accessed October 12 2006].

[2] R. L. Glass, Facts and Fallacies of Software Engineering, Pearson Education, Boston, 2003.

[3] C. Hughes C. (2006), Professionalism in IT, Keynote Address, 19th IFIP World Computer Congress (WCC 2006), Santiago, Chile, August 20-25, 2006, Presentation available from:

[4] B. Johnson And D Hencke, Not Fit For Purpose: £2bn Cost Of Government’s IT Blunders,Guardian, Saturday January 5, p11, 2008.

[5] BCS Professionalism in IT Programme, covered in a series of articles in the May 2006 issue of IT NOW, British Computer Society, Swindon, UK.

[6] Hughes C. (2007), International Professional Practice Programme – I3P, IFIP News, September 2007, P5, available from http://www.ifip.org

[7] Thompson, J. B. (2007), Globalisation and the IT Professional, 9th International ETHICOMP Conference, Meiji University, Tokyo, 27 to 29 March 2007, Proceedings pp. 564-575.

AUTHOR
Ian Stoodley and Christine Bruce

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to represent the conceptual world of IT professionals with respect to ethics and asserts that the most effective means of influencing their ethical behaviour rests in influencing professionals’ conceptions of their discipline and practice. Such influence is possible, through facilitating their encounter with alterative points of view. In this way, IT professionals’ understanding of their practice may be influenced to increasingly benefit others.

A change of professionals’ conception of the scope of IT and the possible ways of experiencing IT professional practice will engender a change in their ways of inhabiting their professional world. This will result in professionals living out an internally re-configured view of their practice – a change of behaviour which flows from a change of conception.

The traditional techno-centric conception of IT leaves user needs and social factors largely unexplored (Alter, 2003; Finkelstein & Hafner, 2002; Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001). This shapes IT experts’ and practitioners’ expectations of professional ethical practice. In contrast, proposed here is an expanded conceptualisation of IT, which brings others into focus. A Model of Ethical IT Professional Practice represents these views of IT in a conceptual map, along three continuums of:

1. Artefact Developer to Artefact User;
2. Technology to Information; and
3. Citizenship of My World to Citizenship of the Wider World.

Such a map may be used on an individual, group, organisational, professional or discipline level to reconceptualise the IT professional space, to guide future planning, to underpin ethical training and support, and to inspire ethical conduct.

The model builds on trends previously identified through empirical research, which found some IT researchers privileging end users over artefact developers and emphasising the information accessed rather than the enabling technology (Bruce, Pham, & Stoodley, 2004; Pham, Bruce, & Stoodley, 2005; Stoodley, 2007). From an ethical point of view, we suggest that a trend towards the consideration of end users and their information needs is a step in the right direction, however it needs to be underpinned and extended. This extension is indicated in further empirical research which shows some professionals reaching out beyond the technology and the client, to humanity (Stoodley, 2008).

The ethical responsibilities of IT professionals are represented in the model presented here, along a continuum from a self-focussed to a humanity-focussed view. IT professionals thus see themselves as citizens of distinct, though related, worlds. (‘Citizenship’ here represents professionals’ choice to make their home in the ethical terrain, where they enjoy certain rights and accept certain responsibilities.) Five citizenships serve to symbolize these worlds:

• citizenship of my world;
• citizenship of the corporate world;
• citizenship of a shared world;
• citizenship of the client’s world; and
• citizenship of the wider world.

The respective rights and responsibilities associated with these citizenships progressively focus away from the individual professional and towards third parties. The more ethically mature a professional is, the more of these citizenships will be represented in their portfolio.

A professional development course is suggested using this model. Such a course introduces participants to expanding horizons of responsibility, from their own world to the wider world. Supporting this approach is the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, who focussed on relationships of responsibility to others as the essence of ethics (Levinas, 1998), and the philosophy of Darryl Koehn, who argued that a relationship based on promise-making and trust is the only defensible ground of professional ethics (Koehn, 1994). Thus, ethics is seen as an increasingly other-centred attitude.

Following the educational Variation Theory (Marton & Booth, 1997), ethical formation for IT professionals would seek to introduce them to the full range of citizenships. This would serve to open their understanding of what it means to be an ethical IT professional to new vistas, influencing their conception of their professional practice. Activities which would engender such illumination include:

• self-assessment of their practice against the citizenships;
• examination of case studies of IT professionals representing the range of citizenships;
• involvement in practical projects which expose them to the range of citizenships;
• group discussion of the citizenships; and
• journaling of personal engagement with the citizenships.

AUTHOR
Paul Sollie

ABSTRACT

During a Department of Defence news briefing in February 2002, Donald Rumsfeld was confronted with the question concerning reports that stated that there was no evidence of a direct link between Iraq and some terrorist organisations. He subsequently answered:

“Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns — the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.”

(Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defence News Briefing, 12 February 2002, transcript of interview at: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636)

This comment was received with a chuckle by many, but Rumsfeld’s now famous reply carries a lot of truth. Many decisions in whatever sphere of life take place under conditions of risk and uncertainty, the known unknowns and unknown unknowns. Modern, complex technology development is a paradigm case of this category. Complex technology developments, like that of nanotechnology, virtual communities, or synthetic biology, confront us with dilemmatic problems. On the one hand, technology developments aim at making life more comfortable, less of a hardship, at increasing health and income, and the like. (Examples: heart-lung machine, Internet/CMC, automotive industry, etc.) On the other hand, modern technology developments are too a large extent indeterminate and problematic. Hence, we should be looking beyond technology. Due to aspects such as complexity and multistability, technologies often cause unanticipated and unforeseen problems (Examples: plastics, asbestos, property rights, CO2-emissions, global warming, etc.). If we take uncertainty of technology developments seriously, and I think we should, then this requires some critical reflection.

Hence, in this paper, which follows previous work , I will take up the issue of ‘Rumsfeldian unknowns’ by investigating uncertainty and the uniqueness debate in relation to the ethical assessment of technology development. Uncertainty, which is to be distinguished from risk because it does not allow for probabilistic analyses, is central to modern technology development. From an ethical perspective it is not only interesting but also necessary to evaluate new technology developments, because technologies might yield adverse and detrimental effects for human beings and the environment that are beyond control or prediction. One of the aims of ethics is concerned with applying criteria or principles to assess persons, situations, or, in casu, technology development. Contrary to other fields of ethical assessment, it is however often argued that the ethical assessment of technology development stands out as unique as it is complicated by the characteristics of modern technologies and factors such as complexity, risk, and uncertainty. The idea the technology and its ethical assessment is unique in some theoretical sense is coined the uniqueness thesis. For instance in Hans Jonas and Walter Maner characteristics of modern, complex technologies are presented that have led people to argue that these technologies pose unique problems. With Deborah Johnson I agree that we should distinguish between unique technologies and unique ethical issues. Whereas many modern technologies might be called unique, the challenging thesis is whether modern technologies pose unique ethical issues. Some scholars have argued for the uniqueness of ethical issues, which entails that the ethical assessment of modern technologies is at odds with traditional ethical theories and requires entirely new theories. I will, however, delineate that the complexity and uncertainty is not so much a problem of deficient or inadequate ethical theories as it is a problem of human beings (e.g. not being omniscient) and the nature of the situation (e.g. inherent uncertainty of natural processes or unpredictability of human behaviour). What is more, the same principles still apply, regardless of uncertainty! Instead of directing our attention to the discovery of new theories or approaches, we should focus on uncertainty, conceptualise it and take the results as input for further reflection on the ethical assessment of uncertain technology development. I will demonstrate that, by taking uncertainty seriously, we can find legitimate ways of dealing with uncertainty in technology development.

I will, first, argue that both pure substantive ethical theories and pure procedural ethical theories are inadequate for the ethical assessment of technology development that is surrounded by uncertainty. Pure substantive approaches do not suffice since they require information, which is lacking due to uncertainty, to arrive at moral judgments with regard to the situation under scrutiny. Pure procedural ethics can only say something about the structure of debate and not about the substance. It is not able to make moral judgments by guidance of moral principles based on the substance of the subject matter. This is a major deficit in procedural approaches and therefore I contend that we should strive for a substantive theory that is able to justifiably include a procedural approach. Second, I will show that such an account (and arguably the only) is offered in Gewirthian ethics. In Reason and Morality (1978) Gewirth propounds a rational justification for a supreme moral principle, which he coins the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC): ‘Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself.’ I will show that the PGC does not fall prey to the described inadequacies, but rather entails such a required procedural turn by definition as it justifiably accounts for both substantive (direct) and procedural (indirect) applications. Hence, it will be concluded that the PGC is a legitimate principle for dealing with uncertainty in the ethical assessment of technology development.