AUTHOR
Paula Roberts and Jenny Webber
University of South Australia

ABSTRACT

Losses due to computer break-ins by malicious outsiders or disgruntled employees are estimated to cost companies billions of dollars each year (Taylor 1999), but the detection and prosecution of these intruders is difficult because companies subjected to security break-ins are often oblivious to such damage, while others who do detect breaches of their information systems choose not to disclose such events, fearing the commercial damage associated with loss of consumer confidence once weaknesses in corporate computer systems are revealed.

Behar (1997) notes that security issues have come into sharper focus as greater corporate dependence on e-mail and networks has been matched by increasing amounts of economic espionage from ‘crackers’, that is, malicious intruders. This increased vulnerability to attack has been paralleled by government requirements that companies take responsibility for keeping their own data secure, and be held liable for losses incurred by ‘downstream’ companies damaged by the host company’s lax computer security.

Some former hackers from the heyday of thrill-seeking computer break-ins are now assisting system operators to establish and maintain sound security practices by testing system vulnerability with their own specialised knowledge, thus helping to foil the activities of the malicious, criminal ‘crackers’ (Sprenger 2000).

Taylor (1999) believes this hacker expertise is needed because a knowledge gap has developed in the security industry as computer programming has moved from a craft-based practice, (typically that of the early creative, if less-than-disciplined hackers), to a scientific reliance on standardised procedures. Deficiencies in computer security reveal problems caused by a similar change in computing education, reflected in an under-valuing of practical knowledge of system vulnerability gained by experimental, hands-on experience. Taylor argues that crackers take advantage of this situation and simply use trivial holes left by inexperienced programmers who have not been taught the limitations of system security.

But the use of hackers by the security industry begs the ethical question of whether hackers who have developed their skill by breaking into organizational systems should now be used for the rightful purpose of strengthening computer security.

However, it could be argued that these former hackers display an ethos, not imposed by professional codes of conduct, but one based on an intrinsic set of values and beliefs, inspired by an inherent respect for computers and the information computers contain, which is accompanied by an abhorence for those who do not share this respect. The practical application of this ethos is displayed, when, for no apparent pecuniary gain, hackers have spent considerable time in obsessively tracking down malicious intruders and bringing them to account for the damage they have caused, not only to organizations, but to the ethos of the former hacking fraternity (Stoll 1991; Shimomura 1996).

Developing ethical sensitivity in a community of practice
Roush (1995) cites the hacker, ‘Knightmare’, who in his book, Secrets of a Super Hacker, defines an ethos of mature, ‘responsible’ hacking, explained as ‘never harming any computer, software, system or person, nor profiting from a “hack”, but instead informing computer managers of their systems’ weaknesses’. Thus a ‘true hacker’ has ‘the ability to steal money, information, software, and hardware and to commit sabotage and espionage, but chooses to do none of these things’ (Roush 1995:35).

This passion for their computing craft in a hacker community of elitist computing skill was accompanied by a contempt for government and corporate computer systems which, in the hackers’ view, constituted a misuse of information technology by contradicting the constitutional rights of citizens with respect to the freedom of information. Thus the hacker ethos has reflected both an intrinsic desire to preserve and extend its own conduct and expertise, and an external motivation to attack and expose the vulnerability of institutionalised computer data systems.

Blum (1994: 146) discusses the relationship between virtue and community in the writings of MacIntyre (1984: 194) who states ‘the essential function of the virtues is clear. Without them, without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of institutions’ (1984: 194). Blum argues that virtues can only be learned and sustained in a community of practice. Thus, the ethics of virtue are not an alternative, but are complementary to the ethics of universality, that is, while based upon universal ethical principles, the commonly held views of the practice community are indigenous and characteristic to its particular activities.

Furthermore Blum argues, ‘a practice, like a profession, is characterized as much by the way its participants conduct themselves as in the skills they develop and the purposes to which they are committed’. Therefore, if hacking is perceived by hackers as an elite practice, with internal goals and standards which are pursued in a moral way for their own sake, then a member of the hacking practice-community would be expected only ever to apply their elite technical expertise to responsible hacking, and not to malicious cracking. Members would also be required to track down and expose deviates (crackers), who by their behaviour were damaging both the integrity of the practice-community, and the wider society.

Such virtuous hacking stems from an earlier craft-like bricoleur approach to computer programming. This holistic approach to computing explains hacking’s lasting appeal to subsequent generations and is the strongest reason why hacking is likely to survive in some form or another, even as programming develops towards more science-based methods (Taylor 1999:88).

There are parallels here in the training of artisans in the guilds of pre-industrial times, a training embedded in the craftsman/apprentice relationship which encouraged not only a transfer of skills but also the development and then guardianship of the ethos of the craft for future generations.

Thus, contemporary computing ‘apprentices’ should be assisted in developing a moral sensitivity for the systems they use and the safety of the information which computers store, at the same time that computing expertise develops. This skills/ethics dichotomy presents a strong argument for an integrated approach to the teaching of computing ethics in mainstream computing subjects (Roberts 1994; Roberts & Webber 1999) so that computing skill development is matched by the development of a moral sensitivity for the social responsibility that skill entails.

REFERENCES

Behar, R. (1997) ‘Who’s reading your e-mail’. Time, February 3, 64-67.

Blum, L.A. (1994) Moral Perception and Particularity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MacIntyre, A.C. (1984) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd Edn. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.

Roberts, P.M. (1994) ‘The place and pedagogy of teaching ethics in the computing curriculum’ Australian Educational Computing, April.

Roberts, P.M. & Webber, J. (1999) ‘Visual Truth in the Digital Age: Towards a Protocol for Image Ethics’ Australian Computer Journal, 31, 3:78-82.

Roush, W. (1995) ‘Hackers: Taking a byte out of computer crime’. Technology Review, April: 32-40.

Shimomura, T. (with Markoff, J.) (1996) Take-Down: The Pursuit and Capture of Kevin Mitnick, America’s Most Wanted Computer Outlaw – By the Man Who Did It. New York: Hyperion.

Sprenger, P. (2000) ‘Tiger teammates, hacking bright’ Information Age, August/September: 32.

Stoll, C. (1991) The Cuckoo’s Egg. New York: Doubleday.

Taylor, P.A. (1999) Hackers: Crime in the Digital Sublime. London & New York: Routledge.

AUTHOR

Helen Richardson
Information Systems Research Centre
University of Salford

ABSTRACT

We are said to be living in a new economy, a virtual age where information is power and strategic use of Information Technology paramount. Electronic media can enable organisations to deliver products and services more efficiently and effectively allowing for competitive advantage through internal networks and external customer management (Loebbecke 1998). In this context CRM is the new buzz phrase. CRM systems are about ‘allowing organisations to do a better job in contacting customers, caring for them and providing quality, service and value’ (Yourdon 2000). CRM is increasingly about use of call centres and Datamonitor predicts that the global call centre software market will reach £5.3bn by 2003 (FT 2000). CRM is not without it’s critics. It is popular for those ‘managing’ customers but can stimulate different emotions if you are the ‘managed’. Indeed CRM often raises issues of privacy and accusations of exploitation – ‘where is the R in CRM – it’s all about customer management’ (Professor Stone in FT 2000). There are startling contrasts in the image of CRM systems in call centres. For the consultants and employers, they mean knowledge intensive, strategic use of technology, flexible working and utility of all those new ways of working like flattened organisations, teamwork and empowerment. For others, they are the ‘sweatshops of the 21st century’ (Belt et al 2000).

This paper catalogues the rise and rise of call centres in the NW of England, UK. Ironically these are often housed in the old mills and engineering shops once foremost in the industrial revolution but long since idle. That is until the ‘virtual’ age and we consider whether this is indeed the new economic era heralding the information economy accompanied by new ways of working, or history repeating itself. Call centre work is characterised by temporary, short-term contracts, agency working and casual employment. Nevertheless, in our research, we shadow 4 call centre workers over a period of 2 years to report on their work experience in a number of centres. We catalogue their tales of stress, burn out, sacking, job changes and frustration but also the community, solidarity and collective action that suggest a more rosy future than the ‘dark satanic call centre mills’ seems to offer. The ethical issues we raise lie in the inherent contradiction of CRM systems and their use in call centres. We consider communication richness, privacy, management techniques and general problems of computer ethics in an organisational context.

Even for managers, CRM raises questions of privacy with IT strategic guerrilla’s locking in systems and knowledge of others in the value chain. For call centre workers, issues of privacy are tied up with work practices. Headsets are worn with call after call streaming in – always another one waiting. CRM systems means codifying intellectual capital with software providing ‘scripts’ enabling monitoring and call analysis. This metaphorically, if not physically, welds the worker and machine into a streamlined and controlled knowledge system. No aspect of a call centre workers day is unaccounted for. They are profiled, listened in to, their opening remarks are analysed as are wrap-up time and phrases used. Their sales content of the conversation, achievement of call numbers and sales targets scrutinised. Their off-line frequency, intimate toilet habits are considered and discussed at teamwork supervision sessions as are perceived attitudes displayed during conversations with customers. Ethical issues of workplace privacy generally centre around concepts of personal autonomy and dignity infringed by these practices, yet some would suggest workplace privacy should extend further, worthy of becoming a matter of organisational justice (Introna 1999). CRM rhetoric emphasises quality customer care and how this is related to effective communication, by particularly the gatekeepers – a role delivered by call centre workers. This leads us to a general discussion of communication richness in an organisational context that goes beyond considering Information Communication Technologies merely as information transferors and processors, but constitute new statuses and formation of new identities (Flores 1998). Others have suggested that ‘good’ management should adopt rich media (Ngwenyama and Lee 1997) and how limiting electronic media is in it’s richness. Nevertheless our research reveals how call centre staff circumvent the scripts and controlled phrases and rich human communication and problem solving makes the job more satisfying. This is despite facing frequent and sustained verbal abuse from customers.

We then explore issues of CRM system use in call centres and the adoption of teamwork and empowerment management techniques. Again contradictions are evident with CRM systems designed to dis-empower sales staff. Our qualitative research reports on the ways in which sales roles changed in the 2 years of our study. To start the process of ethical decision making, some have suggested that ‘when it comes to virtual organisations, we must first have a set of commonly accepted values and norms’ (Gotterbarn 1999). We look at the realities of using teamwork and empowerment techniques in call centres and suggest that the gap is too wide between call centre workers and management for this to be achieved. Teamwork sessions in our study included dissemination of orders from the top down and attempts to exert team pressure on the ‘weakest link’. Often these measures backfired with general community solidarity of call centre workers overriding team identity. In an extreme case, headsets were taken off until old shift patterns were restored but more often management techniques were side-stepped, exposed and ridiculed.

We have talked about the contradictions of call centres and CRM systems. They are exploitative and work against communication richness. They increase bureaucracy yet supposedly embrace empowerment. They are about control of communication and yet to provide quality to customers, need to enhance the ”company ambassadorial” role of call centre workers (Frenkel et al 1999). Computer ethics and its adherence to technological determinism and liberalism are problematic for understanding issues of equality and participation (Adam 1999), and moreover power structures play a large part in the making and accepting of knowledge (Adam and Richardson 2000). In this context it is our contention that a debate on the ethical issues of CRM systems, information management and call centres is long overdue.

REFERENCES

Adam A (1999) Computer Ethics in a different voice in The Proceedings of the 1st Critical Management Conference. Manchester July 1999

Adam A, Richardson H (2000) Feminist Philosophy and Information Systems (under review)

Belt V, Richardson R, Webster J (2000) Women’s work in the Information Economy: the case of telephone call centres Information Communication and Society 3:3 2000

FT. (2000) Understanding CRM FT Financial Times. Spring 2000 www.ft.com/crm/

Flores F (1998) Information Technology and the institution of identity Information Technology and People Vol 11 no 4 1998

Frenkel S, Korczynski M, Shire K, Tam M (1999) On the Front Line: Organisation of Work in the Information Economy (Cornel University Press)

Gotterbarn D (1999) An ethical decision support tool in The proceedings of the 4th ETHICOMP conference 1999

Introna L (1999) Privacy, autonomy and workplace surveillance in The proceedings of the 4th ETHICOMP conference 1999

Loebbecke C (1998) Economics of content provision on the Internet in The proceedings of the 8th Annual BIT conference. Manchester November 1999

Ngwenyama O.K., and Lee A.S, (1997) Communication richness in e-mail MISQ Vol 21 No 2 June 1997

Yourdon E (2000) Introduction to the special issue on CRM Cutter Journal Vol 13 No 10 October 2000

AUTHOR

Michal Ren
Computer science student,
Research associate at the Multimedia Laboratory of Institute of Cultural Studies, Adam Mickiewicz University,
Poznan,Poland

ABSTRACT

The main objective of my paper is to present arguments supporting the following thesis: the activities of certain software developers (including large, well-known companies such as Microsoft or Logitech) closely resemble crimes known and described in literature, particularly in the computational ethics field (1). The aforementioned software developers include in their programs – without future user’s knowledge nor consent – software “gifts” that induce changes in the computer’s performance. Their presence often disrupts normal operation of the operating system or other applications, sometimes even forcing the user to reinstall the operating system with all the consequences; that needs to be defended against!

The proliferation of Internet access created an easy way for software developers to distribute their work. These days it is often unnecessary to pay for any program – lots of freeware is there for the taking! It goes without saying that this situation benefits every user. However, free software does not always work as expected. It is understandable that programs developed by individuals, without quality assurance and peer review, may contain bugs. But sometimes authors intentionally add, shall we say, hidden functionality to their software. These programs are called “trojan horses” or “trojans” for short, but only if their hidden functions are malignant in nature. Yet nobody would complain if a program played a song every Friday the 13th. Complacency can be dangerous, however. If a program does one thing which nobody knew about, maybe it also does something else – something not as easily dismissed as harmless. Among the most common activities is spying on the user, or robbing him or her of privacy by any means possible. This can be accomplished by, for example, embedding a unique identification number in every document saved by a word processor, as was the case with Microsoft Word (2). Any document could then be tracked back to the computer it was created on.

Even more insidious than identification of a computer (in MS Word’s case the ID was actually derived from the hard drive) is the identification of a person using it. The Internet allows for free flow of information and, unfortunately, also for dissemination of information about the user, usually without his or her consent. It is frightening how much information is routinely given away by web browsers (3,4) – the entered email address is the most common example. Recently advertisers went beyond simple spam (unsolicited email messages (5)). So called “web bugs” are more and more common on web pages. They are small, almost invisible (often consisting of only one transparent pixel), and they allow the advertising company to track the use through every web site he or she visits, provided they are also “bugged” (6). The data is later compiled for “targeted advertising”. Often in the privacy statements of the companies involved users are assured that “no personally identifiable information is obtained”, but if that is the case, how can one target advertisements at a particular user? (Assuming that no information is available on any particular user.) Such claims are often simply lies. (7)

Distributing advertisements through the Internet allowed software developers to generate revenue simply by forcing users to watch advertisements while using their program. A new term was coined – “adware”. The authors are often trying to blur the distinction between it and freeware (software available for free). (8) Some costs of using adware are easily quantifiable – many people pay for connection time, and downloading advertisements can take a long time. There are often hidden costs, such as loss of privacy. Often programs advertised as adware could be better described as “spyware” (2,9), since they intentionally spy on the user, collect intimate information, and then phone home at an opportune time to transfer it. (2)

The solution seems to be simple – remove all malignant software from the system. It is very difficult in practice, at least on Microsoft Windows operating systems, which are the most common on desktop computers right now. Shareware authors graciously allow users to install their software, try it, and later uninstall if it proves to be unsuitable for the task. It is a well known fact, that most of them can not be deleted completely, at least without some serious effort on the user’s part. An even simpler, and more effective solution is not to install any suspect software. However, not always there is a choice. Recently I’ve had to install Logitech digital camera, and in order to do that, I needed appropriate drivers. The provided installation program insisted on installing RealPlayer, and just would not take no for an answer. Of course, RealPlayer would not uninstall, so I ended up manually deleting it. In short, in order to use the hardware, I was forced to install software which I neither wanted, nor needed.

How can one defend? Only by participating in the arms race of software against software. There are utilities for removing spyware (10), deleting unwanted software without a trace (11), filtering advertisements and web bugs (12), and for preventing unauthorized connections from one’s own computer (13). This advice applies to the users of Windows operating systems. At least for now, the only complete solution is to switch to a different, open source OS such as Linux, and to compile all applications from source code. This way, no hidden functionality can sneak through. Unfortunately, by a normal user this would be viewed as an extreme measure.

1. cf. T. Forester & P. Morrison, Computer Ethics, MIT Press, 1995 (second Edition)
2. Privacy Foundation
3. Privacy.Net – The Consumer Information Organization
4. Gibson Research Corporation
5. Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email
6. Web bugs
7. Electronic Frontier Foundation
8. news://alt.comp.freeware
9. The Spyware Infested Software List
10. Ad-aware
11. RegCleaner
12. WebWasher
13. ZoneAlarm

AUTHOR

Dr Harjinder Rahanu
School of Computing Science
Middlesex University
The Burroughs
London

Eva Turner
Principal Lecturer
Department of Innovation Studies
University of East London
Royal Albert Way
London

ABSTRACT

Teaching in ethics for computing students may take many forms, for example, as part of technical module; separate module taught in technical departments; or module taught in other departments, such as a Philosophy module. The second form is the technique used at Middlesex University. The module is delivered to computer science and business information systems students. The experience gained by the authors in delivering this module has led to several changes in the approach and syllabus of the module. The paper describes the rationale for the development of a distance learning application on the Internet. This application is seen as a mode for future delivery of the module.

During its history the module has evolved accordingly due to the introduction of new teaching personnel; to new computing technologies and their respective ethical issues, which have implied revisions to content; to changes in student profiles and to logistics issues in running the module across a number of distributed campuses. The analysis of each change describes the challenges that academics face in educating the professionals of tomorrow in the context of undergraduate courses at university level. It is hoped that the lessons learnt from this case study can assist fellow academics that are working on developing modules to teach ethics to computing students. The paper discusses whether there can be one standard curriculum suitable for distance learning.

Introduction of new personnel
The introduction of new personnel involved with delivering the module at Middlesex University has invoked changes to the module syllabus. Each member of the teaching team introduces a certain expertise to the module. If the involvement of any specific member is lost then this can, and has had, profound effect on the content of the module. Respective units on the module can be lost or replaced according to the loss or recruitment of teaching staff. On occasions this can be detrimental to the learning outcomes of the computer ethics module. The development of the distance learning application on the Internet is seen as a possible solution to this issue.

Introduction of new computing technologies
The ever-rapid introduction of new computing technologies invokes respective ethical issues. Each advent implies revisions to content of the module. The impact of the development and deployment of the Internet is a classic example of how a new technology has implied changes in the syllabus of the computer ethics module. New units have been developed for introduction into the module. This implies that

1. A typical 12 week semester, each teaching week corresponding to specific topic, constraints the number of topics that can be covered. The development of each new unit implies a conscious decision being made as to which existing unit must be replaced, if at all.
2. Each member must be professionally competent to deliver a unit. The introduction of new units implies the possibility that staff may not have the relevant expertise. This factor influences whether the adoption of a new unit is successful or not.

The above can have a profound affect on the learning outcomes of a module. The development of the distance learning application on the Internet is seen as a possible solution to this issue. The expertise of teaching staff can be captured and delivered to students. The syllabus is neither constrained by timetable issues or the possible lack of expertise.

Changes in student profiles
The module was originally developed with the intention of delivering to traditional information systems students. However, recently computer science and information technology students have been given the choice of choosing the module as an option. The pre requisite skills and knowledge that the students have influence the delivery of a unit. The paper will highlight the pre requisite knowledge the students may or may not share when they begin the module, and this is of importance because it influences the deliver of computer ethics modules. In addition, in terms of learning outcomes there has been a greater emphasis placed on developing transferable skills. These skills will be identified in the paper.

Logistics issues in a distributed campus environment
The current computer ethics module is run across three campuses at Middlesex University distributed over North London. Issues of timetable, additional teaching and research commitments imply that more often than not a lecturer cannot deliver units themselves across all three campuses. Reliance on additional staff in assisting the on delivery of module units at other sites is paramount. However, as argued above each respective team member has specific expertise, which they introduce into the module. On occasions a lecturer can find themselves in a position where they feel that they do not have the level of competency to justly deliver a unit. In these instances the student learning experience is impinged and ultimately detrimental to their learning outcomes. The development of the distance learning application on the Internet is seen as a possible solution to this issue assisting as a support mechanism for teaching and learning.

The development of the distance learning application on the Internet
In addition, the paper highlights the work initiated on developing distance learning via the Internet. It is envisaged that initially Intranet technologies will assist in primarily resolving the logistics issue in delivering the module across three distributed campuses at Middlesex University. Upon successful completion of the project the scheme will be updated to an Internet solution offering universities distributed across the UK and world to use the site as a teaching and learning resource. The development of the application will be ideally utilizing multi media technology. The incorporation of text, audio and video images, alongside an on-line discussion group is seen as the future delivery mode for this module. In conclusion the paper will discuss the viability of long distance learning as applicable to this subject area.

AUTHOR

Brian T. Prosser
Dept. of Philosophy
Fordham University
Bronx,NY

Andrew Ward
School of Public Policy
685 Cherry Street
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta,GA

ABSTRACT

“The world’s fundamental misfortune,” the 19th century Søren Kierkegaard writes, “is …the fact that with each great discovery …the human race is enveloped … in a miasma of thoughts, emotions, moods, even conclusions and intentions, which are nobody’s, which belong to none and yet to all…” The great discoveries Kierkegaard is referring to are those made possible by the use of technology, and his concern is that the use of technology often results in human beings having a “destitute” relationship to the world. As exemplified for Kierkegaard by the popular press, the use of technologies not only transform face-to-face relationships, they create masks behind which people hide from one another. It is this latter point that is especially important. For Kierkegaard, what ultimately drives people to use technology, and to create masks through its use, is fear. “What rules the world,” Kierkegaard writes, “is… the fear of humanity. Therefore this fear of being an individual and this proneness to hide under one abstraction or another…. Ultimately an abstraction is related to fantasy, and fantasy becomes an enormous power… [T]he human race became afraid of itself, fosters the fantastic, and then trembles before it.”

Although the prose may be somewhat oblique, what Kierkegaard recognizes is that traditional face-to-face encounters between individuals structure the dynamics of communication in ways that can be avoided through the use of various technologies. For instance, face-to-face communications often permit the immediate and dynamic clarification of the appropriateness of a particular piece of information. Moreover, the contexts of face-to-face communications generally impose a stronger concern for the veracity of information and instill in the participants a greater sense of responsibility both for what is communicated and how it is communicated. For Kierkegaard such elements are essential to our most “important” and characteristically human experiences. Using technology to avoid these experiences represents, for Kierkegaard, a fear of, and an attempt to flee from what it is that is most important and characteristic of our own humanity. Kierkegaard, like many others, sees an inherent tendency to transform human experience in the use of technology. However, what particularly concerns him is that using technology to mediate our communications permits us to reconstruct human relationships devoid of the experiences most important to our humanity. For these reasons Kierkegaard writes that, “[F]rom fear of the others, one dares not to be an I and therefore strives to become an impersonal something…. This again has led to anonymity.” The dynamic force behind contemporary technology is, for Kierkegaard, fear, which turns the impersonal, anonymity-enhancing powers of technology into an attraction.

It is the possibilities of anonymity permitted by the use of technology that, as Kierkegaard sees it, removes communication from what he refers to as “The Situation”. The Situation represents for Kierkegaard that characteristic of individual existence that distinguishes the “individual” from the “crowd” or “the public”. In “The Situation” you and I have the possibility of having an encounter not as anonymous agents, but as people with distinctive, accessible histories. Because of this, communication within “The Situation” can become individualized – my words can become words meant for you and words that you can recognize as being from me. When communication is removed from this context, the identity of those communicating becomes a mere abstraction, and words cease to belong to anyone in particular. In an anonymous exchange devoid of particular content, “all personal communication and all individuality have disappeared; no one says I or speaks to a Thou…. It is the old sophistry of being able to talk – but not of holding a dialogue. For dialogue immediately posits: Thou and I, and such questions as require ‘yes’ and ‘no’….” Impersonal, technologically-generated contexts become, for Kierkegaard, a “miasma” that offers a convenient escape for those who are unwilling to accept the often challenging, sometimes even distressing, contingencies and expectations that are unavoidable in face-to-face “dialogue” between individuals.

So, what is to be done with all of this? Kierkegaard’s analysis offers an insightful explanation of why someone would write, as Maia Szalavitz recently did in a Newsweek editorial, that “I was immediately hooked by [the Internet…] a world where what you write – not how you look or sound – is who you are. It had definite appeal to someone who has always found socializing difficult.” We often allow technological replacement of standard face-to-face activities, not because we fail to realize that the number of immediate face-to-face interactions is diminishing, but because the reduction is taking place. As Szalavitz suggests, we often appreciate not having to deal with the “difficulties” that traditional relational contexts require. But, is there not something “healthy” about learning to deal with those difficulties? Such questions encourage us to reconsider Kierkegaard’s fundamental assumption that there are some experiences – perhaps constituted by, or inherent in traditional face-to-face activities – which simply cannot be captured in and conveyed by technologically mediated communications. As Kierkegaard’s “fear of humanity” thesis suggests, perhaps some of our attempts to reach beyond the legitimate framework of such relationships arise not because we are trying to preserve the relationships to an illegitimate extent, but because we are trying to subvert them and escape them. Consequently, Kierkegaard challenges us to question our motives for wanting to displace such activities.

If, as people other than Kierkegaard have agreed, technologically-mediated contexts really do foster a more impersonal atmosphere of communication, and if Kierkegaard is right that such impersonality and anonymity diminish important aspects of interpersonal relationships, then we should ask why we increasingly allow technology to transform our world in such ways. Kierkegaard’s claim of a psychological attraction toward anonymity and interpersonal isolation – an attraction that comes from within the individual – suggests that it is insufficient to describe “technological reality” as “invading” the private space that is the individual. For Kierkegaard there is always complicity involved in the way we allow ourselves to be transformed by technological society. Technology, even in its negative forms, enters our lives as much by invitation as by invasion. From a Kierkegaardian perspective, technological society plays an enabling role for the “fearful” individual who chooses to hide behind the fantastic abstractions provided by technology.

With these remarks in mind, we will explore in more detail the Kierkegaardian critique of technologically mediated communications. We will compare the Kierkegaard’s account of technology’s appeal with that offered by Marcuse in an attempt to delineate the degree to which technology is responsible for dehumanizing our relationships with others. Finally, we will offer some positive recommendations for how technology can, in some carefully defined contexts, offer possibilities for communication that should be embraced and supported.

AUTHOR

Mary Prior
Department of Information Systems
De Montfort University

ABSTRACT

Summary In the author’s place of work, CCTV has been installed in a variety of locations. Research is being undertaken to establish:

1. the decision-making process leading to the installation of surveillance equipment;
2. the awareness and perceptions of those who are subjects of the surveillance.

This paper will present the outcomes of this research, in the context of ethical issues raised by the question of surveillance in the workplace.

Introduction
A perennial problem for any university, but particularly for one based within a city, is how to ensure the security of the buildings, the equipment and the people who work there. One solution that has been adopted is to use CCTV in areas such as computer laboratories where equipment is vulnerable to abuse or theft. In the author’s place of work, a number of CCTV cameras have been installed in recent years, the purpose of which can be presumed to be to protect expensive equipment and to ensure the safety of both staff and students in a building that is open late on dark, winter evenings on an easily-accessible site close to a city centre. Presumed, because there does not appear to have been open debate nor consultation with respect to surveillance policy. While an organisation has every right to protect its resources, a number of issues are raised by the installation of surveillance equipment. Thus this research is being undertaken to clarify the decision-making process within the author’s institution and the extent to which ethical considerations have been taken into account. At the same time, the awareness of students as subjects of surveillance is being investigated.

Methodology
The paper will present a rationale for the methodology used to undertake the research and the procedures involved to ensure that the ethical issues raised by the use of human subjects have been addressed.

Surveillance policy and practice within a UK university
The first issues to be addressed are who was responsible for deciding to install the CCTV cameras in a particular building and where to position them, and for what reasons this decision was taken. The extent of any ongoing review of the effectiveness of surveillance and indeed, whether any measures of effectiveness have been established, will be discussed. The protocols observed with respect to the films recorded will be examined as will the question of whether any consideration has been given at any stage to the ethical dimension of workplace surveillance. The research will reveal whether any of the decision-making has been made within the framework of institutional policy or whether responsibility currently lies at a more local (departmental) level.

Student awareness and attitudes
The second strand of the research involves investigating the extent to which students are aware of the surveillance mechanisms that are in place and the issues associated with them. This is being undertaken by means of a survey which will not identify individuals but which will reveal any evidence of differences based on factors such as year of study, course and gender. The research instrument is designed to help determine whether students perceive surveillance of themselves within the university as raising equivalent issues to surveillance of employees within the workplace.

Issues and outcomes
Finally, the paper will present the issues raised by the research.

Just as there is a need for guidelines to ensure ethically sensitive use of surveillance in the workplace, there is likely to be a need for guidelines for the ethical use of surveillance within a higher education context. While an institution has the right to protect its resources it also has a duty to observe the human rights of its students and employees. The question of how to attempt to balance these competing objectives will be addressed.

The investigation of the awareness and perceptions of the students who are subjects of surveillance adds another interesting dimension to this paper, likely to raise as many further questions to address as it answers.