AUTHOR

Antonio Marturano (UK)

ABSTRACT

According to Hardt and Negri (2000, p. 3), we have two different trends in the account of globalisation: one is seeing that phenomenon as rising up “spontaneously” out of the interactions of radically heterogeneous global forces, as if this order were a harmonious concert orchestrated by the natural and neutral hidden hand of the world market; the other sees globalisation as dictated by a single power and a single centre of rationality transcendent to global forces, guiding the various phases of historical development to its conscious and all-seeing plan something like, they say, a “conspiracy theory of globalisation”. Seems to me Negri and Hardt follow this line along their entire book without asking if historically these two different and incompatible views on globalisation have merged neither are questioning about the consequences of keeping quite well separated these two alternative narratives.

Another interesting question is raised by Anthony Giddens well known book The Third Way (Giddens, 1998). Giddens argues with Hirst and Thompson’s (1996) claim that a fully globalised economy is the result of the advance of trade within and across different economic blocs which has simply taken us back to the late nineteenth century (Giddens, cit, p. 29). Giddens, in other words, claims that globalisation is a very new phenomena as its salient characteristics (such as the fall of the keynesian economies which, on the contrary, characterised the first post-war era, and the revolution communication) are not shared with the late nineteenth century.

In my opinion an alternative conception of globalisation is provided by Bertrand Russell. In the present essay I will argue against Hardt and Negri, that the “spontaneous” account and the “conspiracy theory” of globalisation were historically not so broadly sharpened, but on the contrary both accounts merged together. In Bertrand Russell these two diverse account are reunited, becoming what Louis Greenspan called as “the incompatible prophecies” (Greenspan, 1978) which form the basis for the actual impasse in the world politics. Moreover we will argue against Gidden’s account of globalisation as a revolutionary and unprecedented step. Russell, in fact, provides arguments for looking at the actual state of globalisation as, according to K. Coates (1993, p.7), a world situation which resumes something closer to the condition that was familiar to him at the beginning of the past convulsive century, against which Mao launched his ragged and heroic legions.

Russell in fact explain in a very straightforward way how information technology and the rising of the multinationals was leading since the nineteenth century to the actual process of globalisation. The peculiarity of Bertrand Russell’s notion of Globalisation is thus the fact that he envisages how its two driving forces such as technology and economics, localisms and the lacking of a supranational legal system were going to create a colliding clash. Hardt and Negri’s starting point is Kelsen’s vision of international law which was at the basis on the actual aspect of the UN in order to balance the weight of the single nations. However they even realising the reduction of the importance of the single nations (or at least that nations having not a leading role on the international scenery) they not didn’t realised, as Russell clearly explain, that step was achieved by the rising of the multinationals in the beginning of the past century. A shift in the globalisation paradigm is therefore realised: there is a change in the paradigm of World Order when we understand that from a supranational legal system (which is needed for peace-keeping reasons) we need to pass to a World Government which is needed not only for peace-keeping reasons but also to allow the multinationals (which have the real power inside the single state-nations – that is they are leading the international politics) to have a free trade across the nation independent from localisms. Not only a supranational legal system for peace-keeping is needed (that’s what Kant and Kelsen had in mind) but also a system of international free trade in order to protect business.

REFERENCES

Giddens, A. (1998): The Third Way, London, Polity Press

Greenspan, L. (1978): The Incompatible Prophecies, Oakville (Ont.), Mosaic Press

Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000): Empire, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press

Kelsen, H. (1960): Reine Rechtslehre, Wien, Springer-Verlag

Coates, K. (1993): Forewords to The Problems of China, Nottingham, Spokesman

Russell, B. (1923): The Prospects of Industrial Civilization, London, Routledge, 1996

AUTHOR

Thomas M. Powers (USA)

ABSTRACT

The literature in business ethics on the topic of individual and corporate responsibility is heavily indebted to H.L.A. Hart’s analysis of the concept of responsibility. That analysis leads to some interesting philosophical problems, e.g., that the corporation may not be responsible per se for the ill it does because it lacks rationality, intentionality, and hence moral capacity. It also leads to some dissatisfying results, e.g, that Ford’s responsibility for the many exploding Pinto automobiles is somehow diminished by additional causal factors in the crashes, beyond the obvious factor of Ford’s design. Ultimately, the only practical suggestion is to reduce the moral question to the legal one, and formulate systems of legal liability to punish, after the fact, those who have been irresponsible . For the businessperson who wishes to act responsibly in releasing a product for sale, Hart’s analysis of responsibility may lead to paralysis; it may transform the moral agent into a mere legal subject.

Private sector software engineers and managers find themselves in a similar fix. Especially for those who produce safety critical software in competitive markets, there is the Scylla of releasing poor quality software too early, and the Charybdis of releasing high quality software too late. [McConnell 1997] While there are technical tools (testing, formal methods), organizational procedures (peer review), and legal maneuvers (disclaimers and licensing agreements) to help in this decision, the ethical models for proactive responsible behavior are often lacking. I will argue that the two primary views of responsibility, stemming from “Hippocratic” and Utilitarian theories, respectively, offer poor conceptions of responsibility. Ultimately I advocate a Kantian approach, supplemented by a game-theoretic conception of ethical codes put forth by the economist Kenneth Arrow. I intend my approach to appeal to people who are inclined toward the deontological view, but to be able to withstand objections from egoists and other consequentialists.

The Hippocratic moral view is essentially conservative and has one strict requirement: do no harm. Formal work in program verification, or proving programs “correct,” is the one great hope for this view of responsibility. Unfortunately, verification is at present impossible for programs of moderate complexity, and even if programs were provably correct in relation to a specification, we have no formal way of knowing that a specification is correct in relation to the world in which it is to operate. [Cantwell Smith, 1985] Hence this absolutist view of responsibility would require that many good and reliable programs not be released. Effectively, the verification method of the Hippocratic view turns the ethical question of responsibility into a computational one, and it is a question which software engineers must ultimately answer in the negative, for now.

The second method, that of the cost-benefit-analysis (CBA), is tied to a Utilitarian conception of responsibility. In particular, CBA becomes the method of choice for questions about acting responsibly from the Market Utilitarian perspective, since it resolves the measurement problem that has plagued Utilitarianism since Bentham’s announcement of the view. For safety-critical software engineering, the Utilitarian view leads to disastrous results, I argue, much like it was used in Ford’s decision to release the Pinto, and could similarly be used to justify the software engineering decisions by AECL in the Therac-25 case. CBA, it seems, can easily become an unreflective, institutionalized decision procedure. Its aptness often turns on luck, market factors (such as time-to-market pressure), and an easy conflation of instrumental and intrinsic values. Probabilities can be introduced in the software engineer’s CBA [Fenton, et al., 2001] but the allure of mathematical rigor is not to the point. For all types of software, there seems to be no connection between the adoption of the Utilitarian view of responsibility and the long-term improvement of software reliability, since market and legal factors play a larger role in the outcome of the CBA than does software quality. Essentially, the CBA method of determining responsibility teaches the software engineer the horrible lesson that the sales, marketing, and legal departments of the corporation are more crucial to success than software engineering.

My approach to the responsibility issue is Kantian, but not thereby antiquated. Neither is it absent in the computing world. It is reflected in recent developments in academic computing circles such as the Sustainable Computing Consortium [www.sustainablecomputing.org] and the Center for Empirically-Based Software Engineering (CeBASE) [www.cebase.org]. The focus of the Kantian account, following the procedure of the categorical imperative, is to think about universally acceptable rules for releasing imperfect software. These rules, at the same time, must never treat harm to individuals in a cavalier manner; they must, in Kantian language, treat end-users never merely as means but always as ends in themselves. [Kant, (1785) 1902] That is what it means for a Kantian to act responsibly. I go further and argue that the Kantian’s procedure for formulating and testing maxims of action mirrors some aspects of the early peer-review process for software design and development.

It follows on this non-consequentialist view that the act of releasing risky software that ends up being de facto harmless is not free from blame. When the probability of software failure drops to zero because the product is replaced by a new version or a competitor, the responsibility question is not thereby resolved. The legal issue may be moot, but the ethical issue is not. By way of concluding, I compare the Kantian account to a Rawlsian account [Rawls, 1971] and to Arrow’s account of social responsibility arising from mutually-beneficial ethical codes in a game-theoretic context. [Arrow, 1951, 1973] I argue that the Kantian account is on good philosophical footing, and that it holds promise for the advancement both of computer science and the global computer industry.

REFERENCES

Arrow, Kenneth J. “Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations,” Econometrica 1951
__________. “Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency,” Public Policy 1973

Cantwell Smith, Brian. “Limits of Correctness in Computers,” CSLI 1985

Fenton, Norman, Krause, Paul, and Neil, Martin. “A Probabilistic Model for Software Defect Prediction,” IEEE Transactions in Software Engineering, Sept. 2001
Hart, H.L.A. Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford, 1968

Kant, Immanuel. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) in Kants gesammelte Schriften vol. 2, Berlin 1902

McConnell, Steve. “Gauging Software Readiness with Defect Tracking” IEEE Software, May/June 1997

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA1971

AUTHOR

Fernando Naves (UK)

ABSTRACT

Little work has been done in evaluating electronic commerce in relation to the adoption and exploitation of Information Technology and Systems (IS/IT) in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) business in Portugal.

This paper is supported by three main sources:

a) Literature review, mainly sustained on legal documentation produced in the last decade, either by Portuguese Government and Parliament or adopted from European Union directives;

b) Analyses of recent reports relating debates promoted by institutions and public organisations concerned with SMEs environment and electronic commerce; and

c) An academic survey produced in June 2002, through e-mail, addressed to 1750 of top most successful Portuguese SMEs (ranked by net sales figures), questioning issues related with the adoption of the Web by such enterprises and their understanding of ethical issues.

This investigation will examine:

a) Major legal issues related to electronic commerce in Portugal, in general, and to SMEs, in more detail;

b) Difficulties of protecting privacy, with a tentative description of the measures taken by SMEs and individuals to protect it avoiding conflicts;

c) How the intellectual property issues in electronic commerce are considered in Portugal and the measures provided for its protection
d) Some of other ethical issues in electronic commerce and the measures taken by SMEs to improve ethics.

This paper discusses the current challenges being presented by the Internet. Starting by identifying a number of general issues particularly relevant to SMEs, including the availability of in house development expertise and supporting infrastructure, and the limited availability of personnel, it also discusses these new enterprise topics related with electronic commerce.

Drawing on the experiences achieved by means of the sources above mentioned and focused on the Internet presence of SMEs in Portugal, the paper also highlights the current state of following ethical current issues:

a) Understanding of the conflict between Internet indecency, obscenity and free speech, and of the attempts to resolve the conflict

b) Discussion around the control of domain names and spamming, treatment of cookies and around the implementation of taxation and encryption policies

c) Differentiation between contracts online and offline

d) Knowledge and recognition about fraud on the Internet

e) Description of the measures available in Portugal to protect buyers and sellers on the Internet

Final conclusions indicate the growing need for a more active participation of SMEs on the current developments of Ethics and Internet and, eventually, for the adoption of specific Managerial Issues.

AUTHOR

David Sanford Horner (UK)

ABSTRACT

In a previous Ethicomp paper I contrasted models of individual decision making in information ethics and argued for an incremental approach as a framework for understanding the relationship between ethics and action (Horner, 1999). In this paper I want to consider the ways in which we ought to make rational, ethical and collective, strategic decisions. How can we promote the ethical control of increasingly complex and large scale information and communication technologies? The paper argues that ‘justificationist’ approaches to strategic decision making fail and that a ‘fallibilist’ methodology is required for making strategic and ethically grounded decisions under ignorance.

Simon Rogerson suggests that an important aim of Computer Ethics is to reduce the probability of the unforeseen effects of computer technologies (Rogerson, 2002, p.160). Similarly Terrell Ward Bynum claims that the overall goal of Computer Ethics is to integrate human values into the evolution of the technology in such a way that it protects rather than damages human values (Bynum, 1997). It seems to me that these aspirations come up against a fundamental dilemma, at least at the macro-level, in making ethical public policy decisions. This dilemma, following Collingridge (1980), might be called ‘the dilemma of ethical control’. The first horn of the dilemma is that at an early stage in the evolution of a technology, when it may be more easily regulated and controlled, we rarely know enough about its harmful consequences to justify regulation. The second horn of the dilemma is that once the harmful consequences are known it is often too late to take effective ameliorating action or such action is slow and costly.

The traditional response to this dilemma is to seek to forecast probable unwanted social and moral impacts. For example Moor (1985) suggests that it is precisely the job of computer ethicists to formulate and justify policies for the ethical use of computer technologies. However, I want to argue that the search for justification is deeply problematic on empirical, logical and moral grounds. At the core of the search for justification is the claim that a decision is rational to the extent that it can be justified by the decision makers (Collingridge, 1987, p.117). From an empirical point of view the demands of traditional, rational models of strategic decision making cannot be met. Such models assume perfect information or a level of information for which time and costs of collection are prohibitive. The logical problem is the paradox of rationality – full information only relates to the past never the future. Choices for the future are made under conditions of ignorance (Hayward and Preston, 1999).

This poses particular problems for approaches to decision making which adopt a utilitarian approach to public values. If we cannot predict the consequences of big decisions especially in the case of the planning of large scale technological developments (national air traffic control systems, or health information systems, for example) then any attempt to justify decisions on the basis of some calculus of utilities is doomed to failure. In addition justification for particular values may prove elusive for a number of reasons; values founder on conflict or disagreement, preferences may change and be subject to different interpretations. Finally in the search for justification of particular value judgements or preference by reference to further moral principles there is the danger of an infinite regress of values (Collingridge, 1980, p.162).

The situation we arrive at with respect to conditions of ignorance and the making of ethical decisions was foreshadowed in the work of the British Intuitionist philosopher W.D.Ross. He argued that in any given case it is possible to perform actions which are right in one or other of four senses:

(a) an act which is in fact right in the situation as it is in fact is;
(b) an act which the agent thinks right in the situation as it in fact
is;
(c) an act which is in fact right in the situation as the agent thinks
it to be;
(d) an act which the agent thinks right in the situation as he thinks it
to be. (Hudson, 1983, p.94)

Ross held that we can only have a duty to perform (d) since the information requirements for (a) to (c) are unobtainable (in practice even if not in principle). In a strong sense we cannot therefore ‘know’ what the right action might be. However, clearly, public policy or organisational strategies need to be formulated on ethical grounds.

The usefulness of Ross’s position is that it maintains an important distinction between what really is the case and what is merely thought to be the case. Dogmatic policy makers with their armouries of forecasting techniques claim to know what is the case. However, we should, as we have seen, be sceptical of such claims to justification. In response, I will argue that we ought to adopt a’fallibilist’, critical methodology. Since none of our values or preferences can be justified then they should all be open to criticism (Collingridge, 1987 p.125). This requires the constant testing of preferred values with morally relevant facts.

REFERENCES

Bynum, T.W., (1997), Global information ethics and the information
revolution. In: T.W.Bynum and J.H. Moor, eds. The digital phoenix: how computers are changing philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 274 – 291.

Collingridge, D., (1980), The social control of technology. London: Pinter.

Collingridge, D., (1987), Criticism – its philosophical structure. Lanham: University Press of America.

Hayward, T. and Preston, J., (1999), Chaos theory, economics and information: implications for strategic decision-making. Journal of
Information Science, 25 (3), pp. 173 – 182.

Horner, D.S., (1999), Perfection and the idea of moral progress: decision making in information ethics. In: A.D’Atri, et al., Proceedings of Ethicomp ’99, Looking to the Future of the Information Society. Luiss Guido Carli University, Rome, 6 ñ 8 October 1999. [CD Rom] Rome: Luiss Guido Carli.

Hudson, W.D., (1983), Modern moral philosophy. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan. Moor, J., (1985), What is computer ethics? Metaphilosophy, 16, pp. 226 – 275.

Rogerson, S., (2002), Computers and society. In: R.E. Spier, ed. Science and techology ethics. London: Routledge.

AUTHOR

K.D.Gunawardana & Chamnong Jungthirapanich(Thailand)

ABSTRACT

The literature on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has recently analyzed the nature of the firm’s entry mode choice in a foreign market, particularly the choice between a joint venture and a wholly owned subsidiary. Foreign-based companies are defined as having one or more overseas manufacturing subsidiaries or joint venture relationship. Foreign-based companies can be divided into following three groups in descending order: multinational, transnational and ventures. Most of these companies are using Advanced Manufacturing Technologies (AMT) in manufacturing operations conducted in host country. Therefore experience, initial investment, and location of the host country and number of employees are variables of AMT for conducting this research. This paper aims at providing further empirical evidences on the influence of some key variables in explaining issues related to transfer of AMT.

Advanced Manufacturing Technologies are integral part of the production process. It is important to understand the factors that are associated with differences in technology use at the plant level. This paper examines the relationship between the use of AMT at the plant level and the characteristics of these plants. The researchers have analyzed information collected from 1026 foreign-based companies operating business in Sri Lanka and developed two models-Regression based model and Artificial Neural network based model. It was found that the ANN model and regression model guide same prediction of AMT use by foreign-based companies contributing to developing countries.

AUTHOR

Carlos Roxo and Gonçalo Costa (Lisbon)

ABSTRACT

Our goal with this paper, is related to the influence of the Internet on the young people of the not occidentalized countries. This analysis will try to reflect the opposite “feelings” that the young people of those countries have inside of them, which means what are the consequences of the Internet and its use in the life of those young people, because many of them have a different life concepts of the western young people.

This life concept is clearly a result of the historical, cultural and social environment, and most of the times totally different from the ideas, that are bounded of the Internet (environment that is related to the occidentalized countries). Is this “fight” that we will analyse, how the youngsters of those countries deal with the information that have access through the Internet.

How many times is it possible to the youngster survive in that daily struggle, between the values of their ancestors, and the values showed by this window that let us see the world. The layers in Indian society are clearly an example of this situation, because only the top layers have access to the benefits of trading ideas with other cultures and how the youngsters of this layers feel about it, since Internet is a “way” to change society (one of the main issues of our paper).

These explanations will be based in several examples, like the Indian society represented by the “conflict” lineage/ideas bounded by the Internet; like the internal struggle in China, with the socialist model and the islands of development in that country that adopt almost the capitalism model, and in that way how the young Chinese people of those regions feel about it, and other several examples, according with the bibliography.

It is common knowledge that Internet is the “mainstream” of new ideas, business, health, almost everything, but specially the “mainstream” of information of the different societies that exist and how the “cultural shock” between cultures, specially the western/eastern, north/south cultures and how the young people of the not occidentalized countries are influenced. The paper will not discuss the influence of the Internet in the youngsters of the occidentalized countries, because those youngsters are starting to have a global and similar culture.

That similar culture is a reality because of the globalisation, the values of the societies, which they belong, based on democratic values, the respect of human rights, and several others issues.

REFERENCES

www.un.org

www.oecd.org

www.fe.up.pt