AUTHOR
David H. Gleason

ABSTRACT

I. Introduction

“Subsumption Ethics” was first published at CEPE 11 years ago and much has changed in ICT since then. In particular, the pace of communication has increased while the friction on information transfer has decreased. Web 2.0 and 3.0 functionality is now mainstream, and many users share their most personal information with impunity, from, “bored at home, going to do laundry,” to “I know I shouldn’t have slept with….” This rapid, and often vapid exchange of information calls for a new look at the ethics of current “subsumed objects,” and whether the basic principles of Subsumption Ethics are still applicable.

Many positive steps forward have been made in the last decade, for example, on-line data integration has improved dramatically; grassroots organizing is facilitating the democratic process; many more people have access to good medical information, etc. Some backwards developments include quiet, closed-door compromises with high-stakes information like electronic health records, electronic voting and on-line banking. Some sideways changes include movement from local data centers to on-line servers; massive, inexpensive, redundant storage; and integration of handheld devices into the Web.

After a brief review of the concept of Subsumption Ethics (SE), this paper will provide a series of subsumption in current ICT examples, covering such issues as social networking (Web 2.0); virtual machines, on-line applications and software as a service (Web 3.0); and Internet time.

The paper will show the benefits of applying SE principles to these examples. Finally, it will present a series of specific recommendations to help improve the ethical outcomes of ICT activities.

II. Subsumption Ethics

“Subsumption ethics” is the process by which decisions become incorporated into the operation of information and communications technology (ICT) systems, and subsequently forgotten.

ICT systems, by nature, repeat operations over and over. If those operations have unethical impacts, the system will nevertheless continue to execute them anyway. Unlike a human operator, there is no point in the cycle where the machine pauses to ask, “Should I do this?”

Subsumption in general is the process of building larger components from smaller ones. In ICT systems, small components, like the code that reads data from disk drives, are developed and tested, and once they are working reliably they are subsumed into larger systems that present file lists. Thus we stand on the shoulders of giants.

The larger systems, in turn, are subsumed into still larger systems. Once components, subsystems and applications are operating, the subsumed processes become invisible and unavailable to the user, what Dartmouth Professor James Moor calls the “invisibility factor” – components (and the human impacts of their operation) are forgotten, requiring no further attention unless they fail. These components are called “Subsumed Objects”. Technological systems are built from such objects until they are enormous.

As Aristotle pointed out, virtuous decisions require informed balance between many factors. Developers and users must actively seek understanding of many issues, on continua from stakeholder analysis to technical limitations. In order to apply the right knowledge to the right problem, an informed, deliberate decision-making methodology is required.

Furthermore, ethical decisions need to be made as situations arise and a simple, universal statement of ethics is not possible. The ethics of each situation must be worked out according to specific circumstances, in relation to guiding principles.

III. What’s New – Examples

A. Social networking (Web 2.0)

• Subsumption without thinking – twittering about taking out the trash
• Electronic grassroots organizing – on-line services like Democracy In Action
• Privacy and digital images
• Acceptable use policies, e-mail retention policy and legal discovery; the difficulty of deleting

B. Virtual machines, server management and portability

• System configuration files
• Life cycle management
• Can mitigate the risks of poor decisions by making them easier to undo

C. On-line applications and software as a service (Web 3.0),

• Switching to Microsoft Office 2007,
• Automatic installation of affinity software (e.g. installing the Yahoo toolbar during a routine update).
• The value of time when machines don’t work correctly

D. Internet time

• Instant replication of a stolen credit card list, propagation of the news of Michael Jackson’s death, a car bomb in Chechnya, and the 24-hour news cycle.
• Hive mind and the acceleration of “The Social Construction of Cyberspace”

E. New examples of subsumption ethics

• Why computers slow down as they subsume more and more material – from updates to malware
• The Citicorp tower case
• Tattoos, brands and trademarks

IV. SE Applications and Potential Benefits

• Saving money and time
• Open source software
• “Happy customers feeling safe and secure”
• Avoiding litigation
• Quality improvements

V. Recommendations

Support and contribute actively to on-line user groups. Comment on software improvement opportunities, publicly critique errors in systems and judgment. Foster discussion on abuses of ICT power by governments, corporations and individuals, from invasion of privacy to anti-trust activity to malicious hacking.

Teach the concept of SE at the college and graduate levels; help professionals to understand how their decisions become embedded into systems. Demonstrate the cost-benefit of thinking ahead to systems developers.

All this demands a great deal of ethicists, who must embrace web 2.0 functionality, including blogs, social networking sites, grass-roots organizing systems and interactive, multimedia publication in order to move the industry forwards and not backwards in its service to humanity.

AUTHOR
Jean-Gabriel Ganascia

ABSTRACT

Generalized sousveillance

A spectre is haunting the contemporaneous world, the spectre of “Nineteen Eighty-Four” [9], the famous Orwell’s novel. With webcams, RFID tags, remote sensing techniques and many other new information technologies, it now becomes possible to continuously record all the daily activities of everybody [1, 8]. Moreover, in many developed countries, personal data concerning health, employment, incomes, travels and digital communications are officially traced and stored in data bases. It is then possible to fuse all those data using modern data mining techniques. Many people fear the surveillance society that could result from the generalized use of those techniques.

However, the continuous record of all individual data, i.e. the constitution of personal digital archives, and their public dissemination through the web may receive a completely different interpretation. They contribute to establish a state of total transparency among people. According to some researchers, for instance to Steve Mann, this would not really lead to a generalized surveillance society, but to a regime of “sousveillance” [7], where the powerful people are permanently under the watch of those whom they dominate. For instance, if the police beat youths in the street or on a platform subway, the use of mobile phone makes every onlooker able to record and to publicly spread videos of this event. Recently, the 20th of June 2009, during the demonstrations of protest against the results of the Iranian presidential elections, a young woman, Neda Agha-Soltan, was shot in the chest. Immediately, her tragic death was captured on video by bystanders and broadcasted over the internet, which drew the international attention, while in old totalitarian countries such information would have been totally ignored. Such a story characterizes the society of sousveillance where everything can be seen by everybody, without the knowledge of the powerful people, even if they prohibit information dissemination. This clearly opposes to the local surveillance societies, which have dominated the 20th century.
Panopticon vs. Catopticon

The Panopticon has been designed in the end of the 18th century by Jeremy Bentham, as architecture for prisons [2]. It was supposed both to decrease the cost of surveillance and to improve its efficiency. Many philosophers, whom Michel Foucault in “Surveiller et punir” [4] was among, described it as a typical “dispositif” of the modern legal state, i.e. as a social arrangement that summarizes the underlying political structure of the society. Briefly speaking, the Panopticon is built on a ring around a central tower, where inspectors can see all the actions of prisoners. The cells are transparent, which means that they receive and transmit the sunlight. In that way, the inspectors may observe every movement of the prisoners without being viewed. Moreover, the prisoners are totally isolated from each others. To summarize, the Panopticon principles are: 1- the total transparency of the peripheral cells, 2- a fundamental inequality, which makes the occupants of the central tower, i.e. the observers, watching all the occupants of the periphery, i.e. the prisoners, without being watched, 3- the isolation of the prisoners who can’t communicate each others.

In a recent paper [5], we have shown that, by analogy to the Panopticon, that schematizes the surveillance society, the generalized sousveillance gives birth to another social arrangement that we call the “Catopticon”. The three fundamental principles on which the Catopticon is built can be compared with – an opposed to – the three fundamental principle of the Panopticon : 1- the total transparency of society, 2- the fundamental equality, which gives everybody the ability to watch – and consequently to control – everybody, 3- the total communication, which makes everyone able to exchange to everyone. In practice, it means that there is no hierarchy, i.e. no central tower, and that everyone may communicate to everyone in a total transparency.

There are many examples that show the existence and the modernity of the Catopticon [6]. For instance, due to the extensive use of information technologies, the modern subway is a Catopticon, while the classical 20th century subway was organized on the model of a Panopticon. More generally, the contemporaneous infosphere is mainly structured as a huge Catopticon [6] that is extended both to the entire planet and to the world of informational organisms, i.e. “inforgs” by reference to Floridi terminology [3].
Ethical Issues of the Panopticon

During the past few years, most of the computer ethics issues were related to the figure of the Panopticon, which acted negatively, showing what to avoid. More precisely, ethical attitudes were mainly motivated by the Panopticon of which they must prevent the achievement. It means, by reference to the characteristic structure of the Panopticon, that it is necessary both to restrict the ability of the central tower occupants to observe the occupants of the periphery and to make the occupants of the periphery able to freely communicate among them. For instance, the notion of privacy defines the limits of the transparency that makes a central power able to gather personal informations about the occupants of the periphery and to misuse them. Concerning the civil society, ethical questions are related to the lack of free and the authentic communication among people , e.g. to identity usurpation, and to the cyber-criminality. Lastly, the way the free speech and the democracy are influenced by the development of information technology defines new relations between the central power and the peripheral.
Ethical Issues of the Catopticon

Our goal, in this paper, is to show that many modern ethical issues are not directly related to the Panopticon, but to the Catopticon. More precisely, the main problems not only concern the privacy and the emergence of a totalitarian state in a hierarchical society, but also the anonymity and new distinction processes in an equalitarian society. Those processes are mainly based on the use of search engine, as Google, on voting procedures and on reputation establishment, like in eBay. Their economical and political roles are more and more important in the information society. However, many techniques – e.g. “Spamdexing” – tend to bias those distinction processes, which could generate new inequalities, new discriminations, new unfairness and new injustices. We claim that the Catopticon helps to understand those new ethical issues [6].

REFERENCES

[1] Bailey, J. and Kerr, I. (2007), The experience capture experiments of Ringley & Mann, Ethics and Information Technology, Springer Netherlands, Volume 9, Number 2 / July 2007, 129-139

[2] Bentham, J. (1838), Panopticon or the Inspection House, The Work of Jeremy Bentham, volume IV, 37-172

[3] Floridi, L. (2008) Information Ethics, its Nature and Scope, in: Jeroen van den Hoven and John Weckert (eds.), Information Technology and Moral Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

[4] Foucault, M. (1975), Surveiller et punir, Gallimard, Paris, France, p. 252 – In English Discipline and Punish, trans. A. Sheridan. (1977) New York: Vintage.

[5] Ganascia, J.-G. (2009a), The Great Catopticon, in proceedings of the 8th Computer Ethics and Philosophical Enquiry conference, June 2009, Corfu, Greece.

[6] Ganascia, J.-G. (2009b), Voir et pouvoir: qui nous surveille?, Editions du Pommier, Paris (in French).

[7] Mann, S. (1998) ‘Reflectionism’ and ‘diffusionism’: new tactics for deconstructing the video surveillance superhighway. Leonardo, 31(2): 93-102.

[8] Mann, S., Nolan, J., Wellman, B. (2003), Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, Surveillance & Society 1(3): 331-355, http://wearcam.org/sousveillance.pdf

[9] Orwell, G. (1949) Nineteen Eighty-Four, Secker and Warburg, London, UK.

AUTHOR
Georgia Foteinou

ABSTRACT

In the era of the digital revolution most governments around the world adopt relevant technological strategies and try to construct the so called “e-government”. However, what should be done is not obvious and the decision to follow the strategy of the most developed countries is not always a wise choice. What should be taken into account is not only the technological infrastructure and the citizens every day needs but also the specific cultural and legal environment and the future trends, otherwise the evolution of e-Government may be a path which leads society backwards.

The modern European society faces a number of challenges caused by many factors (social, economical, political) and the evolution of ICTs in the social and political life accelerates the process of change. But, where this process leads and how we can measure the results? Billions of euros are spent every year for e-Government infrastructure, while the European Governments still haven’t found an effective way to measure the results. The e-Government Economics Project (eGEP) recommends three value drivers for the measurement of impacts and outcomes of e-government: efficiency, democracy and effectiveness. Also, states that “metrics for the public value potentially generated by e-Government should not be limited to quantitative, financial impact” and suggests the adoption of other qualitative indicators, such as users’ satisfaction. This qualitative evaluation of e-Government raises other basics questions, such as: is it possible to measure democracy and how? And what actually means “user’s satisfaction”. Has this expression the same meaning for someone who lives in Turkey and someone who lives in Norway? And of course we have to determine and define who the users are: are the citizens? are the politicians or the employees in public administration? Are the women or the men? Is there a gender dimension in e-Government? Which is the basic view of the system and in what way do we classify the citizens into users categories; according to which attributes and characteristics?

The research reveals that the gender dimension is present on e-Government systems and sometimes may lead to what we call “Gender Digital Divide”. The most impressive is that this Digital Inequality may co-exist synchronously with an official governmental policy for the alleviation of this inequalities. Why a governmental policy may be contradictory to another is a political issue, but the ability to examine the results of these policies may unveil that the ICTs is a tool for other purposes other than the social welfare. For example ICTs may be a tool for the empowerment of women or instead a tool for applying extensive control over women, and of course what is ethically right and what is legally right is up to a specific sociopolitical environment. There are no general ethical rules and the problem emerges in a such multi-cultural and multi-national area as Europe. The nations are not unified but the systems sometimes should be integraded.

This paper presents the case of the Greek TAXISnet and the social implications of this e-service. TAXISnet (taxation information system) is the most successful Greek e-Government system which offers services directly to the citizens through a web site. A variety of services concerning taxation issues are fully available electronically to the public while the system exploits existing information infrastructures [Stamoulis et al., 2001]. It has extremely high rates of usage in enterprises (which reach 80% of the Greek enterprises) and the highest rates in citizens, comparing to other Greek e-services. Actually, this service is the only well-known e-Government service in Greek population and probably its great performance is the reason why e-Government services in Greece have satisfactory usage rates, compared to other EU countries (although they are still under the average EU rates).

TAXISnet had an overall budget of 60m euro and it was funded by the Greek Government and the European Union. Until today it remains an efficient and well running information system which saves millions of euros every year for the Greek government [Stamoulis et al., 2001]. However, a recent evaluation regarding the social aspects and the citizens’ satisfaction of TAXISnet revealed that the system has many weaknesses. This is due to a lack of support for people with disabilities, for immigrants, for foreigners and for other social groups [Terzis & Economides, 2006]. Moreover, the system does not permit actual access to any married woman although it gives “access rights” to them. The man – the husband – has alone right and responsibility to use the system and to declare the family income. The Greek tax law which was fully implemented in the case TAXISnet caused a number of gender-related issues and brought to the fore gender inequalities from past years.

The women pay of course their taxes and give details for their personal income and property to their husbands but they have no right to access the system and to see the tax declaration which concerns their income. This happens because the husband’s personal data are fully protected by the Greek law. Hence, the spouse has no right to see it. But what is happening with her personal data and why an e-government system eternalises a social inequality? What are the implications of this policy?

Of course the official statistics concerning the e-Government usage in Greece show that there is a gender dimension and the gender digital divide is evident, but in what degree that’s a social attitude and in what degree is the result of a governmental policy? The consequences, positive and negative, of a governmental policy may be huge. Can we consider Greek TAXISnet as a successful digital service? It has of course substantial economic benefits for the citizens, but it is contradictory to principal ethical values. The citizens do not “feel equal” when they access the service, because what someone can or cannot do depends on his or her gender.

The main conclusion is that the aforementioned e-service exacerbates the existing discriminations and we can even suppose that it creates new ones by preventing young, highly educated women from using e-Government. The potential female users of e-services are wealthy, well educated women who, until recently, had never felt what really means gender discrimination. Moreover, this case study indicates that many factors can produce biased statistical results, because of a lack of understanding of the context of use.

REFERENCES

Huyer S. & Siloska T. (2003) “Overcoming the Gender Digital Divide: Understanding ICTs and their Potential for the Empowerment of Women”, Instraw Research Paper Series No 1.

Stamoulis D., Gouscos D., Georgiadis P., Martakos D., (2001), “Revisiting public information management for effective e-government service”, Information Management & Computer Security, vol. 9(4), pp. 146-153

Hacker K. & Mason S. (2003) “Ethical gaps in studies of the digital divide”, Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 5 pp.99-115

Floridi L. (2001) “Information Ethics: An Environmental approach to the Digital Divide”, Philosophy in the Contemporary World, vol. 9, No 1, pp.1-7.

Foteinou G. & Pavlidis G (2009), “Ethical Aspects of e-Government: Social Actors, Politics and the Digital Divide”, proceedings of the Eighth International Computer Ethics Conference, Corfu 2009.

AUTHOR
William M. Fleischman

ABSTRACT

Since the introduction of electronic voting systems following the passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, numerous studies have disclosed serious and unsettling flaws in virtually all of the electronic voting devices marketed and in use in the United States. Since HAVA was intended to prevent problems like those encountered in the contested 2000 Presidential election, these shortcomings have created the unsatisfactory situation in which the purported remedy for problems associated with the conduct of fair elections has in actuality served to intensify public doubts about the electoral process.

The potential flaws identified by these scientific studies of existing electronic voting devices include susceptibility to the installation of malicious software resulting in the intentional theft of votes with the further possibility of modification of records, audit logs, and counters to frustrate subsequent forensic examination of the election process, denial of service attacks that disable the use of these devices either at the start or during the course of an election, as well as accidental “flipping of votes” and other anomalies caused by careless handling or unskilled actions of election workers. In addition, experience in the use of electronic voting devices in recent elections has confirmed their fallibility. Ballots have been inexplicably lost from or added to vote totals, direct recording electronic devices (DREs) have provided incorrect ballots, machines have failed to operate at the start of voting and have broken down during the course of an election, memory cards and smart card encoders have failed during elections.

The existence and widely publicized knowledge of the vulnerability and unreliability of electronic voting machines serves to undermine the public’s confidence in the integrity and accuracy of the electoral process and goes to the heart of the essential bond of trust between citizens and their government. Thus, these are clearly matters that threaten the public good.

Many of the flaws that have been uncovered are directly attributable to poor software engineering practices in the design and development of electronic voting devices. The Software Engineering Code of Ethics, which “expresses the consensus of the profession on ethical issues,” places concern for the public interest as its highest priority, the first of the eight principles that express the ethical aspirations of the profession. How are we then to square the uniformly questionable quality of electronic voting devices designed to carry out the intent of HAVA with the fidelity to their code of ethics of the several independent teams of software engineers for different companies who participated in the design and development of these devices?

It may well be, as some suspect, that it is an intractable problem in software engineering to produce electronic voting devices that solve simultaneously the critical functions of protecting the secrecy of each voter’s ballot, protecting the security of the voting process, providing an interface that is sufficiently easy to use for all voters – including those with disabilities related to vision, hearing and mobility – and assuring the integrity and accuracy of the final ballot count. Although these questions are implicitly raised by research efforts investigating vulnerabilities and deficiencies of current electronic voting devices – and although these investigations have spurred a vigorous discussion in the profession concerning electronic voting – there remains the responsibility that rests with any practitioner involved in the development of these devices to take care to implement best practices (for example, in regard to encryption) and to acknowledge the possibility that even the most carefully designed device may fail to meet the exacting standards necessary for the conduct of elections in a democracy.

In their recent paper, “The Public Is the Priority: Making Decisions Using the Software Engineering Code of Ethics,” Professors Donald Gotterbarn and Keith Miller “present three cases – one fictional and two based on news reports – that illustrate how a software professional can use the Code as a decision-making aid when ethical conflicts arise.” In their examination of the difficult conflicts arising in the three cases they consider, the authors provide much valuable guidance for practicing software engineers whose consciousness is supported by a robust conception of the public good.

The contention of the present work is that the distressing phenomenon of uniformly poor standards of software engineering practice evident in the design and development of existing electronic voting devices is a symptom of something more fundamental and more dangerous than inattention to the Code of Ethics itself. It is that the very conception of what constitutes the public good, what it means to act in the public interest, has been degraded and attenuated to the point that, in this case at least, it is difficult to imagine that the principle of acting in the public good can even have penetrated the consciousness of the members of the various software engineering teams. In this connection it is pertinent to recall Terry Winograd’s admonition that “we can take obliviousness as a key sign of” behavior that is ethically deficient.

In this paper, we will explore some of the factors that have resulted in the degradation of the concept of acting in the public good. We will present the results of informal as well as more structured surveys of how inattention to the importance of education in citizenship undermines concern for the public good. This inattention to education in the meaning of being a good citizen extends from the earliest years of a young person’s formation through his or her experiences in secondary school and university. It combines powerfully with what young professionals learn from stories of the unexemplary behavior of public officials, members of government, and leaders of industry and finance to nourish a cynicism that argues concern for the public good out of existence. Finally, we discuss some possibilities for raising the level of awareness of civic responsibility, especially in the education of those aspiring to careers in software engineering.

AUTHOR
William M. Fleischman

ABSTRACT

Between June 1985 and January 1987, a series of accidents involving the Therac-25 medical linear accelerator caused severe injuries to six cancer patients. Three of these patients died as the result of massive radiation overdoses to which they were exposed. The accidents were found to have been caused by the failure of software that controlled safety critical operations of the Therac-25. A thorough retrospective analysis of these accidents undertaken by Nancy Leveson and Clark Turner revealed that, from an engineering standpoint, the Therac-25 was a poorly and carelessly designed system. More generally, their analysis points to failures at a higher level of abstraction in the systems of medical treatment in which the Therac-25 was utilized, as well as failures in the regulatory regimes meant to protect the public through prior approval and oversight of the use of such medical devices.

The Therac accidents are widely studied in courses or modules devoted to the ethical responsibilities of professionals in the computing field. It is difficult to imagine that they did not influence the authors and the content of the various professional codes of ethics – for example, the 1992 revision of the Code of Ethics of the ACM and the Software Engineering Code of Ethics promulgated in 1999.

Since the introduction of electronic voting systems following the passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, numerous studies – we cite, among others, investigations by teams at Johns Hopkins University, Princeton University, the University of California at Berkeley, and the Center for Election Integrity at Cleveland State University – have disclosed serious and unsettling flaws in virtually all of the electronic voting devices marketed and in use in the United States. In addition, experience in the use of electronic voting devices in recent elections has confirmed their fallibility. Ballots have been inexplicably lost from or added to vote totals, direct recording electronic devices (DREs) have provided incorrect ballots, machines have failed to operate at the start of voting and have broken down during the course of an election, memory cards and smart card encoders have failed during elections. Since HAVA was intended to prevent problems like those encountered in the contested 2000 Presidential election, these shortcomings have created the unsatisfactory situation in which the purported remedy for problems associated with the conduct of fair elections has in actuality served to intensify public doubts about the electoral process. By analogy with the case of the Therac-25, the software controlling these electronic voting devices can be considered “safety-critical” in the sense of safeguarding the integrity of elections on which public trust in the legitimacy of elected governments rests.

Carefully considered, these studies of the deficiencies of electronic voting systems reveal numerous striking analogies with the engineering and system failures diagnosed in the case of the Therac-25. The analogies begin at the level of operation of the devices themselves, in particular the presence in each instance of chronic “minor” malfunctions which must somehow be ignored or explained away in order not to undermine belief in the trustworthiness of the devices. At a higher level, investigations uniformly disclose the absence of defensive design, overconfidence in the infallibility of software, inadequate software engineering practices relating to safety and security, conflation of user friendly with safe interface design, and, most pointedly, inadequate or nonexistent documentation.

In comparing the medical treatment systems in which the Therac-25 was utilized with the systems of state and local election boards which form the “customer base” for electronic voting devices, we find the same pattern of articulation failure within organizations, failures of due diligence, complacency involving unwarranted trust of the vendor and tolerance for fault-prone devices, and inadequate training of personnel.

At the level of the vendor or manufacturer, the analogies that begin with poor engineering practices already cited, extend further to the predilection to rush the product to market while overselling its reliability, the absence of documentation and audit trails concerning adverse incidents, inadequate response to such incidents, and evidence of willingness to bear the cost of penalties rather than undertake necessary engineering revisions.

Finally, the situation at the level of regulatory regimes seems even less satisfactory in the cases relating to present-day electronic voting devices than it did in the 1980s in connection with the radiation accidents associated with the Therac-25. The same problem of the absence of regulatory personnel with the technological competence to evaluate system shortcomings appears to plague the current case as it did at the time of the approval and oversight of the operation of the Therac-25. At the same time, there appears to be a widespread belief at present that the regulatory system will somehow fix everything.

In this paper, we will explore the analogies between the deficiencies of the Therac-25 and those of present-day electronic voting systems by laying out in some detail the elements of similarity described above, paying particular attention to system interactions at several pertinent hierarchical levels. We will try to come to grips with the question of what has been learned – especially in regard to responsible practices of software engineering – by past experience in relevant circumstances and what makes it so difficult to avoid the vexatious repetition of certain unsatisfactory patterns of behavior, even in the presence of admonitory precedent. Finally, we discuss some possibilities for incorporating the insights offered by the comparison of these two cases in courses on ethics and professional responsibility, especially in the education of those aspiring to careers in software engineering.