AUTHOR
George D. Magoulas and Nancy Pouloudi

ABSTRACT

The concern about the ethical implications of the use of artificial intelligence techniques in medicine is ongoing. On the one hand, the use of artificial intelligence increasingly provides opportunities to facilitate and enhance the work of medical experts and ultimately to improve the efficiency and quality of medical care. On the other hand, the debate about the appropriate level and the role of intelligent decision support has become more complex, as technical, organisational and social issues become intertwined. In this paper we use a research project that applies neural network-based methodologies as an opportunity to study the ethical issues that may rise from the application of artificial intelligence techniques in a medical context.

Advances in neurocomputing have opened the way for the establishment of decision support systems which are able to learn complex associations by example. It is acknowledged that the appropriate use of the neural network-based methodologies in medical problem solving could be very effective to improve the efficiency and the quality of medical care. The growing number of projects that employ neural network based methodologies in medical care makes necessary to examine the level and the role that neural networks will play in the development of automatic diagnostic systems.

This paper considers the use of neural networks in image processing and knowledge representation in image interpretation systems from an ethical perspective. The diagnostic attributes of such systems are based on the result of the feature extraction procedure from digital images, in conjunction with previously available medical knowledge, in order to expand this knowledge. A key issue in the use of neural network methods in a medical application of this kind is that it is unclear how decisions are reached. Most neural networks suffer from the opaqueness of their learned associations. In medical applications, this black box nature may make clinicians reluctant to utilise a neural network application, no matter how great the claims made for its performance. Thus, there is need to enhance neural networks with rule extraction capabilities. In addition, it is necessary to examine how productivity can be increased and how quality can be assured. This examination addresses the specification of the problem, the development of appropriate representations for the network input and output information and the preparation of the training, testing and validation data.

Using the acquisition, processing, storage, dissemination and use stages of an information life cycle as a basis for the different stages for the development and use of neural network medical imaging applications, this paper elaborates on the broader ethical implications of the use of neural applications in medicine. These include issues of interpretation, coordination between the technology and the human expert, validation of results and professional responsibilities. Although we concentrate on the use of neural network-based methodologies, the ethical issues discussed in this paper are relevant to a broader spectrum of artificial intelligence and information technology applications in health care. To illustrate this broader set of topics, the paper concludes with suggestions for future research in the area of medical informatics that can support ethical practice.

AUTHOR
Mark Lycett and Nancy Pouloudi

ABSTRACT

A fundamental challenge for information systems professionals is the development of information systems that are flexible and can respond to changing user needs within an unstable business environment. System flexibility is a problem that has long haunted the profession and it may be argued that traditional approaches to system development result in static systems that have to work in a dynamic world. This is witnessed in both statistics related to the cost and time devoted to software maintenance and the literature devoted to understanding information systems failure. Building on the foundations of object-oriented approaches to development, ‘component-based development’ has been proposed as a software engineering approach that can enable the development of flexible and evolutionary systems. This is primarily a consequence of mixing the flexibility of object-orientation with the encapsulation of earlier modular approaches to software development. From an object perspective, components may be simplistically viewed as collections of related classes that are strongly encapsulated, communicating with the outside world only via interfaces. With significant behavioural characteristics embedded, this allows them to be viewed as independent units of production, acquisition and deployment. Consequently, in Utopian terms, the component-based approach aims at the dynamic composition of information systems from pre-fabricated heterogeneous software components in a ‘plug-and-play’ fashion. Organisations can thus acquire black-box components from different sources at different times and deploy them as they see fit.

From an organisational perspective, this ideal places an emphasis on systems integration as opposed to development. It also has interesting ramifications in ethical terms that relate strongly to the concept of ‘trust’. Components, potentially drawn from a number of diverse sources, will be integrated together and allowed to operate on data that may be sensitive at both the individual and corporate level. The black-box nature of components mandates that the user organisation will understand the component only in terms of what is stated in its interface specification(s) and any additional documentation that is supplied. This means that the organisation integrating components will have to (a) trust that a component does exactly what it says that it does, (b) trust that a component does not inadvertently mishandle the data that it operates with/upon and (c) that a component does not covertly pass data to entities outside the originating organisation’s sphere of control. With the growing role of Web-based communication some of these issues exist already, with point (b) above evidenced in a recent case where it was discovered that users registering Microsoft’s Windows 98 online were inadvertently sending a number that would identify their PCs. Such issues are, however, exacerbated in the component world as, in a dynamically extensible system, it is not necessarily possible to know which components will use what data and when. This feature of component-based development has particular significance for data protection.

This paper considers the above points in the context of the provisions of the recent European Union directive on data protection (95/46/EC) as they are implemented in the new Data Protection Act (1998) in the United Kingdom. The 1998 Act defines the conditions for processing data and has enhanced provisions for data subjects (i.e., individuals who are the subject of personal data). More specifically, data subjects are entitled to (a) a description of the data being processed, (b) a description of the purposes for which it is being processed (c) a description of any potential recipients of their data and, except in limited circumstances, (d) any information as to the source of their data (where available). In addition, where the data is processed automatically, and is likely to form the sole basis for any decision significantly affecting the data subject, then they will also be entitled to know the logic involved in that decision making. Thus, the Act affects component-based developed systems, to the extent that these process personal data.

The discussion for the interpretation of the Act and its implications for business and information systems development are ongoing while the compliance deadline approaches. During this time information systems developers and users need to consider on the one hand the ways in which data protection legislation restricts information systems development and on the other hand the ways in which information systems development practices limit or enable data protection. We believe that our study of data protection in a component-based development environment contributes to this discussion and unveils a complex ethical debate for data controllers (i.e., those who determine the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are to be, processed), the supervisory authority that oversees data protection, and information systems developers.

AUTHOR
Tomas Lipinski and Johannes J. Britz

ABSTRACT

Information and communication technology makes possible new levels of connectedness between potentially diverse and distinct interests throughout the world. In order to minimize those cultural, political and economic differences attempts are made to establish common ground upon which relationships can develop. Within the global legal structure this linkage occurs within the harmonization of laws. Often a Western model of legal theory dominates the harmonization process. This is evidenced, for example, in the negotiation of intellectual property rights among first and third world communities.

Commentators have a developed a rich scholarly tradition in the critique of the disparity between those countries that benefit from their control of knowledge vis-a-vis expanding western-based intellectual property regimes and those countries that are limited by international agreement or economic or political pressure from accessing that intellectual property. This paper discusses the underlying concepts of that disparity. However the approach is not so much to identify the disparity from a traditional economic or political perspective, but from a cultural one.

What is it about a third or alternative world culture’s perception of concepts such as knowledge and ownership that are in contrast and opposition to a first world order of intellectual property ownership. This analysis is important for several reasons. Harris (1998) comments that intellectual property is the currency of the 21st century, but what of those cultures that do not view intellectual property ownership in the same terms and conditions as the western economic perspective? Systems of communal ownership may dominate some cultures in contrast to the exclusive ownership schema of western intellectual property models. Likewise Delta and Matsuura (1999) view intellectual property as the foundation for a new economic and legal paradigm based less upon notions of content and more toward concepts of “transaction.” If harmonization is truly to exist with respect to the subjects of traditional intellectual property then the harmonization that results must incorporate both first and third world order concepts of property ownership. Western legal theory must not come to dominate the determination of ownership of information.

To some extent western legal theory incorporates alternative viewpoints in its intellectual property schema, but these rights are often limited and underdeveloped. The concept of moral rights is a case in point (even so it is far more developed in continental perspectives than in the United States). However, other concepts such as communal ownership are less developed and are often subservient to established notions of intellectual property. Several examples can serve as case studies for review: the commercial ownership and control of blue corn (Native American) products, the medicinal knowledge base of tribal cultures in the Central and South American rain forests, and the aboriginal perception of communal knowledge in South African cultures.

Some cultures do not perceive intellectual property rights on the same plane. In fact there may some cultures to which ownership akin to western traditions is antithetical. Is a philosophical perspective of intellectual property rights culturally dependent or is it culturally dominated, and if dominant, whose view should be supreme? All cultures might agree that it is wrong to steal, but may not view reproducing software without “permission” as in fact stealing. The concept of ownership may not be a subject of the software. (Moreover, some cultures might not have developed the concept of stealing because stealing is based upon exclusive ownership and that culture might never have had a need to develop that concept but instead relies on communal or shared ownership.) In the alternative some superceding effect might be at work, i.e., reproducing and sharing the software with others is viewed as a tribute or honor to the creator instead of a taking. If one rule can serve many cultures, should a western view dominate and in the process dismiss alternative cultural perspectives? If the ethical standards are subject to cultural relativism, then what hope is there for global harmonization? Finally, what is the impact upon the cultural identity if a western view of property ownership dominates in the coming century?

This paper attempts to analyze these perspectives from both western, alternative as well as arrive might be viewed as a possible harmonizing position. To accomplish this an ethical matrix is designed to facilitate this review. It is hoped that this analysis might demonstrate how both traditional (private and exclusive) and alternative (public or communal) perspectives on knowledge (intellectual property) ownership might be incorporated into any international harmonizing legislation proposed for the new millennium.

AUTHOR
Tomas Lipinski

ABSTRACT

The debate over the widening gap between the information rich and the information poor is a concept that is secure and fixed in the fields of information policy and information ethics. Previous work has addressed problems of the First World versus the Third World order or has investigated, within the context of the United States for example, the disparate access to communication and information technology. This paper presents original research into the context of the information rich and poor within a genre of information production in the United States, specifically its legal system and the access, communication and use of unpublished case law or precedent. This detailed study can serve as a microcosm of the broader information rich and information poor debate.

Within the American legal system, federal appellate case law is designated as either published or unpublished. This designation is made, in most instances, by the court or through an advisory panel. It is an objective process more or less, but previous studies have identified prejudice. Notwithstanding this possible taint, if a case is so designated as “unpublished” litigants and other courts are prohibited from citing the case. In addition the text of the case is not readily available through traditional legal print reporters. However it is available to users who have access to online legal databases such as Westlaw or LEXIS-NEXIS. Generally, those who can afford the higher cost of computer assisted legal research (CALR) will have access to this precedent, those who can not afford CALR (pro se, prisoners and other “lower” order litigants) do not. It is in this scenario that the present study attempts to identify a disparity of access. The “upper” order litigants do not cite the unpublished precedent, yet may nonetheless use the content of the unpublished precedent to their advantage, often without the knowledge of the court or opposing party. Lower order litigants, as well as the supervising court may not realize the extent to which the unpublished precedent was used, although not cited, to the advantage of the upper order litigant.

In order to assess the magnitude of this problem, first the incident and use of unpublished precedent in a sample of United States Court of Appeals is examined. Second, a review of the unpublished precedent actually cited is reviewed. This review is done both by litigant type and broad subject matter of the case. This accomplishes two tasks. First, it identifies the character of litigants in unpublished precedent consistent with previous studies (upper or lower order). However, unlike previous studies, this determination focuses upon those unpublished cases actually used as precedent by the United States Courts of Appeal, and so provides a more accurate position from which to assess the claim of disparity in unpublished precedent designation and its actual legal impact, at least as that impact is expressed by its subsequent citation by courts in the sample. Finally, a study of those cases that were by motion re-designated as “published” (originally issued as unpublished by the court) is analyzed to identify the characteristics of the parties who request and potentially benefit from a republication. Not only will this study document the disparity that occurs with respect to basic legal information, but also provides informetric techniques that might be used to assess information disparities in other areas for other researchers.

AUTHOR
Stephen J. Lilley

ABSTRACT

The debate in science and technology studies over whether or not humans and machines are essentially different is described here. Conceptualizing humans and machines symmetrically or asymmetrically is described in this paper as being a crucial theoretical divide which is at the heart of disagreements over 1) who or what is accountable when software fails, 2) whether human oversight over software applications is necessary, and 3) whether to encourage or discourage attempts to incorporate values in the design of software.

Is it better to consider human and machines as distinct entities having different properties, or should such divisions be done away with altogether? Harry Collins et al present the strongest case for human-machine asymmetry, suggesting that machines can only behave, whereas humans are capable of intentional acts, some of which are standardized but others which are socially nuanced and require immersion in a culture. As long as machines remain independent entities, in the sense of not being socialized into human culture, the divide between humans and machines will continue.

Writers often identified under the rubric of actor-network theory (for example, Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law) have been most critical of Collins’s distinctions between humans and machines, and they have developed an alternative approach which denies inherent differences. They suggest that the qualities that human and machines take on vary in terms of the context or the specific configuration of relations.

Actor-network theorists are more likely to see software failure as resulting from failure or breakdown of a much larger network of heterogeneous agents (e.g., technicians, salespeople, non-digital machine parts, routines, regulators, etc.). What this suggests is distributive accountability. Collins et al, on the other hand, insists that humans are moral agents and machines are not, and this is why humans are often (and should be) held more accountable.

In regard to human oversight over software, Collins advances a meta-view of humans and intelligent machines in which the latter are deemed important constituents in the social body, but, lacking social fluency, are not conversant participants, let alone active promoters of this body. He criticizes confusion on this point and the tendency to anthropomorphize machines and overlook the a-social character of even the most advanced artificial intelligence programs. In the end, Collins feels that humans must supervise smart machines if the latter are to play any constructive role in the social body.

Actor-network theorists argue that if machines have been placed in a subservient capacity, it is due to framing with a human bias. New potentials may emerge without such framing. Also these writers criticize efforts to incorporate values in the very design of software and other technologies. Even if values could be incorporated in the design phase, the tendencies of drift and overflowing, and the unforeseen complexities of interrelations would certainly defeat the intentions of the designers. In contrast, Collins believes that human oversight of technology is inevitable, and he advocates a more democratic approach starting from the very beginning phases of design. Assuming an indeterminancy to technology, he argues, invites passivity, fatalism, or, at the very least, allows for the de facto control over the shaping of technology by dominant groups. An approach which, instead, recognizes human imprint on technologies serves as a better framework for the building of technologies resonant with humanistic principles

Although the work of Collins et al is innovative, there is a certain amount of familiarity in its humanism ( i.e., human actions, human choice, and consequences for humans are primary concerns). Actor-network theory, whether by its symmetrical treatment of humans and machines or its emphasis on process and complex hybrids, represents a radical departure from humanism. In evaluating these diverse approaches, computer ethicists also will have to evaluate the importance of humanism to their own work.

AUTHOR
Duncan Langford

ABSTRACT

Most commercial and academic computers are networked, normally sharing connections with a local mailhost and fileserver, as well as enjoying onward links to the wider Internet, often through a company proxy server. Today, dependence upon local and global electronic mail (email) is routine, and the sharing of computer files and reliance upon information held on a local Intranet is both widespread and growing rapidly.

However, within many companies such use may have developed piecemeal, without any particular consideration of non-technical issues. Lack of usage considerations might well lead to potential problems, for manager and user alike. Given that business computers must inevitably be used by people, I suggest questions concerning the social, rather than technical, use of company computer systems are not only justified, but essential to ensure appropriate business use. For example: assuming the design and implementation of a typical commercial computer system only took account of technical issues, are clearly defined safeguards (for systems operators, as well as users) likely to be in force? Might the expectations of the owners of a networked system potentially conflict with the users of that system? Have guidelines been developed which specify how a company anticipates its computers should be used – and, if so, are such guidelines appropriately policed? Of course, large organisations, with greater resources, have often been able to give thought to the wider issues of corporate ethical behaviour, and in consequence are more likely to have generated company policies and ethical guidelines. However, even if such policies exist, the rapidly evolving issues involving employment of company computer systems may mean relevant sections are overdue for revision, while specialist consideration of computer use might well have been overlooked entirely. Naturally, in other, less well resourced, business settings, the reduced support available for generation of company policy guidelines could well result in an absence of direction, or even an ethical vacuum, where official definition of appropriate computer use is unclear and uncertain, and employer expectations of computer-using and computer-supporting staff are undefined.

While potential problems in the use of company computer systems may be obvious, the dependence of modern business and commerce upon computers is growing dramatically, increasing the risk of computer-related difficulties.

With honourable exceptions, official company policies toward computer use and abuse are typically either non-existent, or out of date. In view of the importance to business of appropriate use of their computer systems, I suggest a regular, independent and objective inspection of company systems is essential. The concept of such a regular evaluation – for which I have appropriated the accounting term ethical audit – should allow a business to feel confidence in the appropriate employment of its computer systems.

This paper briefly examines the background to the use of business computer systems, and addresses the need for both clear definition and regular and appropriate evaluation of that use. It then discusses the concept of ethical audit as applied to computer systems, and considers examples of such an audit in a variety of settings. It concludes with an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages to business computing of the ethical audit procedure.