AUTHOR
Paul B. de Laat

ABSTRACT

The so-called `open source software movement’ enjoyed a huge increase in popularity over the last decade. The movement has multiplied in scale. This holds for both `output’ – software in source code form to be used freely by anyone, and `process’ – networks of thousands of volunteer hackers working together. Famous examples include hackers developing Linux, Apache, and OpenOffice. This development is, of course, mainly the result of the creation of the Internet; participants now have immediate access to each other, and downloading code is a matter of minutes only.

What motivates hackers to contribute? This question has been the subject of fierce debates. Both the joy of writing code and building a reputation are the best answers that have come up. However, still puzzling is that such virtual teams assemble overnight and exchange comments and/or source code for some period of time, on a massive scale at that. How is it possible for people that are complete strangers to each other, as well as separated in space, to work together so quickly without much hesitation? What processes underlie this instantaneous creation of mutual trust?

Until recently, the development of trust in (normal) teams was believed to be well understood. Trust takes time to develop, must grow step by step, requires meeting face to face regularly, and is furthered by common language and common culture. All of this seems hardly of any use regarding virtual networks of open source hackers. Therefore some authors have taken to the concept of swift trust in order to come to grips with these teams. This article will explore the concept of swift trust and the theories behind it, and try to answer the question whether the comparison brings us any further. It is a theoretical exercise, which tries to connect two separate strands of theory.

The concept of swift trust was first developed in the context of film crews, theatre groups and the like, which come together for a short time and then disband. Their work mode necessarily is fast in, fast out. There is simply no time available for the usual processes of getting to know and trust each other. In these circumstances it is a norm of professional conduct to act along the lines of swift trust. Subsequently the concept has been adapted to virtual circumstances by authors like Walther, Meyerson and Jarvenpaa.

In their theories, swift trust refers to global virtual teams that are never to meet in reality. In contrast to the classical type of trust, swift trust develops in the first moments of electronic interaction (or not at all). It is task-oriented behaviour that keeps interactions going. Showing initiative as well as responding quickly to initiatives from others are crucial, given the inherent anxieties that cyberspace creates. At the same time, virtual communication tends to hide rather than reveal cultural characteristics. As a result, culture as a binding force recedes to the background, and efforts at building a common culture become irrelevant. Virtual trust hinges upon contributing creatively and swiftly, not about showing compassion and contributing to the social cohesion of the group. As I interpret these theories, again, like in the classical case of film crews, trusting swiftly is a mode of profesional conduct. Swift trust is the trade mark of the virtual worker that takes his profession seriously.

Questions to be answered are the following. Is it warranted to characterize the process of contributing to open source groups as swift trust? Does this analogy with temporary film crews yield new insights? More generally, are the two types of trust possibly a product of varying circumstances only? Related to this, might the impossibility of face to face contact by any chance be considered as a blessing instead of a curse, i.e. virtuality as freedom from the terror of social conventions that allows focusing upon the tasks at hand? Finally, are the two types of trust, classical versus swift trust, really opposites of each other? In particular, is not the vindication c.q. refutation of expectations of trust a driving mechanism common to both?

AUTHOR
Frank Land, Sevasti-Melissa Nolas and Urooj Amjad

ABSTRACT

Knowledge Management is widely regarded as the way an enterprise can leverage the know how of its employees, trading partners, and outside experts for the benefit of the enterprise (Chun Wei Choo, 1998, Bellaver & Lusa, 2001, Ackerman et al, 2003). Indeed some its advocates regard knowledge management as the essential tool for success in the highly competitive world of the global economy. Further, it is argued, the management, and with it the sharing of knowledge, not only enhances the enterprises ability to compete by increasing the competence of its employees also enriches the welfare of all those who are able to engage in the process. Hence, for those involved it is a win win game.

The advocates fall into two groups – those who focus on technology as the mechanism for managing and sharing knowledge, and those who place a greater an emphasis on human relations, on conversation and on the elicitation of tacit knowledge. But both groups appear to share the assumption that knowledge management is beneficial, and that in some senses the knowledge which is managed and shared is equivalent to the ‘truth’.

There is an asymmetry in most of the discussion of the field. Knowledge management is primarily discussed from the point of view of the user of knowledge. The motivation of the user of knowledge is seen to be to enhance capabilities, to be able to utilize knowledge to increase effectiveness.

There is much less discussion about the source of knowledge or of the dissemination of knowledge or of the motives of the knowledge provider. That information provides power is widely admitted. At the same time the political dimension of knowledge management and knowledge sharing is often covered in the KM literature as no more than an aside. Yet if we follow Sussman and her colleagues (Sussman et al, 2002) who perceive an organization to be a “political system, a network of interdependent members using power, influence, and political manoeuvring to achieve their goals”
Politics can be been defined as an intentional social influence process in which behaviour is strategically designed to maximize short term or long term self interests.

In the real world politics is often the dominant influence and knowledge manipulation, the dark side of knowledge management, is its prime weapon. In the world of politics we are accustomed to the notions of spin, deception and propaganda. The business world is no different. If we want to pick out those companies which have been the most successful managers of knowledge, ENRON appears high on the list. For many years they achieved competitive success through the systematic management of information and knowledge. One of their prime tools of knowledge management was the shredder.

My conclusion – knowledge management has a very strong ethical dimension and unless we recognise that fact we are going to develop technology based systems which enhance the power of the knowledge manipulator.

The paper traces the evolution of the concepts behind knowledge management, contrasts this with the actual practice and highlights the ethical problems that the development of ever more efficient tools for the dissemination of ‘knowledge’ poses for the systems designer.

REFERENCES

Ackerman, M., Pipek, V., Wulf, V., (2003), Sharing Expertise: Beyond Knowledge Management, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.

Bellaver, R.F., & Lusa, J.M., (2001), Knowledge Management Strategy and Technology. Artech House.

Choo, Chun Wei, (1998), The Knowing Organization: How Organizations Use Information to Construct Meaning, Create Knowledge and Make Decisions, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Sussman, L., Adams, A. J., & Raho, L. E. (2002). Organizational Politics: Tactics, Channel, and Hierarchical Roles. Journal of Business Ethics, 40, 313-329.

AUTHOR
Banita Lal and Jyoti Choudrie

ABSTRACT

The creation and evolution of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has challenged the traditional structure of work activities within organisations and enabled a movement away from office-based work (Belanger, 1996; FORUM, 2002). New technologies such as videoconferencing, audioconferencing and messaging (both standard text and multimedia) enable employees to see, hear and communicate with colleagues at disparate locations, thus representing teleworking opportunities within organisations (Lipton, 1998). Recent years have witnessed an upsurge in the adoption of teleworking in many countries (FORUM, 2002) and developments in technological capabilities suggest further growth.

Greater flexibility promoted by teleworking replaces the traditional ‘Industrial Age’ style centralisation of work processes and location and strict hierarchy-based structures (Hedberg, 2000). A transition from more traditional work structures entails a vast amount of change and incorporates a variety of possible costs and benefits for all parties involved. However, much of the existing teleworking literature that investigates the costs and benefits of teleworking initiatives fails to support such assertions with solid empirical research.

Benefits for companies often stated by the implementation of teleworking include reduced real estate and recruitment costs, enhanced productivity and organisational flexibility (Helling, 2000; Skyrme, 1993). The benefits for teleworkers include reduced travel and costs, better quality of life and greater flexibility over work organisation (Skyrme, 1993). Given the theoretical context of this research and the lack of availability of empirical evidence, this research was interested in exploring and understanding the costs and benefits associated with teleworking -by incorporating a cost benefit analysis- and whether these affected two often cited and desired outcomes of teleworking: individuals’ productivity and satisfaction within an organisational context. Studying the overall impact of costs/benefits on these two factors can help determine the long-term prosperity of teleworking within an organisation.

Lack of an accurate measurement tool meant that productivity and satisfaction had to be measured subjectively: based on each individual’s perceptions (Belanger, 1999), which are shaped by his or her experiences of teleworking. An amalgamation of qualitative and quantitative research methods (Myers, 1997) was used in this research. A combination of methods enabled the shortcomings of one method to be counteracted by the other. The research methods chosen for primary data collection in this paper were case study, questionnaires and in-depth semi-structured interviews.

The case study in this research was a large UK-based telecommunications company with a global presence: ‘Company X’. Following Yin’s definition (1994), the case study was an empirical inquiry that allowed for the investigation of a contemporary phenomenon (teleworking) within its real-life context (Company X). At the time of this research, Company X employed 150,000 employees; 5,200 of which were teleworkers. Following a pilot study with 10 willing Company X teleworkers, questionnaires were used to collect primary data from teleworkers as they allowed for the attainment of a larger sample size. Questionnaires were utilised as the opinions of multiple participants could be understood in a more beneficial manner whereas in-depth semi- structured interviews allowed the researchers to gain deeper insights into the actual teleworking initiative at Company X. 106 questionnaire responses (66 male, 40 female) were received and three in-depth semi- structured interviews (2 males, 1 female) were carried out in the research. The interviews were not regarded as being representative of the 106 participants or the teleworking population as a whole at Company X. They were used solely to gain a deeper understanding of teleworking at the company. More details on why this particular strategy was followed will be presented in the final paper.

The participants were all self-selected, i.e. volunteers, and were highly professional individuals occupying a variety of job roles, from Systems Engineer to Personnel Manager. The length of employment at Company X ranged from ?1 year to 35 years and the length of time spent teleworking ranged from ?1 year to 30 years.

Following data collection, the questionnaire data was analysed principally using SPSS. Interviews were recorded, transcribed then underwent an analysis of the content in order to gain a corroborating description of the teleworking initiative at Company X. The main costs identified in the research were: lack of social face-to-face interaction and high reliance upon technology. The main benefits were identified as being: reduced commuting time, financial and time savings and the ability to arrange work duties around domestic duties. The general understanding generated from the findings was that the number of participants who perceived the benefits to be greater than the costs exceeded those who did not. In the majority of cases, costs were offset by the benefits as different individuals placed dissimilar weightings on each of the costs and benefits. This depended upon the individuals’ own experiences and beliefs. The existence of different costs and benefits of teleworking was depicted in the research. Additionally, there was a strong indication that the generally positive perceptions of teleworking lead to overall positive perceptions of satisfaction and productivity: the majority of participants felt more satisfied and more productive when teleworking.

The research concludes with a discussion on the limitations of this research and from this, makes suggestions for future research looking into the same topic area. For example, limitations regarding the problem of using ‘self-selection’ as a method of participant recruitment are discussed. The contributions of this research are finally addressed, namely how this research contributes to the area of IS by providing an in-depth exploratory study looking at assertions made about teleworking, thus linking teleworking theory with practise. Such findings contribute towards a greater understanding of the social aspects of teleworking, which is important considering the expected future growth of teleworking.

REFERENCES

Belanger, F. (1996), Distributed Work Arrangements: Impacts of Advanced Information Technologies, Work Coordination Mechanisms and Communication Requirements, http://hsb.baylor.edu/ramsower/ais.ac.96/papers/BELANGER.htm, (viewed 28/07/03)

Belanger, F. (1999), Workers’ Propensity to Telecommute: An Empirical Study, Information and Management, 35,(3), pp139-153

Berg, B.L. (1998), Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, third edition, Boston, USA, Allyn and Bacon

FORUM (2002), The Changing World of Work: Trends and Implications for Occupational Safety and Health in the European Union, http://osha.eu.int, (viewed 23/06/03)

Hedberg, B.; Dahlgren, G.; Hansson, J.; Olve, N.G. (1998), ‘Virtual Organisations and Beyond: Discover Imaginery Systems’, West Sussex, John Wiley and Sons

Lipton, S.P. (1998), ‘Planning the Office of the Future- Today’, Journal of Accountancy, December 1998, v186 i6 p(85)I

Myers (1997), Qualitative Research in Information Systems, www.qual.auckland.ac.nz, (viewed 15/05/03)

Skyrme, D.J., (1993), Teleworking- Achieving the Business Benefits (1993), From Teleworking to E-Work (2000), Distance Working- The Corporate Perspective, www.skyrme.com, (viewed 12/05/03)

AUTHOR
Matthijs Kouw, Edo Schreuders and Lizette Pater

ABSTRACT

In 1890, Warren and Brandeis famously formulated privacy as ‘the right to be left alone’. However, it may be argued that, in the light of contemporary technological developments, this definition demands a thorough reworking. Dealing with, for example, surveillance, cookies, computer hacking and so on, demands a revisiting of the concept of privacy. Debates surrounding privacy and technology tend to treat the former as a given concept to be found in human nature, thereby begging the question at hand, namely: how is privacy being articulated in particular social contexts?

Instead of treating privacy as a given, we will take a look backstage and problematize its apparent rigidity, thereby hoping to clarify the relation between privacy and technology.

Firstly, the traditional liberal distinction between the public and the private sphere will be reflected upon. It will be exemplified that the binary public-private distinction is not neutral in the sense that it applies equally to everyone (as it pretends to do). This commonly accepted dichotomy will be unveiled as supportive of certain inequalities. The liberal distinction appears to be an expression of a specific point of view, namely that of the neutral liberal state, in which the public sphere is carefully demarcated from the private sphere. All things associated with nature, body, particularities, irrationality are excluded from the public sphere. This serves the alleged neutrality of the liberal state, which claims to be impartial and rational, but that claim only works insofar all nee! d and desire is kept in the private realm. We argue that this dichotomous organization has exclusionary effect

That this exclusion is obvious, but at the same time maintained, will be explained in the second part. Panoptic power regimes, carefully explored in the work of Michel Foucault, exercise normalizing judgment by punishing deviations from the required standards. The constant threat of coercion disciplines and regularizes people as individuals, and causes an internalization of the norms. In the panoptic regime there is no distinction to be made between the public and the private sphere. Panoptic power is not limited to one realm: power is exercised always and everywhere. The ideal, which can easily be traced back to legitimizations of camera surveillance, is one of perfect visibility, complete transparency, and total surveyability. First of all, this Foucauldian model of disciplinary power will ! be supplemented by Reg Whitaker’s model of the participatory panopticon (which he describes as more consensual and voluntary because convenience for consumers is the motivation for implementing panoptic norms). Secondly, we will enhance Foucaults model by discussing Gilles Deleuze’s model of the society of control. Where, according to Foucault, power was thought to penetrate everything, Deleuze states that for Foucault each realm corresponds with a specific, limited exercise of power. Deleuze argues that control strives for ubiquity: it uses the newest surveillance technologies in order to accomplish the production of the ‘proper citizen’.

Thirdly, biometrics will be considered. The examination of practices of biometrics will reveal them as discursive practices, ideologically engineered to produce legible bodies that thereby represent cultural codes that deliver a description of socially appropriate responses. Bodies are then not pre-discursively given, but appropriated through discursive practices, as a discussion of the work of Judith Butler and Donna Haraway will reveal. Since these discursive practices are never devoid of ideological elements, inclusion and exclusion are concomitant to the protocols deployed in biometric practice

The way the body is made legible then leads to a preoccupation with visible properties, and a suspicion, or exclusion, of tactile properties that lie beyond the scope of biometrics. In the biometrics discourse the bodily aspects become the ultimate decisive factor in determining who one is. Biometrics seems to decontextualize people from their motivations and environments. This can be a particularly questionable practice when it is related to biometric body surveillance, since many social problems have socio-economic contexts: people may have good reasons to act in a certain, unaccepted way. Body surveillance basically ignores this, by focusing mainly on behavioral aspects.

Parallels will be drawn between biometrics and the preoccupation with visible behavior (which will be illustrated in a discussion on Closed Circuit Television). Just as biometrics reduces identity to what can be found in the text of the body, this preoccupation reconceptualizes socio-economic problems in terms of visible behavior.

Fourthly, we will consider some of the implications of technology on the public-private distinction. After elaborating on technology and the disappearance of the biological substrate of human agency, due to virtual technologies, a problematization of panoptic societies may be provided. Subsequently, common themes of both virtual technologies and control societies may be described – to what extent is disembodiment a common theme of both digital culture and control societies? A closer investigation will then allow a description of the emancipatory power of virtual technologies. The latter examination implies a definition of human agency as a locus that contains both creative and suppressive forces that can lead to an explanation of privacy as an evaluative concept that may unfold throu! gh processes of critical examinations.

In conclusion, we will argue that privacy is to be seen as an evaluative concept that emerges as an immanent possibility for the human subject to reflect upon its dependence on existing power structures. Privacy in our view is fundamentally contingent over time, and permanently needs to be worked upon.

AUTHOR
Mikolaj Kocikowski

ABSTRACT

In context of Western democracies’ current crisis, electronic voting (voting in which votes are cast using Electronic Voting Machines, or EVMs) has become a very popular topic of discussion in academic and technical circles. I propose a paper in which I will use real-world data from EVM applications in non-western countries to propose a shift in focus of the so far abstract discussion in the West, away from would-be dangers to the possibilities of real, much-needed improvement of the democratic system which electronic voting procedures might enable.

While Western countries (Western Europe and the USA) have been reluctant or slow to introduce EVMs into the electoral process, many non-western countries have had success in applying the technology. Most notably, both for their size and history of electoral problems, Brazil and India have been using the technology in their parliamentary elections: Brazil already twice in nationwide elections, India so far in a pilot program, but with upcoming elections (Jan 2004) scheduled to be entirely “electronic”, deploying over a million terminals throughout the country.

While discussion in the West has largely been focused on issues of security and privacy, and particular threats that replacing paper ballots with machines brings to the process, little thought has been devoted to possible benefits of the technology – other than the obvious speedup in tabulation. As examples of Brazil and India seem to indicate, this focus might need to shift.

Overall, deployed EVMs turned out to be less susceptible to fraud than “traditional” voting setups. While poor engineering (as in recent Virginia/Diebold case) can facilitate security breaches, so is the case with “paper” votes (poor engineering of the Florida/Bush/Gore ballot). In the field, documented exploits of deployed EVMs were mostly carry-overs from the traditional voting procedures, and were technology- independent (the most common example being buying of votes), end did not raise from EVM-specific technical issues. In the area of privacy, EVMs surprisingly offered some advantages over traditional voting methods: for example, machines equipped with speech synthesizers allowed blind voters to cast their votes, for the first time, in a truly private manner. Moreover, EVMs’ ability to present illiterate voters with not only text, but also with image and audio data, helped to eliminate a lot of social-engineering based fraud.

Successful EVM deployments can serve as a basis for a more focused, and more practical discussion of the issue of electronic voting. Case studies from Brazil and India can help shape existing discussions in following areas: 1) design and implementation procedures – public vs proprietary; 2) security concerns – fraud, accountability, supervision; 3) privacy concerns – national IDs, identity theft; 4) accessibility – absentee ballots, accessibility for the elderly and the handicapped.

Case studies of successful implementations of nationwide EVM systems, however, not only bring substance to above mentioned discussions. They allow to look beyond the problem of replacing the current voting system with its more efficient substitute; they give a chance to ask if the new technologies, now proved to be effective, can be used to improve on the political system which they serve. The question here is: will EVMs be only more efficient, more accessible, and more fraud-resistant replacements of the paper ballot, or will they bring entirely new qualities into the electoral process? Being an advocate of new technologies not being merely replacements of their older siblings, I will at this point briefly present an idea for a system of “continuous participation” in a representative democracy. It is an idea which aims at combining the practical benefits of representative democracy with the ideal of direct democracy, a system which is impossible to implement without the use of EVMs. By presenting this specific idea (first presented during the World Philosophical Congress in Istambul, 2003) I hope to shift some of the focus of discussion over electronic voting away from issues which in part have been settled in practice, and towards finding new (revolutionary?) applications of technology which already has proved itself to be effective.

AUTHOR
Andrzej Kocikowski

ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this paper is to argue that one of the great challenges facing both citizens and governments of the Information Society is the necessity to undertake multi-directional activities to energetically promote universal use of software (both system and application software) created according to “open source” policies. The paper will propose a solution to some deeply frustrating and potentially harmful experiences common to ICT users, including computer professionals and “ordinary users” alike. Although the problem has a global range, my focus will be primarily on Europe, and especially on the European Union.

Ideally, the above-mentioned activities should constitute a long-term and complex undertaking that — after being accepted by national governments — would find a prominent place among aid programs of the European Parliament and other institutions fulfilling similar functions. Such a project and its justification will be the focus of my paper.

Before moving on to the details, I will explain to the audience that, in my view, the most noble conception of the term “open source” is a philosophy expressed by numerous computer programmers all over the world, who believe that software should be distributed as open and easily modifiable code that is accessible free of charge to anyone. I have the highest respect for the people who created this conception and those who accept it, who – thank goodness — are many. Of course, I am also fully aware that this idea–to which they have given a big portion of their lives — will probably never be widely accepted.

Another meaning of “open source” is a slightly less noble idea: computer programmers receiving fair pay for their work instead of giving it away for free. This is the meaning that I will use for the term “open source” in this paper.

Why would citizens of the Information Society, their governments, and the representatives of both – the European Parliament — support the promotion of increasingly universal use of open source software? As in any other case, here too the reasons are many and of various importance. I will try to discuss most of them in my paper. In this abstract I will mention just a few.

First, I am convinced that open source software can be less expensive, safer, more productive, more elegant, more user-friendly, and so on, than software offered by for-profit corporations. Can this conviction be proven? Yes, although not in just a few words. For example, regarding the important issues of quality and security, it is much easier to discover problems resulting from a simple mistake, or a wrong use of particular tools, or negligence or (as Gene Spafford calls them) “programmed threats” in open source software than in any other kind. My conviction is justified by the existing similarity between computer programs and scientific theorems. A computer programmer basically assumes that if certain conditions will exist then certain effects will take place. Indeed, every line of code is a step in the “proof” of a particular theorem. Basic knowledge in the methodology of science states that the best way to judge the value of a theorem is through the process of intersubjective verification. That means that many individuals — a great many, if necessary – comprehensively examine the “proof” for correctness. I believe that this kind of (essentially social) control of the correctness of software code cannot be replaced even by the best organized control within a profit-oriented corporation that creates programs “behind closed doors.”

A Case in Point: The Infamous Story of Enron. Enron, with its alleged “model” control system, elaborate employees’ training programs and assessment, was a “poster boy” in business ethics textbooks — and in secret background money making through “creative bookkeeping”! Is there any better proof that lack of an “open door” policy and social control enables a significant discrepancy between declarations and reality?

Secondly, a total or near-total monopoly in the software market, like a monopoly in the production of oil, natural gas, etc., or — in a different context — like a political monopoly, seriously threatens freedom and democracy. In the Information Society computer software is a strategic good; especially the kind of software that controls the functioning of the global net. Hence, there is a great necessity to protect it from domination by any monopoly.

Thirdly, the creation of open source software that is fairly paid-for can benefit the economy of many countries. National governments or international organizations like the European Parliament could finance well-thought-through assistance programs to support the work of computer programmers, a great many of whom — for financial reasons — cannot afford to join the somewhat exclusive open source club, in the first meaning of the term “open source.” Instead of working in fast-food restaurants, scores of talented young computer programmers could make a living, for example, by testing professionally created open-source software.

So, are there any fundamental reasons why the task described in the main thesis of this paper should be pursued? Yes, there are. Governments should finance the creation of good software the way they finance the construction of highways used by all, schools attended by our children, museums and libraries in which our cultural heritage is preserved, hospitals, and so on. In addition, as mentioned before, free, safe, more efficient, more elegant, more user-friendly software is as much a strategic product as some natural resources.

I repeat: control over the global information infrastructure should not rest with any monopoly. Open source software is the only reasonable alternative to any software source that — with the help of trade secrets or intellectual property ownership — tries to dominate the global market (and also our PCs!) thereby threatening freedom and democracy.