AUTHOR
Peggy Gregory and Donal Flynn

ABSTRACT

We present a discussion of issues arising from a case study of a web-based diabetes system used by patients and health-care practitioners in a GP surgery in north-west England. The study ran over 18 months in a GP surgery during which 38 diabetic patients each used a web-based system for 6 months. The system enabled participants to upload their blood glucose readings to a password protected website and share the results with their GP and the practice nurse. It also enabled patients to communicate with the nurse and GP; to post to a discussion board shared with other users of the system; to read regularly updated news and information pages about diabetes and to join a diet and exercise email system. The case study used mixed methods, gathering both qualitative and quantitative data. Factors of interest were use and non-use patterns, behaviour and attitude changes and experiences of those who participated.

The two parts of the system that participants reported as being of most interest were the blood glucose upload feature and the communication features. The blood glucose upload feature was valued by the participants who used it because it allowed them to view graphs of their results and find patterns in the readings, and it also allowed the practise nurse to see their readings and make comments on them. The communication features of the system were of particular interest to participants, especially the discussion pages and the messaging facility. The discussion board was the most used part of the website and participants reported that the experience was useful in terms of learning, sharing and also in providing a sense of not being alone. Issues of trust and data security on the Internet were discussed with patients. Finding a set of trusted electronic sources of information about diabetes was reported by many patients to be important whereas few were concerned about data security when transmitting health data over the Internet.

An interesting feature of system use was that many of the more engaged users were those whose attitude towards their diabetes was positive when the study started. Most patients who were struggling to accept and control their diabetes did not use the system very much, and although many of these patients showed evidence of shifts in attitude and behaviour during the project, the existence of the system did not in itself encourage them to become significantly more engaged in their diabetes care.

Five categories of use characteristics were identified: ‘frequent users’, ‘regular users’, ‘occasional users’, ‘minimal users’ and ‘non users’. Most users were either ‘regular’ or ‘occasional’ with fewer ‘frequent’ and ‘minimal’ users. However there were also a significant number of ‘non users’. Consistent reasons explaining use patterns were difficult to find, but those in the ‘minimal’ or ‘non user’ groups were more likely to experience one of the following: difficulty accepting their diabetes, technical problems that couldn’t be solved or health and personal problems that made participation difficult. Those who fell into the ‘frequent’ or ‘regular’ user groups were more likely to be accepting of their diabetes and to use their computers regularly for purposes other than just the diabetes system.

The social implications of the introduction of such systems are wide-ranging. There are possibilities for new ways of supporting and communicating with patients through electronic media. These systems can provide ways for patients to become more active in their own disease management. Previous work on self-management has shown that patients who take more responsibility for their health care have better health outcomes (Lorig et al. 2001). Such systems can also enable patients to engage with a range of healthcare practitioners asynchronously in a way that provides a more continuous level of support than is currently experienced by most patients with chronic diseases (Goldberg et al. 2003). As well as communication with professionals, electronic media can provide ways in which patients can communicate with each other and that can help to develop a sense of being supported by a community. The discussion board in our case study was private to the group of diabetic patients using it and a number of participants mentioned how useful it was to be able to share experiences with other diabetics. Such support can be particularly helpful for patients with chronic diseases because of the need to keep on track over a long period of time and through a number of different disease phases.

There are however a number of potential problems that a more widespread introduction of such systems would raise. Some patients would be unable to use computerised systems because of a lack of access to the required technology or because of physical or mental health problems. There is a danger that the introduction of such systems may further entrench the division between those who can access health care successfully and those who cannot. The availability of smaller, possibly freely available, devices would not necessarily alleviate this problem because they would not be easy to use by older patients or those with sight problems. Also, as evidenced by our study, the fact that such systems are available does not mean that they will be used. The technical system is not in itself a solution to the problems faced by diabetic patients but is a tool that can be used to the benefit of patients if they choose to engage with it. There is still a need for other systems to work in concert with technical systems to support the engagement process. It seems almost inevitable that technical patient support systems will gradually become more available for users, and as a part of this growth the issues of division, exclusion, non-use and ease-of-use need to be addressed.

REFERENCES

Lorig, K.R.; Sobel, D.S.; Ritter, P.L.; Laurent, D.; Hobbs, M. (2001) “Effect of a Self-Management Program on Patients with Chronic Disease.” Effective Clinical Practice, 4(6), pp. 256-262

Goldberg, H. I.; Ralston, J.D.; Hirsch, I. B.; Hoath, J.I.; Ahmed, K.I. (2003). “Using an internet comanagement module to improve the quality of chronic disease care.” Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Safety, 29(9) Sept 2003.

AUTHOR
Philippe Goujon

ABSTRACT

The proactive and AmI technology into highly sensitive environment produces specific challenges that are inextricably linked to ethical and societal issues. Proactive systems such as AmI will make decisions without direct human supervision placing the technical system in a position of authority. The ethics of interactive computer systems that focuses on how such systems are (or can be) used by human users have been discussed at length, taking in account the possibilities of the technology presented in the project, it becomes urgently necessary to consider the implications of decisions made or influenced by computers. As specified by L Venter, MS Olivier and JJ. Britz the integration of mobile technology, wireless networks, ubiquitous computing and artificial intelligence with thousands of embedded devices such as sensors and actuators may result in networks that can proactively monitor and respond to human behavior without human interaction and with little supervision. Decisions that can influence or alter the environment will be made at faster-than-human speeds.(Venter et al. 2005) Ethics as applied to current interactive computer systems will not be adequate. The objective of this article is to analyze the ethical and societal problems related to the AmI technology. To reach that objective, we will firstly analyze the conditions for a critical perspective, the ethical references used as the foundation of our analysis and in the last part of this article the ethical issues raised by AmI.

AUTHOR
Donald Gotterbarn

ABSTRACT

Some video games, such as the Grand Theft Auto series are notorious for their rewarding of racial, sexual, nationalistic discrimination and savage behavior. There are significant psychological studies of the negative impact of prolonged playing of such games, indicating an increase in aggressive thoughts.’ (Anderson & Bushman). The Entertainment Software Rating Board ESRB has content descriptors: use of drugs alcohol tobacco; strong language sexual, five degrees of nudity, four degrees of violence content. Work on the ethics of video games seems to focus on potential reinforcement of these specific behaviors.

Such broad stroke criticism of video games in not justified. There is a need to distinguish types of video games. Some interactive video games such as the Nintendo Wii are being used in rehabilitation in physical therapy for stroke patients. Video game controllers are used to direct real-time surgical devices and video games are used to improve surgeon’s reflexes that operate with these game controller driven surgical tools.

There is however a significant issue ethical issue with video games that has not been discussed in the literature. Video games are treated by members of the game design and development community as a domain of software development that seems to lack clear ethical impacts beyond some minimal affect on the users of the software. I recently asked a group of computing students if they would blow the whistle if a software product they had been working on was about to be released to the public even though it is clear that the software is unreliable and does not adequately perform. An immediate response was to ask if the software was merely a video game or was it “more serious”. If it controlled devices for eye surgery there was unanimous agreement that it is wrong to release known unreliable software. If, however, it was ‘merely’ video game software there were a variety of justifications given for releasing the unreliable software. I think this attitude points to a deeper problem and it needs to be addressed.

There is a family of video games based on rapid decisions which are related to the success of the gamer in that game. These include role playing games, real-time strategy games, games whose success is determined by the number killed , or to use the games euphemism ‘ the number K.O.ed” The Xbox and Game Boy generation of students raised on these games are being trained that decisions are all and only about themselves.

The most banal description of the problem is to say, in a non-pejorative way, that the development of e-games seems to be ‘self-centered’. The gamer is encouraged to think solely in terms of benefit to their character when making a decision. Thus in ‘Gears of War’ which mimics dangerous military situations, the only reason to save a wounded teammate is that the action will improve your chances of winning. The motivation is not loyalty or concern for the other soldier’s life. In Grand Theft Auto one is rewarded for the number of acts done in service of a master criminal. The driving question is not the impact a decision has on society but rather the impact on the individual character. This approach is true of most button mashing shoot-up games as well. We are training a generation to make decisions without any attention to the consequences for others of their actions

This problem is also exacerbated by the focus of new e-gaming curricula. The focus resembles the early computer science curricula which focus on the speed and efficiency of the system with little attention to the impacts the system has on others. A typical description treats video game design as devoid of social impact. For example “…the program provides preparation in the math and physics of games; programming fundamentals; game design; modifications (MOD) and massively multi-player online game (MMOG) programming; two- and three-dimensional graphics programming; and simulation and game engine design”

In this paper the strengths and weaknesses of a variety of ways to address this problem of game design and development and its negative impact on ethical decision models will be presented. The methods considered include Value Added Programming, decisions on when to ethically break rules, the impact of these decisions on the world beyond one’s character, and suggestions for modifying e game curricula to address these issues.

AUTHOR
Roma Gorzelanczyk

ABSTRACT

The aim of the paper is to present the most important activities of the European Union in the scope of the protection of cultural identity and heritage in the light of such phenomena as ITC revolution, globalization or the development of Information Society. Cultural exclusion, including language exclusion, poses a challenge to the governments of the member states and institutions of the united Europe. The paper aims at presenting the extent and ways in which the European Union deals with this problem.

Modern telecommunication technologies significantly influence the issues connected with the shaping of cultural identity. An acceleration and facilitation of contacts, in a wide scale, emphasized the importance of cultural differences. In such cases, the occurrence of new technologies abounds in twofold consequences. Positive ones: making the popularization of an increasing access to cultural goods possible. An additional positive consequence is the possibility of protection and preservation of the products of culture, with the use of latest technological achievements. There are also negative results of the creation of a “global society” – traditional societies and their cultural identity are threatened with an unprecedented interference from other cultures and with their possible marginalization. One of the elements of this process, which I would like to point your attention to, is the significance of the language. The possible language exclusion is meant here, connected with the dominance of English in new media and the consequences this fact may have on the re-production of cultural bonds.

Doubtlessly, one of the tools of spreading and maintaining the dominance of English is the Internet. We are dealing here with a technology which is rapidly entering all the spheres of human life, starting from education, to learning, work and entertainment. Therefore, computer literacy is becoming increasingly important and, consequently, so is the knowledge of English. Obviously, more and more software and websites exist in national languages; however, scholarly publications and specialist or international websites are developed mainly in English. Additionally, the Internet develops in the direction which breaks away with its traditional perception of a “huge encyclopedia” or a “collection of information on each subject” and steers in the direction of an increasing commitment of users in its creation. The Web 2.0 is a perfect example of this tendency. The Internet, which ensures the possibility of communication with almost everyone, “needed” a platform on which these processes may take place. One may state that it “forced” determining (adopting) one language which would enable (or significantly facilitate or optimize) communication. English has become such a language. Therefore, a question arises whether its dominance in such a powerful medium as the Internet poses a threat for national cultures, and if so, what are the ways of preventing this threat?

The exclusion from the access to the sources of information, caused by the lack of language skills, may, in consequence, lead to disturbances in the process of constructing identity, including cultural identity. Such problems as cultural identity and heritage are connected with the concept of language competence or a linguistic view of the world. Therefore, the access to information in national languages is becoming so significant.

In the context of transferring a growing number of all human activities to the Internet and the above-mentioned dominance of English content result in very concrete consequences. Starting from those most obvious problems with communication on the basic level, to those connected with the problem of the access to cultural goods, including scientific achievements. Political documents, especially those related to the creation of Information Society within the activities of the European Union, assume the protection of cultural identity, popularization of culture and fostering scientific development.

In addition, in global Information Society, such issues as digital copyright management, digitalization of cultural goods, media convergence or the ability to use them acquire a new dimension. All these issues are a challenge both for cultural institutions as well as for the European Union.

The paper aims at presenting the main aspects connected with the significance of cultural identity in the light of phenomena related to the ITC revolution and the development of a global information society. The backdrop for the presentation of this phenomenon is constituted by concrete actions of the institutions of the EU. This should result in acquiring a picture of real consequences of the processes taking place, both stemming from new opportunities and possibilities and new threats.

AUTHOR
Federico Gobbo and Rosario Sica

ABSTRACT

As said by George Simens, to know today means to be connected, as knowledge moves fast today and “we can no longer seek to possess all needed knowledge personally.” As the known case study of Wikipedia demonstrates, knowledge reliance is an open issue in an unstructured virtual community of practice. In fact, participation is considered as a mark of prestige in itself, without consideration about competence or encyclopedic knowledge, while often domain experts aren’t so active in the community. An explanation of this kind of paradox, sometimes referred as ‘the problem of the experts’, can be found in social network analysis current trends. This field, with which is far from being new [1], has spread in into the field of organization studies, in particular at the Network Roundtable at the University of Virginia, grounded into in the complex network analysis results and perspectives – see for instance [2]. This approach describes networks with specific tools used for finding relevant nodes called ‘hubs’, which are distributed according to the power law, instead of a normal distribution. Moreover, the hubs intertwine with one another in such a way so that the social network analysis can predict reasonably predict the evolution of the network itself.

Recently the term ‘social network’ acquired an additional meaning indicating popular web 2.0 sites – e.g. Facebook, Linkedin, Ecademy, or Xing – which let people remain in touch in a semi-structured way. In these sites, algorithms measure, for instance, the degree of between-ness and density so in order to facilitate new job opportunities or simply friendship or any other kind of social relationship. Companies are becoming aware of the opportunities and challenges offered by these social networks, as they capture informal relations that go beyond the traditional hierarchies which depict organization and they are potentially disruptive, if not domesticated appropriately. A coherent model which take takes into account the social and ethical aspects of the aforementioned phenomenon is needed. The aim of this paper is to describe the guidelines of such a model, proposing the notion of authentic trust [3] as the underpinning force of web 2.0 social networks.

The notion of ‘authentic trust’ is precise and specific at the same time. Unlike the current use of the term in computer science, trust is an act performed by an agent, according to its interests and strategies, in a conditional, focused and therefore limited context. This means that the agent who trusts is always aware of the risk of betrayal and it is negotiable, so that it absorbs this risk in a reasonable way. In this way, authentic trust neutralizes its antithesis, i.e. cordial hypocrisy. It is worth noticing that trust can be performed by a single person as well as a group of people, when they can perform a choice – otherwise, there is no trust but only brute power or sheer force. Consequently, authentic trust is a process, and involves the establishment of a relationship (in the case of computers the terms ‘reliance’ or ‘reliability’ seem to be more appropriate: machines don’t have interests, in this respect they are like like stones). Authentic trust is negotiable, and it absorbs the risk of betrayal. On the contrary, according to [3], ‘simple trust’ is unconditioned, naive and typical in children, while ‘blind trust’ blocks evidence, denying the risk of betrayal and can be even foolish. As a a corollary, trustworthiness is the passive side of trust(ing), i.e. the belief about the receiver, if he or she is worth being trusted. For example, we can trust a child who isn’t (yet) trustworthy, or we can deny trust to someone trustworthy as since we want to perform the task by ourselves.

Web 2.0 social networks are reconfiguring the notion of endorsement, which is the public approval of somebody’s competence. In fact, competence is based on reliance, but it is the social network which informally certifies informally professional competences, and this informal certification is based on authentic trust. For instance, the certification given by an external organization, e.g. a University, can assure that that person is a doctor, but it is the social network in which he is in that tells us that he is honest, sincere and, for instance, not fighting a alcohol abuse problem.

A provisional conclusion of the paper is that, while organizations deal with competence certification, their inner social networks, i.e. the ones living within them, are the source of trust and therefore of endorsement. The challenge is that the informal knowledge spread out from inner social networks can improve the organizational system along flexible models, which are far more appropriated to the ever-changing context they are facing nowadays.

In the paper, illustrations and case studies of the aforementioned thesis work will be given, together with more relevant citations.

REFERENCES

[1] Levi Moreno, Jacob (1977). Who shall survive? Beacon House. Original edition: 1934.

[2] Barabasi, Albert-Laszlo and Frangos, Jennifer (2003). Linked: The New Science of Networks. Perseus Books.

[3] Solomon, Robert C. and Flores, Fernando (2001). Building Trust. Oxford University Press.

AUTHOR
Andrea Glorioso

ABSTRACT

In a seminal article published in 2003, Edward Felten polemically compared a mythical system for Digital Rights Management (DRM from now on), that would be able to correctly capture, interpret and enforce all the subtleties of copyright law, to a “judge on a chip”. In so doing, Felten wanted to stress how, given current technology, granting DRM systems – or, one might reason by analogy, automated systems in general – the power to take on-the-fly decisions over complex legal issues (such as whether a particular act, in and by itself constituting a copyright infringement, would fall under the defence afforded by the “fair use” doctrine in the US ) amounted to vesting such systems with the authority of the judicial branch in a democratic society. Even worse, these decisions are almost unavoidably taken ex ante, without the “judge” being able to “listen to the arguments” of each side – such as, in the case considered by Felten, copyright holders and the supposedly infringing user – before reaching a decision.

Analysis on the relationship between automated enforcement systems, such as DRM systems, and “fair use” or similar doctrines/legal provisions has been substantial – but not conclusive, at least for the time being and the foreseeable future. Similar analysis, highlighting the legal problems that arise when applying automated systems to social interactions, have taken place in other fields as well – e.g. when discussing the legal implications of applying automated filters to Internet usage and Web navigation, restricting or penalising the efficiency of access to online resources.

However, beyond the legal implications of using automated systems in the contexts described above – and in others that, for the sake of brevity, will not be discussed now – there is arguably a more subtle point to be considered, which touches upon one of the pillars the legal system, and consequently on how the law copes with automated systems: the ethical implications of using automated systems to regulate social interactions.

This contribution will focus on one specific “ethical implication”: whether, by putting in place automated systems deciding whether a particular human action should be “approved” or not, we are witnessing the birth of “ethics on a chip”, of a mythical “moral judge” that decides ex ante whether that particular human action falls within the acceptable realms of “ethical behaviour” in a given social environment. In short, the question is : “what are the ethics of creating automated ethics”?

More specifically, this contribution will analyse the way in which the usage of three particular technologies, that nowadays are mostly implemented through automated systems, might embed a particular form of ethics and, therefore, impose that ethics to the human beings that use them – often unknowingly or involuntarily: DRM systems, Internet filtering technologies and Trusted Computing.

While several forms of the “ethical implication” introduced here have already been apparent for some time – for example, the way in which DRM systems tend to impose a clear limitation on the acceptable level of “criticism”, when its expression involves a copyright infringement, as might be the case for quotations or some forms of parodies; or how Internet filtering categorises (and blocks) as “pornographic”, “immoral”, “terrorist”, “pedophile”, information and resources that ought to be analysed on a case by case basis – this contributions argues that we need a more coherent analytical approach, at least for the three technologies introduced above. This need is particularly relevant in light of the fact that these technologies are not independent from one another: one might very well imagine DRM systems based on Trusted Computing platforms and able to enforce their “ethic” not only on a local computer used by a single human being, but also on the networks – via application of automated filters – through which several human beings communicate.

While this contribution is of a theoretical nature, and the discussion it wishes to stimulate should arguably be independent of any particular way in which the technologies under examination are or will be implemented – as long as they have a fundamental characteristic that here is considered as problematic, i.e. being automated – practical examples will be used throughout the discussions as a tool and help. In the end, however, to answer the question that is raised in this contribution, it is necessary to go beyond a detailed analysis of any particular technology, and pose the more fundamental question of whether “ethics without choice”, or more precisely an ethics where human choice is severely limited by the architecture of an automated system, still deserves to be called “ethics”.

[1] See E. Felten, A skeptical view of DRM and fair use, in 48(4) Communications of the ACM, ACM, 2003: pp. 56-59.

[2] Various definitions of Digital Rights Management systems have been used throughout time, often hindering a clear and coherent discussion on the pros and cons of the “DRM approach” as a whole. In this contribution I will refer mainly to the so-called “NIST definition”, according to which DRM systems are “systems of information technology (IT) components and services along with corresponding law, policies and business models which strive to distribute and control intellectual property (IP) and its rights” (G.E. LYON, The Internet Marketplace and Digital Rights Management, NIST Software Diagnostic and Conformance Testing Division – 897, paper presented at Conference on Infrastructure for e-Business, e-Education and e-Science on the Internet (6-12 August 2001, L’Aquila, Italy), 2001.

[3] “A DRM system that gets all fair use judgements right would in effect be a “judge on a chip” predicting with high accuracy how a real judge would decide a lawsuit challenging a particular use. Clearly, this is infeasible with today’s technology. […] If our technologies can’t make the fair use judgement correctly in every case, perhaps they can get it right most of the time. Perhaps they can enforce some approximation of the law. The challenge in doing this lies again in the difficulty of internalizing the four-factor fair use test so a program can evaluate it. The true result of the test relies on economic analysis and on factors outside the computer that are not easily measured (such as the social context in which a use occurs). In some respects, the fair use test seems designed to frustrate attempts to computerize it” (E. Felten, A skeptical view of DRM and fair use, p. 58, supra at n. 1 – emphasis added).

[4] Although fair use, as a legal doctrine allowing “limited use of copyrighted material without requiring permission from the rights holders, such as use for scholarship or review […] [and providing] for the legal, non-licensed citation or incorporation of copyrighted material in another author’s work under a four-factor balancing test” (see http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Fair_use&oldid=192802994) is specific to the US legal system, the general principle underlined by Felten and taken as a basis for the analysis of this contribution is not US-centric, either when focusing specifically on copyright law (as most countries have similar provisions, as is the case of the “exceptions and limitations” to the exclusive rights of the author in the Italian legal system) or, more to the point, when applying the principle to other legal fields or extending it beyond legal analysis, as is the case for this contribution.

[5] See inter alia see D.L. Burk-J. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, in 15(1) Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 2001; S. Bechtold, The Present and Future of Digital Rights Management – Musings on Emerging Legal Problems, in Eberhard Becker et al (eds.), Digital Rights Management – technological economical, legal and political aspects, Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2770, November 2003; J.S. Erickson, Fair Use, DRM, and Trusted Computing, in 46(4) Communications of the ACM, ACM, 2003; P. Samuelson, DRM {and, or, vs.} the Law, in 46(4) Communications of the ACM, ACM, 2003; T.K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, in 20(3) Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 2006; I. Brown (ed.), Implementing the European Union Copyright Directive, FIPR, 2003; S. Dusollier, Fair Use by Design in the European Copyright Directive of 2001, in 46(4) Communications of the ACM, ACM, 2003; U. Gasser-M. Girsberger, Transposing the Copyright Directive: Legal Protection of Technological Measures in EU-Member States, Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Berkman Publications Series No. 2004-10, 2004; G. Westkamp (ed.), The Implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC in the Member States, Study MARKT/2005/07/D, Part II, February 2007 (in particular sec. I.B, sec. I.D.III, sec. I.D.V, sec. I.D.VI and part III); G. Mazziotti, EU Digital Copyright Law and the End-User, Springer, Berlin, forthcoming, 2008.

[6] See inter alia the reports of the project “OpenNet Initiative” ( http://opennet.net/). Drawing from the taxonomy developed by the OpenNet project, in this contribution I will mostly refer to the cases of “technical blocking”, i.e. using automated systems to decide whether a particular Internet resource should be made accessible or not. The other cases discussed by the OpenNet project, namely “search results removal”, “take-down” and “induced self-censorship” appear less relevant for the conceptual framework I purport to develop, although all of them – and particularly the last, “induced self-censorship” (i.e. “encouraging self-censorship both in browsing habits and in choosing content to post online […] through the threat of legal action, the promotion of social norms, or informal methods of intimidation [as well as] [t]he perception that the government is engaged in the surveillance and monitoring of Internet activity, whether accurate or not, [which] provides another strong incentive to avoid posting material or visiting sites that might draw the attention of authorities”) are indeed relevant in a more general discussion on the ethics of ICT-based practices. See http://opennet.net/about-filtering for further discussion on the taxonomy proposed by the OpenNet project.

[7] The debate on the so-called principle of “Network Neutrality” is another case in which the legal legitimacy of Internet Access Providers penalising (slowing down or blocking tour court) access to certain Internet resources has been questioned. However, the debate so far does not seem to have focused specifically on the implications of (some) Internet Access Providers using automated systems to achieve their goals, but rather on more general aspects related to freedom of expression (see supra n. 6), competition law (T.R. Beard-G.S. Ford-T.M. Koutsky-L.J. Spiwak, Network Neutrality and Industry Structure, in 29 Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, 2007, p. 149; M. Cave-P. Crocioni, Does Europe Need Network Neutrality Rules?, in 1 International Journal of Communication, 2007, pp. 669-679) and the economic analysis of innovation dynamics (M.A. Lemley-L. Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, UC Berkeley Law & Econ Research Paper No. 2000-19; Stanford Law & Economics Olin Working Paper No. 207; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 37, 2000; T. Wu, Network Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Access, Working Paper, 2006; S. Crawford, Internet Think, in Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 2007).

[8] This contribution will not discuss the general relationship between ethics and the law, i.e. whether the law should promote any particular kind of ethics. It will, however, touch upon the issue whether the law should promote a vision of ethics that deprives human beings from the possibility to choose a particular course of action – therefore, one might say, depriving the concept of “ethics” of its very foundation.

[9] Obviously, the fact that the systems discussed in this article are being used to regulate activities which are or might be conducted via the Internet raises another issue, i.e. what should be the appropriate “social environments” which rules ought to be taken as a reference when assessing human behaviour in a global environment which interconnects very different cultures and social groups. While the problem exists and does not easily lend itself to clear-cut answers à la “information wants to be free”, this contribution will not delve too much on it, mainly because its aim is to discuss more fundamental – and, one might say, abstract – questions related to the ethics of using automated systems for assessing the ethics of a human action. Answering these questions might very well lead to the conclusion that even though some form of filtering might be desirable, due to the differences among different social groups and the desire to shield members of one social group from the “damaging” cultural expressions of another, implementing such filtering through automated systems would be unacceptable even for the social group that wants to be shielded.

[10] In this contribution the definition of “technology” introduced in R.G. Lipsey, K. I. Carlaw, C. T. Bekar, Economic Transformations – General Purpose Technologies and Long Term Economic Growth, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.58, will be used, i.e. “the set of ideas specifying all activities that create economic value […] comprising (1) knowledge about product technologies, the specifications of everything that is produced; (2) knowledge about process technologies, the specifications of all processes by which goods and services are produced; (3) knowledge about organisational technologies, the specification of how productive activity is organised in productive and administrative units for producing present and future goods and services”.

[11] See supra n. 3.

[12] See supra n. 6.

[13] Trusted Computing “is a technology […] through which the computer will consistently behave in specific ways, and those behaviours will be enforced by hardware and software. Enforcing this Trusted behaviour is achieved by loading the hardware with a unique ID and unique master key and denying even the owner of a computer knowledge and control of their own master key. Trusted Computing is extremely controversial as the hardware is not merely secured for the owner; enforcing Trusted behaviour means it is secured against the owner as well” (see http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Trusted_Computing&oldid=193004477 ). For more information, see the specifications available on the web site of the Trusted Computing Group at https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/.

[14] See supra n. 5.

[15] On September 10, 2007, Franco Frattini, Vice-president of the European Commission and Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, declared that he intended “”to carry out a clear exploring exercise with the private sector … on how it is possible to use technology to prevent people from using or searching dangerous words like bomb, kill, genocide or terrorism” (Reuters, Web search for bomb recipes should be blocked: EU, 10 September 2007). Mr. Frattini does not seem to have advanced any concrete proposal after his declaration, and to be fair (and optimistic) it is questionable whether what he implied as a goal for his “exploratory exercise” was the creation of automated systems to filter/censor access to “terrorist” information or rather of a fast-lane for law enforcement agencies to block certain web-sites ex post.

[16] In Italy, Decree 8 January 2007 of the Minister of Communications (“Technical requirements of filtering tools that providers of connectivity to the Internet must use, with the goal to inhibit, pursuant to existing law, access to web-sites as indicated by the National Center for Fighting Paedopornography”) obliges all Internet Access Providers to routinely check a list provided by the Ministry of Interior and automatically block access to any web-site contained in that list within 6 hours of receiving the list. The decree does not contain any provision on whom should be able to access that list – for example, to question the inclusion of a particular web-site – nor how the owners of a web-site that ended up on the list could ask its removal.