AUTHOR

Paul Schuegraf and Richard Rosenberg
Department of Computer Science
University of British Columbia
Vancouver

ABSTRACT

The tradition of ethics in psychological and sociological research is being confronted with a new dimension in studies done using the Internet, which thwarts the conventional application of many of the principles of ethical research. The problem of exactly how modern researchers should carry out research on or involving the Internet can be subdivided into a number of problems that are fundamentally ethical in nature and those which involve technical matters. For example, obtaining informed consent from subjects is one of the fundamental tenets of research in the social sciences. However, suppose that a researcher wished to incorporate into his work a message posted to any one of the thousands of publicly accessible newsgroups. Is the researcher obligated to obtain consent from the poster? After all, researchers have traditionally been exempt from obtaining consent for data collected from public sources such as television, radio, books, and open records and spaces.

On the other hand, it has been argued (King, 1996) that some virtual communities have a high degree of perceived privacy. Despite the fact that messages are publicly available, members of the community participate with a belief that privacy will be maintained by other members, allowing for a limited public discussion of sensitive issues. The fact that the information can be perceived as both public and private is the ethical aspect of the issue. Now suppose that the researcher has concluded that the community to which the desired message was posted operates with a high level of perceived privacy, and to proceed without obtaining consent from the person who posted the message would be ethically unacceptable. By what means should the researcher inform the potential subject, and how can he or she verify the validity of the consent should it be given? Assuming that the researcher is not able to meet personally with the subject and is thus forced to obtain information through the Internet, many problems can arise. There may be difficulty in obtaining contact information, the wrong person may be contacted, the subject may be underage or not sufficiently mentally competent to give consent or the subject may falsify information (including age) in responding. The difficulty in obtaining consent ethically when the need for it has been accepted is a new technical problem that does not appear in conventional study and consequently is not dealt with in ethics procedures.

In this paper, we examine some of the problematic areas of Internet research, some ethical, some technical, and some that have both aspects, including informed consent. Another important issue is the varying degrees of public availability or group accessibility of different Internet forums. Much of the research that has been conducted regarding ethics on the Internet has mainly considered publicly accessible newsgroups and MUDs and MOOs. Many more forums exist, such as listservs, chat rooms, and bulletin boards, each with its own particular public or private character, and each with its own particular ethical concerns. For example, some forums, such as newsgroups and listservs, are archived, which means that researchers can have access to large amounts of data that are entirely naturalistic (free from experimental interference) and nearly impossible to obtain consent for.

Other issues addressed in this paper are confidentiality, data maintenance and security, how privacy and deception apply to naturalistic studies on the Internet, as well as the use of pseudonyms and personally identifiable information. We examine the ethics guidelines of the American Psychological Association and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, as well as those of the researchers’ home university, concluding that these guidelines often fail to provide sufficient guidance for those conducting research on the Internet. Guidelines for off-line research simply assume that researchers have access to a certain amount of basic information about the subject: one of the biggest problems with Internet research is the difficulty of verifying subjective data. Any data related to the physical world (age, sex, location, and occupation) can be falsified by the subject with little trouble. In this sense Internet research is more akin to historical or archaeological research, except that attempting to verify subjective data can lead to further ethical complications.

Several examples of Internet research are considered, including two that have been criticized for their ethical approaches (Finn and Lavitt, 1994, and Rimm, 1995). We finish by examining some possible approaches to the suggested problems, concluding however that there are far more questions than answers. Nevertheless, the potential value of the Internet as an area for research is immense; new ways must be found to apply the essential concepts of ethical research to this important but problematic domain.

AUTHOR

László Ropolyi
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eötvös University
1518 Budapest, Pf. 32.
Hungary

ABSTRACT

According to several analyses the Year 2000 computer problem (the Millennium Bug, Y2K Crisis, Time Bomb 2000, etc.) has been the most significant and enormously dangerous technological difficulty in the history of mankind. In spite of this, many experts have emphasized a radically different opinion: the difficulty was not real, no significant danger was expected due to the date problem. The debate between the different groups of “experts” about the nature and treatment of the problem has been widely popularized, in this way the public was informed, however, the lay public was not able to estimate the reality of the risk and the possible consequences of the problem and certain hysteric and apocalyptic reactions were observed especially in the USA. This strange situation demands a detailed social, socio – psychological, psychological, ethical and philosophical investigation.

Studying hundreds of web pages devoted to the problem I shall present a philosophical analysis of the “Year 2000” computer problem in order to demonstrate its most important social and ethical aspects and to contribute to the understanding of the problem with some ideas.

1. At the beginning of the events (a few years earlier) the Year 2000 problem seemed like an enormous software business. Later (a few months before the crucial date) the problem liberated from this framework and became similar to a complete social catastrophe which can destroy the whole human (especially the Western) civilization: the dangers appeared in the personal life of the citizens as well; the collapse of the networks of water, and of electricity supply, and of banking, moreover, the end of the modern city and/or society was visionized. How and why did the problem change so radically? It had clear social and ethical causes.
2. The Year 2000 problem was a complex problem of three – relatively separated – sub-problems: a technical-technological, a business related, and a social sub-problem. The direct technical problem of the date representation in computers did not have any difficulty, for the most experts it was clear that this problem can be solved in a very simple way. However, essential groups of the lay intelligentsia did not trust these computer experts. Realizing the dimension of the technological task it was demonstrated that most technological projects did not get finished in due time, especially in the software industry, so it would be important to take into account the presumable technical, economical, social difficulties. The crucial question is: the presence or absence of the trust of the public in the solution of the technical problem. How and why was this trust constructed or destroyed? A sharp struggle of the social actors for forming of the public opinion in question has been observed. During this struggle the technical problem was transformed into a problem of business and politics.
3. The business related problem had many different aspects. There were some forecasts about the economic crisis and some others about the economic boom caused by the Y2K problem. One of the most important phenomena was probably the appearance of the ideas and activity of the so called survivalists, who – due to the possible collapse of the trade systems – suggested to buy, to store, to supply practically everything which is important for the civilized life. They have emphasized the possible risks of the date problem and with the ideological support of certain apocalyptic religious prophets and movements they have suggested to prepare to a social chaos saying that they are “dedicated to helping you prepare the worst, while hoping for the best”. In this way the question of trust was directly related to the trading activity motivated by a fear of the end of civilization. The representatives of the survivalism were not basically interested in the solution of the technical problem of date but they were interested in a special managing of the fear of people. These relationships formed an advantageous environment to the emergence of the social problem of Y2K.
4. The social problem has been three different managing strategies. The position of survivalism was characterized above. The critical opponents of the survivalist strategy pointed out its hidden business related aspect and criticized its pretended attitude. The government wanted to demonstrate its efforts to prepare its computer systems and that of the other critical sectors of the economy and society, in this way to save the public trust in itself, especially in its high level problem solving abilities.
5. The Y2K problem and its treatment was very significant for the social scientists. It became clear that the modernity have already transcended. The modern computers build up into the social networks have a crucial role in the working of the postmodern network society. The serious anxiety of many people about the collapse of civilization is an important sign that in their thinking the network society represents already the civilized society. The actual running of the Year 2000 problem can be considered as a measurement process of the postmodernity of the present society.

AUTHOR

Wade L. Robison
Ezra A. Hale Professor in Applied Ethics
Rochester Institute of Technology
Rochester, NY 14623

ABSTRACT

The intellectual core of engineering is a design solution to a particular kind of problem, and ethical issues are internal to that intellectual core. Teaching ethics to computer engineering students thus requires an understanding only of the intellectual core of engineering itself and thus of how design solutions are themselves ethically loaded.

Ethics is already in engineering and only needs to be revealed. Once revealed as internal to any design solution, ethical issues can become a subject of explicit discussion within the intellectual core of engineering itself.

We might imagine, using the Cartesian conceit, an evil genius of an engineer who makes our lives miserable by designing artifacts which mislead into mistakes even the most intelligent, the most highly trained, and the most highly motivated among us and which, in the most diabolically perverse cases, seduce us into producing the opposite of what we were led to expect by the design.

We are all familiar with such artifacts in our daily lives — stove tops whose design misleads us into turning on a burner other than the one we intend, doors that entice us into pushing when we must pull them open, and so on. We may have perverse engineers in our midst, but, far more likely, we have engineers who do not think through the implications of their design solutions for those who are to use the artifacts created in accordance with them.

Whenever there is a mechanical or technical failure, it is always a question where the responsibility ought to rest. A pilot who takes off on the wrong runway and so causes a catastrophic crash will be exonerated if something was amiss that would lead even an intelligent, well-trained, and highly motivated pilot to turn into the wrong runway. But if nothing was amiss, we must wonder about the pilot. Did the pilot make a stupid mistake? Was the pilot inexperienced — the Kennedy case? Was the pilot not motivated to survive — as suspected in the Egyptian air disaster?

These two variables — the nature of the situation and the nature of the operator — play against each other, with perfections of the one calling into question the other. A foolproof design must meet a superior fool not to work, and the most motivated of the best of the best must be misled by something problematic about the design. The ‘must’ indicates a conceptual necessity.

It can only be an heuristic ideal for engineers to solve a design problem with something so wonderfully perfect that it would take a perfect fool to misuse it. There are too many ways in which we humans can be foolish, ignorant, and unmotivated, and the bar would be too high if engineers had to design to make impossible the consequences of all our human failings. But it is an heuristic ideal — and an ethical one. For failures built into the design solution itself by, say, a perverse engineer or a careless one will have consequences, some no doubt unexpected, some almost certainly harmful.

It is a harm, although generally not a major one, to push against a door to open it when it must be pulled. It can cause grievous harm to turn on the wrong burner of a stove. And errors in computer programs can cause untold disasters — from directing an airplane, dependent upon the program for navigation, into a mountainside, as happened in Columbia, to causing the loss of data for a long-term experiment, to producing blackouts in the electrical grid, with all the attendant costs to industry and individuals, to mistakenly reading a signal as a launch for nuclear retaliation.

Indeed, as the world becomes more and more dependent upon technology and, in particular, upon computer programs and thus upon computer programmers, and as interconnections between various parts of this complex computer intrastructure increase, what could have been minor failings can take on catastrophic proportions. Recognizing that ethical considerations are part of the intellectual core of engineering ought to change the way we teach ethics within computer science and decrease the likelihood of graduating perverse or indifferent engineers.

The phrase ‘teaching ethics to computer students’ implies for some a particular view of the relations between technological and scientific disciplines on the one hand and ethics on the other. It is a view readily found in most introductory engineering books where a chapter or a section on ethics is mandatory, but is at the end of the book or at least in a separate section, easily bypassed, relegated by its placement to a side issue, distinct from the ‘real business’ of engineering. It is a view that leaves opens the all-to-common response, ‘I’m not responsible for what people do with what I design.’ But if an engineer’s design invites harms and it need not, then, indeed, the engineer is responsible. A code is a contingent string, and no code must be written so as to cause harms. It may be written that way, for there are too many untoward variables for anyone to guard against. But it is incumbent upon engineers to do what they can to achieve the heuristic ideal of perfection, and it is incumbent upon us as educators to teach our students that they have an obligation, internal to the intellectual core of their discipline, to strive for that ideal.

AUTHOR
Paula Roberts
University of South Australia

ABSTRACT

On-line discussion groups represent a rich data repository for social scientists, as is reflected in rapidly increasing activity in cyber-research. Existing research ethics codes for the protection of participants (for example, Commonwealth of Australia, 1999) rest on four major principles; integrity (the ethical conduct of research), respect (the process of informed consent), beneficence (maximising the benefits for research participants) and justice (the fair distribution of the project’s burdens and benefits). These principles, deemed appropriate for human subjects research in the physical world, are now found wanting when applied to cyber-research, as is indicated by case studies of virtual research projects gone awry (Kling, 1996).

This paper applies these four ethical research principles to Kling’s case studies as a means of analysing the appropriateness of transferring existing codes to the very different social and technical environments of virtual space.

First principle: integrity
Thomas (in Kling, 1996) reports an undergraduate study involving an analysis of erotica files on electronic bulletin boards and Usenet postings obtained from the private files of users on a university computer system. System operators collected other data for the study and provided demographic details of users including position (faculty, staff, student) and department. Here the electronic context provided the researcher with access to a store of personal and potentially damaging information together with unknowing research subjects who displayed naive expectations of security and privacy which were easily breached by an inexperienced and unethical researcher aided by unethical systems operators and inadequate research supervision.

Second principle: respect for participants and the process of informed consent
King (in Kling 1996) describes a project (Finn & Lavitt 1994) which examined a nationally accessible sexual-abuse-survivors support group. Data was down-loaded for analysis and publication, bypassing the vital ethical principle of gaining informed consent, with the researcher later justifying his actions by arguing that messages posted on an electronic bulletin board system are public information. This case reveals the blurred distinction of the private and public in cyberspace and highlights the disinhibiting effect of computer-mediated communication with its potential for damaging public exposure when researchers objectify their subjects and devalue their personal information (Shrum 1995).

Schrum argues that collectivities that emerge around sensitive topics should be viewed as closed groups because of their vulnerability and susceptibility to damage, and where even sensitive participant observation can be disastrous to participants’ on-line experiences, as Reid (1996) describes in her case study.

The process of informed consent protects the right of subjects to choose whether or not to participate in a study after being informed of its parameters and possible benefits or harms, and to withdraw from the study at any time. But gaining informed consent is made difficult by the shifting population of on-line groups, and where age and possible vulnerability are masked by anonymity, which may compromise both research validity and the safety of participants, who mostly are unaware that their personal data will be stored for an indefinite period in an electronic medium dependent for its security on system administrators (Reid 1996).

Third principle: beneficence, maximising benefits for the participants
As a benefit, the convenience of on-line communication may offer access to those who would otherwise be precluded from taking part in a study, and e-mail interviews make possible quick responses and clarification of concepts, thus allowing participants greater insights into the purposes and processes of the research than is possible in one-off, face-to-face interviews (Murray & Sixsmith 1998). However, the constantly changing membership of on-line communities complicates efforts to conduct debriefings and follow-up research which are necessary in order to assess the long-term benefits or harm to subjects.

Fourth principle: justice in sharing the project’s benefits and burdens
While cyber-research may provide greater inclusivity for participants in research, thereby giving them a voice (Hewson et al. 1996), the principle of justice bears directly on the selection and recruitment of participants where it is only just and right to ensure that subjects are selected for reasons directly related to the problem being studied, instead of for their easy availability, compromised position, or potential for manipulation.

While these are issues for physical as well as virtual settings, participants in on-line communities may be compromised by their easy availability and, in view of the global, social and economic disparity in Internet access and usage, achieving a fair distribution of the burden and rewards of on-line research may be impossible.

Conclusion: ‘Bottom-up’ ethical wisdom for computer-mediated social research
In these early developmental stages of an emergent cyber-research paradigm, it is imperative that a code of ethics encompass the diversity of cyber research sites and researcher goals, the complexities of the electronic medium in the generation and storage of research data, and the effects of the medium on the behaviour and expectations of research participants.

The problem of how private data can be differentiated from public data, when all data exist in the same transparent electronic medium, may remain a question to be resolved by the ethical judgement of the individual researcher, as may the selection of research participants, for although it is possible to join an on-line discussion surreptitiously for research purposes, it is no more appropriate than taping a conversation without permission (Shrum 1995).

The efficacy of developing a code of ethics for cyber-research is challenged by some theorists. Waskul & Douglass (1996) point out that ethical codes systemise ethical considerations and provide guidelines for the researcher, but are not safe havens to hide from the responsibility of making sound ethical choices.

Likewise, Allen (1996) argues that reliance on ethical guidelines may inhibit a ‘bottom up’ ethical wisdom, which is dependent for its development on concrete experience and the ethical work of everyday life rather than abstract rules (Bakhtin 1993). Allen suggests also that researchers should be required to report on the conditions that grounded their ethical choices and the consequences for their subjects of these choices.

It may be that these open reflections are the best way of building an understanding in the scholarly and wider community of the complexities of cyber-research and its ethical conduct.

REFERENCES

Allen, C. (1996) What’s wrong with the ‘Golden Rule’? Conundrums of conducting ethical research in cyberspace, The Information Society. 12:175-187.

Bakhtin, M.M. (1993) Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Austin, University of Texas Press.

Commonwealth of Australia (1999) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans. Canberra, ACT. AusInfo Publishing.

Finn, J. & Lavitt, M. (1994) Computer-based self-help groups for sexual abuse survivors, Social Work with Groups, 17: 21-46.

Hewson, C.M., Laurent, D. & Vogel, C.M. (1996). Proper methodologies for psychological and sociological studies conducted via the Internet. Behavioral Research Methods, Instruments and Computers, 28(2): 186-191.

King, S. A. (1996) Researching Internet communities: Proposed ethical guidelines for the reporting of results, The Information Society. 12:119-127.

Kling, R. (1996) Special edition on Internet Research Information Society 12.

Murray, C. D. & Sixsmith, J. (1998) E-mail: A qualitative research medium for interviewing? International Journal of Social Research Methodology 1(2): 103-121.

Reid, E. (1996) Informed consent in the study of on-line communities: A reflection on the effects of computer-mediated social research, The Information Society. 12:169-174.

Schrum, L. (1995) Framing the debate: Ethical research in the information age, Qualitative Inquiry, 1(3): 311-326.

Thomas, J. (1996) When cyberresearch goes awry: The ethics of the Rimm ‘Cyberporn’ Study, The Information Society. 12:189-198.

Waskul, D. & Douglass, M. (1996) Considering the electronic participant: Some polemical observations on the ethics of on-line research. The Information Society. 12: 129-139.

AUTHOR
Paula Roberts and Jenny Webber
University of South Australia

ABSTRACT

Losses due to computer break-ins by malicious outsiders or disgruntled employees are estimated to cost companies billions of dollars each year (Taylor 1999), but the detection and prosecution of these intruders is difficult because companies subjected to security break-ins are often oblivious to such damage, while others who do detect breaches of their information systems choose not to disclose such events, fearing the commercial damage associated with loss of consumer confidence once weaknesses in corporate computer systems are revealed.

Behar (1997) notes that security issues have come into sharper focus as greater corporate dependence on e-mail and networks has been matched by increasing amounts of economic espionage from ‘crackers’, that is, malicious intruders. This increased vulnerability to attack has been paralleled by government requirements that companies take responsibility for keeping their own data secure, and be held liable for losses incurred by ‘downstream’ companies damaged by the host company’s lax computer security.

Some former hackers from the heyday of thrill-seeking computer break-ins are now assisting system operators to establish and maintain sound security practices by testing system vulnerability with their own specialised knowledge, thus helping to foil the activities of the malicious, criminal ‘crackers’ (Sprenger 2000).

Taylor (1999) believes this hacker expertise is needed because a knowledge gap has developed in the security industry as computer programming has moved from a craft-based practice, (typically that of the early creative, if less-than-disciplined hackers), to a scientific reliance on standardised procedures. Deficiencies in computer security reveal problems caused by a similar change in computing education, reflected in an under-valuing of practical knowledge of system vulnerability gained by experimental, hands-on experience. Taylor argues that crackers take advantage of this situation and simply use trivial holes left by inexperienced programmers who have not been taught the limitations of system security.

But the use of hackers by the security industry begs the ethical question of whether hackers who have developed their skill by breaking into organizational systems should now be used for the rightful purpose of strengthening computer security.

However, it could be argued that these former hackers display an ethos, not imposed by professional codes of conduct, but one based on an intrinsic set of values and beliefs, inspired by an inherent respect for computers and the information computers contain, which is accompanied by an abhorence for those who do not share this respect. The practical application of this ethos is displayed, when, for no apparent pecuniary gain, hackers have spent considerable time in obsessively tracking down malicious intruders and bringing them to account for the damage they have caused, not only to organizations, but to the ethos of the former hacking fraternity (Stoll 1991; Shimomura 1996).

Developing ethical sensitivity in a community of practice
Roush (1995) cites the hacker, ‘Knightmare’, who in his book, Secrets of a Super Hacker, defines an ethos of mature, ‘responsible’ hacking, explained as ‘never harming any computer, software, system or person, nor profiting from a “hack”, but instead informing computer managers of their systems’ weaknesses’. Thus a ‘true hacker’ has ‘the ability to steal money, information, software, and hardware and to commit sabotage and espionage, but chooses to do none of these things’ (Roush 1995:35).

This passion for their computing craft in a hacker community of elitist computing skill was accompanied by a contempt for government and corporate computer systems which, in the hackers’ view, constituted a misuse of information technology by contradicting the constitutional rights of citizens with respect to the freedom of information. Thus the hacker ethos has reflected both an intrinsic desire to preserve and extend its own conduct and expertise, and an external motivation to attack and expose the vulnerability of institutionalised computer data systems.

Blum (1994: 146) discusses the relationship between virtue and community in the writings of MacIntyre (1984: 194) who states ‘the essential function of the virtues is clear. Without them, without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of institutions’ (1984: 194). Blum argues that virtues can only be learned and sustained in a community of practice. Thus, the ethics of virtue are not an alternative, but are complementary to the ethics of universality, that is, while based upon universal ethical principles, the commonly held views of the practice community are indigenous and characteristic to its particular activities.

Furthermore Blum argues, ‘a practice, like a profession, is characterized as much by the way its participants conduct themselves as in the skills they develop and the purposes to which they are committed’. Therefore, if hacking is perceived by hackers as an elite practice, with internal goals and standards which are pursued in a moral way for their own sake, then a member of the hacking practice-community would be expected only ever to apply their elite technical expertise to responsible hacking, and not to malicious cracking. Members would also be required to track down and expose deviates (crackers), who by their behaviour were damaging both the integrity of the practice-community, and the wider society.

Such virtuous hacking stems from an earlier craft-like bricoleur approach to computer programming. This holistic approach to computing explains hacking’s lasting appeal to subsequent generations and is the strongest reason why hacking is likely to survive in some form or another, even as programming develops towards more science-based methods (Taylor 1999:88).

There are parallels here in the training of artisans in the guilds of pre-industrial times, a training embedded in the craftsman/apprentice relationship which encouraged not only a transfer of skills but also the development and then guardianship of the ethos of the craft for future generations.

Thus, contemporary computing ‘apprentices’ should be assisted in developing a moral sensitivity for the systems they use and the safety of the information which computers store, at the same time that computing expertise develops. This skills/ethics dichotomy presents a strong argument for an integrated approach to the teaching of computing ethics in mainstream computing subjects (Roberts 1994; Roberts & Webber 1999) so that computing skill development is matched by the development of a moral sensitivity for the social responsibility that skill entails.

REFERENCES

Behar, R. (1997) ‘Who’s reading your e-mail’. Time, February 3, 64-67.

Blum, L.A. (1994) Moral Perception and Particularity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MacIntyre, A.C. (1984) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd Edn. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.

Roberts, P.M. (1994) ‘The place and pedagogy of teaching ethics in the computing curriculum’ Australian Educational Computing, April.

Roberts, P.M. & Webber, J. (1999) ‘Visual Truth in the Digital Age: Towards a Protocol for Image Ethics’ Australian Computer Journal, 31, 3:78-82.

Roush, W. (1995) ‘Hackers: Taking a byte out of computer crime’. Technology Review, April: 32-40.

Shimomura, T. (with Markoff, J.) (1996) Take-Down: The Pursuit and Capture of Kevin Mitnick, America’s Most Wanted Computer Outlaw – By the Man Who Did It. New York: Hyperion.

Sprenger, P. (2000) ‘Tiger teammates, hacking bright’ Information Age, August/September: 32.

Stoll, C. (1991) The Cuckoo’s Egg. New York: Doubleday.

Taylor, P.A. (1999) Hackers: Crime in the Digital Sublime. London & New York: Routledge.

AUTHOR

Helen Richardson
Information Systems Research Centre
University of Salford

ABSTRACT

We are said to be living in a new economy, a virtual age where information is power and strategic use of Information Technology paramount. Electronic media can enable organisations to deliver products and services more efficiently and effectively allowing for competitive advantage through internal networks and external customer management (Loebbecke 1998). In this context CRM is the new buzz phrase. CRM systems are about ‘allowing organisations to do a better job in contacting customers, caring for them and providing quality, service and value’ (Yourdon 2000). CRM is increasingly about use of call centres and Datamonitor predicts that the global call centre software market will reach £5.3bn by 2003 (FT 2000). CRM is not without it’s critics. It is popular for those ‘managing’ customers but can stimulate different emotions if you are the ‘managed’. Indeed CRM often raises issues of privacy and accusations of exploitation – ‘where is the R in CRM – it’s all about customer management’ (Professor Stone in FT 2000). There are startling contrasts in the image of CRM systems in call centres. For the consultants and employers, they mean knowledge intensive, strategic use of technology, flexible working and utility of all those new ways of working like flattened organisations, teamwork and empowerment. For others, they are the ‘sweatshops of the 21st century’ (Belt et al 2000).

This paper catalogues the rise and rise of call centres in the NW of England, UK. Ironically these are often housed in the old mills and engineering shops once foremost in the industrial revolution but long since idle. That is until the ‘virtual’ age and we consider whether this is indeed the new economic era heralding the information economy accompanied by new ways of working, or history repeating itself. Call centre work is characterised by temporary, short-term contracts, agency working and casual employment. Nevertheless, in our research, we shadow 4 call centre workers over a period of 2 years to report on their work experience in a number of centres. We catalogue their tales of stress, burn out, sacking, job changes and frustration but also the community, solidarity and collective action that suggest a more rosy future than the ‘dark satanic call centre mills’ seems to offer. The ethical issues we raise lie in the inherent contradiction of CRM systems and their use in call centres. We consider communication richness, privacy, management techniques and general problems of computer ethics in an organisational context.

Even for managers, CRM raises questions of privacy with IT strategic guerrilla’s locking in systems and knowledge of others in the value chain. For call centre workers, issues of privacy are tied up with work practices. Headsets are worn with call after call streaming in – always another one waiting. CRM systems means codifying intellectual capital with software providing ‘scripts’ enabling monitoring and call analysis. This metaphorically, if not physically, welds the worker and machine into a streamlined and controlled knowledge system. No aspect of a call centre workers day is unaccounted for. They are profiled, listened in to, their opening remarks are analysed as are wrap-up time and phrases used. Their sales content of the conversation, achievement of call numbers and sales targets scrutinised. Their off-line frequency, intimate toilet habits are considered and discussed at teamwork supervision sessions as are perceived attitudes displayed during conversations with customers. Ethical issues of workplace privacy generally centre around concepts of personal autonomy and dignity infringed by these practices, yet some would suggest workplace privacy should extend further, worthy of becoming a matter of organisational justice (Introna 1999). CRM rhetoric emphasises quality customer care and how this is related to effective communication, by particularly the gatekeepers – a role delivered by call centre workers. This leads us to a general discussion of communication richness in an organisational context that goes beyond considering Information Communication Technologies merely as information transferors and processors, but constitute new statuses and formation of new identities (Flores 1998). Others have suggested that ‘good’ management should adopt rich media (Ngwenyama and Lee 1997) and how limiting electronic media is in it’s richness. Nevertheless our research reveals how call centre staff circumvent the scripts and controlled phrases and rich human communication and problem solving makes the job more satisfying. This is despite facing frequent and sustained verbal abuse from customers.

We then explore issues of CRM system use in call centres and the adoption of teamwork and empowerment management techniques. Again contradictions are evident with CRM systems designed to dis-empower sales staff. Our qualitative research reports on the ways in which sales roles changed in the 2 years of our study. To start the process of ethical decision making, some have suggested that ‘when it comes to virtual organisations, we must first have a set of commonly accepted values and norms’ (Gotterbarn 1999). We look at the realities of using teamwork and empowerment techniques in call centres and suggest that the gap is too wide between call centre workers and management for this to be achieved. Teamwork sessions in our study included dissemination of orders from the top down and attempts to exert team pressure on the ‘weakest link’. Often these measures backfired with general community solidarity of call centre workers overriding team identity. In an extreme case, headsets were taken off until old shift patterns were restored but more often management techniques were side-stepped, exposed and ridiculed.

We have talked about the contradictions of call centres and CRM systems. They are exploitative and work against communication richness. They increase bureaucracy yet supposedly embrace empowerment. They are about control of communication and yet to provide quality to customers, need to enhance the ”company ambassadorial” role of call centre workers (Frenkel et al 1999). Computer ethics and its adherence to technological determinism and liberalism are problematic for understanding issues of equality and participation (Adam 1999), and moreover power structures play a large part in the making and accepting of knowledge (Adam and Richardson 2000). In this context it is our contention that a debate on the ethical issues of CRM systems, information management and call centres is long overdue.

REFERENCES

Adam A (1999) Computer Ethics in a different voice in The Proceedings of the 1st Critical Management Conference. Manchester July 1999

Adam A, Richardson H (2000) Feminist Philosophy and Information Systems (under review)

Belt V, Richardson R, Webster J (2000) Women’s work in the Information Economy: the case of telephone call centres Information Communication and Society 3:3 2000

FT. (2000) Understanding CRM FT Financial Times. Spring 2000 www.ft.com/crm/

Flores F (1998) Information Technology and the institution of identity Information Technology and People Vol 11 no 4 1998

Frenkel S, Korczynski M, Shire K, Tam M (1999) On the Front Line: Organisation of Work in the Information Economy (Cornel University Press)

Gotterbarn D (1999) An ethical decision support tool in The proceedings of the 4th ETHICOMP conference 1999

Introna L (1999) Privacy, autonomy and workplace surveillance in The proceedings of the 4th ETHICOMP conference 1999

Loebbecke C (1998) Economics of content provision on the Internet in The proceedings of the 8th Annual BIT conference. Manchester November 1999

Ngwenyama O.K., and Lee A.S, (1997) Communication richness in e-mail MISQ Vol 21 No 2 June 1997

Yourdon E (2000) Introduction to the special issue on CRM Cutter Journal Vol 13 No 10 October 2000